Easton v. Hurita

• Citation: 625 P.2d 1290,290 Or. 689
• Decision Date: 06 September 1965
• Docket Number: No. C-7,C-7
• Parties: Thomas EASTON, Petitioner, v. Robert E. HURITA, Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

Page 1290

625 P.2d 1290

290 Or. 689

Thomas EASTON, Petitioner, v. Robert E. HURITA, Respondent.

No. C-79-6-65; CA 16874; SC 27346.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 7, 1981.

Decided March 24, 1981.

Thomas Easton, Willamina, in pro per.

William Gary, Deputy Sol. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James E. Brown, Atty. Gen., John R. McCulloch, Jr., Sol. Gen., and Patrick N. Rothwell, Certified Law Student, Salem.

Before DENECKE, C. J., and TONGUE, LENT, LINDE, PETERSON and TANZER, JJ.

TONGUE, Justice.

This is an action for damages for false imprisonment arising as a result of plaintiff's arrest for a minor traffic offense. It presents the question whether a police officer who stops a person for a minor traffic offense can not only place that person under arrest, but also put him in jail, rather than give him a citation and then release him, when the maximum penalty for the infraction is a fine of $250.

More specifically, however, the question presented for decision is whether plaintiff's complaint alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for false imprisonment. Defendant's demurrer to those allegations of plaintiff's complaint was sustained by the trial court. The resulting judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion. 48 Or.App. 222, 617 P.2d 974 (1980). ¹ We allowed plaintiff's petition for review to consider and decide these questions.

The pertinent allegations of the second cause of action in plaintiff's amended complaint, to which defendant's demurrer was sustained, are as follows:

"On May 30, 1979, defendant was employed by the Oregon State Police as a corporal and located in Gold Beach, Curry County, Oregon.

" * * *

"At said time and place defendant, acting outside the scope of his employment by disregarding ORS chapter 484, intentionally, wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously placed plaintiff under a full custody arrest for a minor traffic infraction by causing plaintiff to be lodged in the Curry County Jail in Gold Beach, Oregon."

The essence of these allegations is that a police officer made a full custody arrest of the plaintiff for a minor traffic offense and then put the plaintiff in jail.

As held by this court in Knight v. Baker, 117 Or. 492, 495-96, 244 P. 543 (1926):

" 'In order to establish the offense of false imprisonment, it is only necessary on behalf of the plaintiff to show the imprisonment. After this is done, the law presumes it unlawful until the contrary is shown, and it is a settled rule that he need not prove malice, nor want of probable cause.' "

To the same effect, see Brown v. Meier & Frank Co., 160 Or. 608, 614-15, 86 P.2d 79 (1939). See also Christ v. McDonald, 152 Or. 494, 500, 504, 52 P.2d 655 (1935); Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or. 230, 244, 315 P.2d 558, 348 P.2d 239 (1957), and Pearson v. Galvin, 253 Or. 331, 337, 454 P.2d 638 (1969). Cf. McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978).

As held, however, in Brown v. Meier & Frank Co., supra, 160 Or. at 615, 86 P.2d 79:

" 'When, however, the plaintiff by his own evidence shows that he was detained or imprisoned as a result of judicial proceedings, and by the issuance and execution of a warrant or other legal process issued thereon, he is required, in order to make a prima facie case of false imprisonment, to show something more than a mere detention or imprisonment.' "

The question thus arises whether it appears from the allegations of this complaint that plaintiff's detention and imprisonment was the result of legal process of such a nature as to carry with it a presumption of validity which plaintiff was required to overcome by the allegation of additional facts.

It is contended by the Attorney General, appearing on behalf of defendant police officer, that ORS 484.100(1) creates such a presumption of validity. That statute provides:

"A police officer may arrest or issue a citation to a person for a traffic offense at any place within the jurisdictional authority of the governmental unit by which he is authorized to act." (Emphasis added)

The Attorney General then cites Restatement 2d Torts, § 118, Comment B, for the rule that:

"Where a privilege to arrest exists, it justifies not only the confinement but also any conduct which is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest."

and says that:

"Defendant's demurrer was * * * based on the privilege set forth rule in Restatement 2d Torts, § 118, Comment B."

