Catlett v. Missouri State Highway Com'n

• Citation: 627 F. Supp. 1015
• Decision Date: 13 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 78-4061-CV-C.,78-4061-CV-C.
• Parties: Jane CATLETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

627 F. Supp. 1015

Jane CATLETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

No. 78-4061-CV-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division.

December 13, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa Van Amburg, Karen Plax, Raytown, Mo., for plaintiffs.

John Gladden, Asst. Counsel, Paula Lambrcht, Asst. Counsel, Missouri Highway & Transp. Com'n, Jefferson City, Mo., for defendants.

ORDER

SCOTT O. WRIGHT, Chief Judge.

This is a class action sex discrimination case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The Court previously ordered the suit to be severed into separate trials on the issues of (a) liability and (b) prospective equitable relief, monetary damages and attorneys' fees. In its order of December 5, 1983, the Court found defendants liable under Title VII for sex discrimination against the four individually-named plaintiffs for failure to hire them as maintenance crew members, and liable for sex discrimination against the class in recruitment and hiring since 1975. Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Com'n, 589 F.Supp. 929 (W.D.Mo.1983) (Catlett I).

Pending before the Court are the parties' motions for summary judgment on various issues concerning remedial relief pursuant to Title VII. There is no genuine issue as to the following material facts, and so under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 summary judgment is appropriate on the following specified issues.

I. TITLE VII MONETARY RELIEF

A. Back Pay for Individually-named Plaintiffs

Defendants argue that because the jury verdict was adverse to the four named plaintiffs on their § 1983 claim, remedial relief for those plaintiffs would be improper. For two reasons, the Court disagrees.

First, the defendants have not previously raised this issue of collateral estoppel. Thus, the Court is faced with the identical problem presented to the Eighth Circuit in Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Mo., 729 F.2d 541, 549 n. 11 (8th Cir.1984). There, as here, "counsel for all parties seem to have assumed that the court would make its own finding on the issue of discrimination, whichever way the jury verdict went on the § 1983 case." In Goodwin the court refused to apply res judicata against the Circuit Court. Defendants also cite Brooks v. Carnation Pet Food Company, No. 84-6105-CV-SJ-6 (W.D.Mo., Sept. 17, 1985) in support of their proposition. However, Judge Sachs distinguished the Goodwin case by noting that defendant Carnation Pet Food Company had raised the argument that the court is bound by estoppel in its proposed conclusions of law. Id. at slip op. 4 n. 3. In the present case, defendants' proposed conclusions of law failed to raise this issue.

Secondly, even if defendants had timely raised this issue, remedial relief would still be appropriate. In Brooks, supra, the plaintiff's Title VII theory was one of disparate treatment, so the burden of establishing intentional discrimination was identical to that under § 1981. In the present case, the Court found evidence not only of disparate treatment but also disparate impact,¹ for which no intent need be established. Therefore, even if defendants' verdict on the § 1983 claim precluded a disparate treatment claim, the disparate impact claim would not be affected, and relief would be appropriate. Calculation of back pay is discussed infra.

B. Back Pay for Class Members

Excluding the individual plaintiffs, there are 161 claimants who seek back pay. Defendants seek to disqualify a number of class members on five different grounds: (1) lacked lightweight equipment experience; (2) lacked a valid Missouri driver's license; (3) stated no discrimination against them; (4) stated would not have accepted a job in maintenance had she been offered one; (5) no vacancies occurred within 20 miles of residence. During the remedial stage, the burden of proof is on defendants to demonstrate that individual applicants were denied employment for lawful reasons. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1868, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).

In Catlett I, supra at 933, the Court made a finding of fact that the basic requirements for initial hire into the maintenance job are an eighth-grade education and an ability to operate lightweight motor equipment. Plaintiffs concede that ten of the class members did not list such experience on their claim forms, but wish to add new information by affidavit at this time. The Court finds it would be inappropriate to consider this additional evidence. Therefore, the following class members were not qualified applicants and not entitled to relief:

Bailey, Aughty L Buehler, Staci L Farris, Debra Fowler, Debbie J. (Rodriquez) Garrett, Jayne L. (Warren) Lyons, Debbie J. (Deprender) Maxwell, Lorenzo P Meyer, Paula (Fannon) Rodgers, Janet L Stewart, Brenda.

