Dixon v. The Hallmark Companies, Inc.

Decision Date09 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 10-10047,10-10047
Citation627 F.3d 849
PartiesDaniel DIXON, Mary Sharon Dixon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE HALLMARK COMPANIES, INC., Hallmark Management, Inc., Christina Saunders, Norine Lewis, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
627 F.3d 849

Daniel DIXON, Mary Sharon Dixon, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE HALLMARK COMPANIES, INC., Hallmark Management, Inc., Christina Saunders, Norine Lewis, Defendants-Appellees.


No. 10-10047.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.


Dec. 9, 2010.

627 F.3d 852

Mary E. McAlister, Liberty Counsel, David M. Corry, Lynchburg, VA, Horatio G. Mihet, Orlando, FL, Anita Leigh Staver, Maitland, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellants.

Michael J. Obringer, Marshall, Dennehey, Michael Fox Orr, Jacksonville, FL, for The Hallmark Companies, Inc.

Steven J. Edelstain, Norcross, GA, Michael J. Obringer, Marshall, Dennehey, Michael Fox Orr, Jacksonville, FL, for Saunders, Lewis, Hallmark Management, Inc.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and COAR, * District Judge.

COAR, District Judge:

Mary Sharon and Daniel Dixon appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment to their former employer, Hallmark Management, Inc., on their claims of religious discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and retaliation and housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3606, 3617. For the reasons explained below, we vacate and remand the district court's award of summary judgment on the Dixons' Title VII intentional discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Dixons' FHA and Title VII retaliation claims.

I.

Appellants Mary Sharon Dixon and Daniel Dixon, a husband-and-wife team, were respectively the on-site property manager and maintenance technician at Thornwood Terrace Apartments, a rental

627 F.3d 853
complex owned by Appellee Hallmark Management, Inc. Previously, the Dixons had worked for Hallmark at two other apartment complexes-Rosemont and Devonshire. As part of their compensation at Thornwood, the Dixons were permitted to live rent-free in an apartment adjacent to the complex's management office.

The clash between the Dixons' religious beliefs and Hallmark's employment policies began as early as their employment at Rosemont. Ms. Dixon was informed that, under Hallmark's policy, she could not display religious items in the management office. She objected to this policy initially at Rosemont, and later at Thornwood.

As a recipient of federal funds in the form of rental assistance under the United States Department of Agriculture's rural development program, Thornwood is subject to periodic inspections by the USDA. On the date of one such inspection, the Dixons' supervisor, Christina Saunders, visited the rental office. During her visit, she noticed that the Dixons had hung on the wall a 26" by 50" picture of flowers with the words, "Remember the Lilies… Matthew 6:28." With Hallmark's religious-display policy in mind, Saunders asked Ms. Dixon whether "Matthew 6:28" was a Bible citation. Ms. Dixon confirmed that it was. Saunders, in response, directed Ms. Dixon to remove the artwork from the wall. Saunders later testified that she believed that displaying the artwork violated the FHA, and she feared that she could lose her job if Hallmark was found to be in violation of the Act.

Rather than immediately removing the artwork, Ms. Dixon stated that she wanted to talk first with her husband, who was absent from the office at the time. According to Saunders, Ms. Dixon "made it clear that picture was not going to come down" and left the office. Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., No. 3:08-cv-620-J-25HTS, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Dec. 9, 2009). Once Ms. Dixon left, Saunders called her own supervisor, Norine Cole-Lewis. Cole-Lewis instructed her to remove the picture from the wall herself and to make sure that the Dixons understood the fair housing laws. Saunders complied.

When Ms. Dixon returned to the rental office with her husband, a dispute ensued, and Saunders ultimately fired both Mr. and Ms. Dixon. According to Saunders, Ms. Dixon was angry and asked why the picture was removed, and Mr. Dixon attempted to re-hang it. Mr. Dixon denies this. Saunders testified that she told Mr. Dixon he would be fired if he put the picture back on the wall. Hallmark maintains that the Dixons were fired for insubordination because they argued with Saunders and insisted on re-hanging their artwork. At some point during the dispute, Ms. Dixon retrieved a picture of Jesus from her apartment and held the picture close to Saunders, asking if it offended her. Although the timeline is not entirely clear, it appears that this incident occurred after Ms. Dixon was fired. The Dixons claim that, although Mr. Dixon took no actions regarding the picture and said nothing at all, Saunders terminated him, stating, "You're fired, too. You're too religious." Saunders denies that she made this comment. Regardless, Saunders instructed the Dixons to vacate the building within 72 hours.

The Dixons filed a lawsuit against Hallmark, alleging that Hallmark violated Title VII by intentionally discriminating against them, failing to accommodate their sincerely held religious beliefs, and retaliating against them. The Dixons also asserted claims of retaliation and housing discrimination in violation of the FHA.

Hallmark moved for summary judgment on all of the Dixons' claims, and the court

627 F.3d 854
granted Hallmark's motion. The court held that, assuming Saunders in fact said, "You're fired, too. You're too religious," that comment did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination with respect to either Ms. or Mr. Dixon. The court noted that the comment alleged was not "You're fired, too because you're too religious" and explained that the context did not support such an interpretation. After rejecting the Dixons' Title VII intentional discrimination and retaliation claims, the court also granted summary judgment on their failure-to-accommodate claim, concluding that it was unclear whether the Dixons held a sincere religious belief regarding the removal of their artwork. Finally, the court rejected the Dixons' FHA claims, concluding that § 3604(b) did not cover the Dixons, and even if § 3606 did, the failure of the Dixons' employment discrimination claim required the dismissal of their housing discrimination claim as well. The Dixons now appeal.

II.

The Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the moving party. Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir.2009). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Further, "[i]f reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

III.

A plaintiff in a Title VII case can establish a claim of intentional discrimination by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir.2010). The Dixons present direct evidence and argue that they have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hallmark intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their religious beliefs. We agree. Contrary to the district court's holding, the Dixons' direct evidence is sufficient to carry their intentional discrimination claim past summary judgment.

Direct evidence of discrimination is "evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or presumption." Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir.2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under Eleventh Circuit law, "only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimination." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The district court held that no reasonable jury could conclude from Saunders's alleged comment, "You're fired, too. You're too religious," that the Dixons were fired because of their religion. In reaching that conclusion, the court placed particular emphasis on its observation that the comment alleged was not "You're fired too because you're too religious." Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., No...

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