Based upon these authorities, the state contends that:

"Thus, on its face, plaintiff's complaint established defendant's privilege to confine and the demurrer was properly sustained."

It would appear upon a reading of ORS 484.100 as a whole that its purpose was to define the place where an officer may make arrests for traffic offenses, not to confer authority upon them to make such arrests.

ORS 484.350(4), however, provides that:

"A police officer may exercise the authority granted by ORS 133.310 and 484.100 to arrest an individual for a traffic infraction."

ORS 133.310 provides:

"(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed:

" * * *

"(b) Any other offense in the officer's presence."

It would therefore appear that ORS 484.350(4) and ORS 133.310 grant police officers the authority to arrest a person for a minor traffic offense. ² The question remains, however, whether it follows from the power of an officer to arrest a person for a traffic infraction that the officer also has power to put in jail a person arrested for a traffic infraction when the maximum penalty for such an infraction is a fine of $250. (ORS 484.360).

Plaintiff appears to contend that there is a distinction between the authority of an officer to arrest a person for a minor traffic infraction and his authority to put such a person in jail. He relies upon the provisions of ORS 484.435(1), which provides as follows:

"Searches and seizures otherwise authorized by law incidental to an arrest shall not be authorized if the arrest is on a charge of committing a Class B, C or D traffic infraction unless the arrest is a full custody arrest in which the person arrested is to be lodged in jail, and the decision to place the person arrested under full custody arrest is based upon specific articulable facts justifying his being lodged in jail rather than being given a traffic citation as provided in this chapter and released." (Emphasis added)

The Attorney General answers this contention as follows on behalf of the defendant:

"Firstly, there is no indication in the record that defendant Hurita did not have 'specific articulable facts' to arrest plaintiff. Secondly, such a standard is not applicable to plaintiff's arrest since no issue of search and seizure was presented. The 'specific articulable facts' language comes from ORS 484.435(1) which deals with search and seizure."

In response, plaintiff contends that "specific articulable facts" are required by the provisions of ORS 484.435(1) before a person can be lodged in jail for a minor traffic offense, and that his complaint was thus sufficient against defendant's demurrer because the burden was on defendant to allege and prove facts justifying putting the plaintiff in jail.

Upon examination of ORS 484.435(1), we find that its provisions are somewhat ambiguous. In such a case we believe that it is our duty to interpret such a statute in such a manner as to be consistent with the intention of the legislature as expressed in the legislative history of the statute and in the policy expressed by it in the enactment of other statutes, and also in such a manner as to avoid any serious constitutional problems and to be consistent with previous decisions by this court.

We first review recent decisions of this court which have discussed the authority of police officers to detain persons for minor traffic offenses under Oregon's 1975 revision of the Motor Vehicle Code, which sought to decriminalize minor traffic infractions and, in doing so, removed many of the constitutional safeguards afforded defendants in criminal prosecutions.

In Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977), this court examined the revised Motor Vehicle Code to determine whether driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), though denominated as a "traffic infraction," was in fact still criminal in nature and was to be afforded constitutional safeguards guaranteed defendants in criminal prosecutions. In answering that question, we examined various indicia of criminal offenses, including the use of arrest and detention by police. We said (at p. 108, 570 P.2d 52):

"Of course a traffic offender must be subject to being stopped, compare ORS 131.605-131.615, and in the case of apparent intoxication prevented from resuming his driving. Often that could be accomplished by other means. But detention beyond the needs of identifying, citing, and protecting the individual or "grounding" him, especially detention for trial unless bail is made, comports with criminal rather than with civil procedure and is surely so perceived by the public." (Emphasis added)

We also said (at p. 108, n. 16, 570 P.2d 52):

"Of course this single element does not turn all traffic offenses into criminal prosecutions. We feel safe in assuming that it is more important to the legislative scheme of the Oregon Vehicle Code to decriminalize traffic infractions than to retain the incompatible aspects of 'full custody' detention for those offenses that otherwise are effectively decriminalized." (Emphasis added)

It is also of interest to note that Holman, J., dissenting in Brown, said (at 114, 570 P.2d 52) that:

"No person may constitutionally be held to answer to a civil charge in lieu of bail, and such a provision is patently unenforceable."

We again discussed the propriety of detaining a person for a...