The Court finds the remainder of defendants' attempts at disqualification to be specious. An applicant could readily obtain a Missouri driver's license, or if offered a job could relocate to live closer to the job site. Calculation of back pay for the remaining 151 members is discussed infra.

C. Calculation of Back Pay

1. Fringe benefits of mitigation

Plaintiffs are entitled to a back pay award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In light of Title VII's policy to make whole a victim of discrimination, the award of back pay should include not only the straight salary, but raises and fringe benefits as well. Rasimas v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 626 (6th Cir.1983); Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F.Supp. 1064, 1070 (E.D. Mo.1981). Fringe benefits should include sick leave, vacation pay, pension benefits and any other benefits the claimants should have received but for the discrimination.

Additionally, under § 2000e-5(g), the claimants' interim earnings are to be deducted from the awarded back pay. Fringe benefits should likewise be deducted as interim earnings. Defendants argue that unemployment benefits or workmen's compensation should also be deducted. However, such benefits have been deemed by the Court to be a collateral source, and should not be deducted. Donovan v. George Lai Contracting, Ltd., No. 84-4154-CV-C-5 (W.D.Mo. July, 1985). See also Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 83 (3rd Cir.1983); Rasimas, supra at 627.

Thus, for the individually-named plaintiffs, each should be awarded back pay and lost fringe benefits from the date she was deprived of the use of those monies when the Highway Department hired a comparable male in her place. This amount will then be offset by that plaintiff's actual earnings and fringe benefits during the same time period.

2. Formula for Class Members

All parties agree that class-wide relief would be most appropriate in this case as explained in Hameed v. Ironworkers, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.1980). However, the Hameed formula, id. at 520, must be adapted in this case to account for the discriminatory recruitment process. In its earlier findings of fact, Catlett I, 589 F.Supp. at 934, the Court determined the expected number of female hires for the years 1975-79. The Court presented figures for both a moderate and conservative definition of women expected to be hired.² While defendants argue it would be punitive to apply anything but the conservative definition, the Court finds that the moderate definition would best fulfill Title VII's statutory purpose of making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. Therefore, back pay calculations will be based on thirty-eight vacancies.³ From these figures, the number of females actually hired should be subtracted, to equal the number of vacancies for which back pay must be calculated.

The next step is to assign the 151 remaining class members to subclasses based upon the year in which they applied for maintenance crew member positions. The number of vacancies for that year will be multiplied by the amount of money those positions would have yielded to date,⁴ less the average interim earnings (as opposed to the highest interim earnings) of those class members during the relevant time period. The money will then be divided equally among the members of that year's subclass.

3. Pre-judgment Interest

Plaintiffs contend they should be granted an award of pre-judgment interest on any award of back pay and fringe benefits. Plaintiffs cite numerous cases where this Court and others have used their discretion to allow pre-judgment interest.⁵ However, all these cases deal with private sector employers, not the government as employer. The general rule when claims against the government are involved is that interest is proscribed absent express statutory or contractual authorization. Saunders v. Claytor, 629 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1980).

Plaintiffs cite no state or federal statute authorizing prejudgment interest. They do argue that, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, when Congress extended Title VII benefits to public employees, Congress intended them to receive the same rights as extended to private sector employees. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 1950, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976). However, numerous courts have since interpreted this section not to include the right to pre-judgment interest. Saunders v. Claytor, supra, at 598; Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C.1980); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 925 (3rd Cir. 1977).

While neither party has cited a case directly on point where interest was granted or denied in a Title VII case against a state agency as employer, defendants' argument is more persuasive since the state is clearly more analogous to the federal government than to private sector employers. Therefore, the Court finds that "other equitable relief" as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 does not include pre-judgment interest.

4. Special Master

While plaintiffs contend a special master should be appointed to...