Ferren v. General Motors Corp., Delco Battery Div.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-083,91-083
• Citation: 628 A.2d 265,137 N.H. 423
• Parties: Dennis FERREN, Jr., and Judith Ferren v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION DELCO BATTERY DIVISION.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 265

628 A.2d 265

137 N.H. 423

Dennis FERREN, Jr., and Judith Ferren v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION DELCO BATTERY DIVISION.

No. 91-083.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 15, 1993.

Cullity, Kelley & McDowell, Manchester (Joseph F. McDowell, III on the brief and orally), for plaintiffs.

Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, Concord (Steven J. McAuliffe on the brief and orally), and Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston, MA (Arthur G. Telegen and Michele A. Whitham on the brief), for defendant.

HORTON, Justice.

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (Stahl, J.) has certified the following questions of law for our consideration under Supreme Court Rule 34, concerning suit by Dennis and Judith Ferren (the Ferrens), New Hampshire residents, against General Motors Corporation (GMC) for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Mr. Ferren's exposure to lead dust while employed at GMC's Kansas plant:

"1. Whether the substantive law of New Hampshire or of Kansas governs this action;

2. If the substantive law of New Hampshire applies, whether the New Hampshire workers' compensation statutory framework bars plaintiffs' claims; and

3. Whether, and under what circumstances, New Hampshire would recognize the 'dual injury' exception to the New Hampshire's [sic ] workers' compensation bar."

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the substantive law of Kansas governs this action. Accordingly, we need not answer the remaining questions.

From 1961 through 1974, Dennis Ferren, Jr., worked at GMC's Olathe, Kansas plant, where he was exposed to lead dust during the battery-making process. In September 1989, fifteen years after his employment with GMC terminated, Mr. Ferren learned that he had lead poisoning and other diseases. The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire against GMC based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dennis Ferren sues for personal injuries arising out of his employment with GMC in Kansas. Mr. Ferren asserts that he did not learn of his illness or its relation to his employment until his diagnosis in 1989, and that GMC misrepresented and concealed the consequences of his lead exposure. Judith Ferren, Dennis' wife, sues for loss of consortium.

The Ferrens argue that New Hampshire law governs their action against GMC. They maintain that because they have resided in New Hampshire since 1974 and because Mr. Ferren discovered his illness while living in this State, these are "substantial connections" to the facts and issues of this case to render New Hampshire law applicable. In addition, the Ferrens argue that as a matter of policy, "[s]ince Kansas would not provide any type of remedy to the plaintiffs, [this court should] apply its own law in protecting citizens such as Dennis Ferren from the harsh results of Kansas law."

GMC contends that the case is governed by the Kansas workers' compensation statute because Mr. Ferren was an employee of GMC when he was exposed to lead-containing products while residing in Kansas and working in a Kansas battery-making plant pursuant to a contract of employment that arose entirely in Kansas. The fact that the plaintiffs moved to New Hampshire after the events giving rise to the lawsuit is, GMC argues, insufficient to apply New Hampshire law.

The choice-influencing considerations adopted by this court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), control the choice of law analysis. These considerations are: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the states in our federal system; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement by the court of its own state's governmental interests rather than those of other states; and (5) the court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law. Id. at 354-55, 222 A.2d at 208-09. "Obviously, some of them will be more relevant to some type of cases, less to other types." Id. at 353-54, 222 A.2d at 208.

The consideration of predictability of results "basically relates to consensual transactions, in which it is important that parties be able to know in advance what law will govern a transaction.... Reliance upon a predictable choice of law protects the justifiable expectations of the parties[, and] ... assures uniformity of decision regardless of forum." Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. at 354, 222 A.2d at 208. This factor "emphasizes the importance of applying to the parties' bargain or other dealings the law on which they agreed to rely at the outset." Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 131 N.H. 6, 17, 549 A.2d 1187, 1194 (1988). The underlying factual basis for this lawsuit is the employment relationship between GMC and Mr. Ferren. Surely, neither Mr. Ferren nor GMC contemplated that anything but Kansas law would govern their employment relationship, and therefore, this consideration weighs heavily in Kansas' favor.

The Ferrens argue that the predictability of results is better met with the application of New Hampshire law because the application of Kansas law will preclude them from recovery. Under the Kansas workers' compensation system, the Ferrens are barred from recovery because Mr. Ferren's illness manifested itself more than one year after his last employment-related exposure to lead dust. See Kan.Stat.Ann. § 44-5a01(c) (1986). The Ferrens contend that New Hampshire's discovery rule offers more protection to its residents and, therefore, ought to apply to this case. The appropriate focus, however, is not on the current status of the plaintiffs as residents of New Hampshire, but rather is on the fact that the employment relationship from which the alleged injuries arose was entered into and carried out in full in Kansas. See 4 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 87.41, at 16-114 (1990). Kansas law determined the legal consequences of the employment relationship, and those consequences follow regardless of where suit is instituted.

A second consideration is "the maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the states in our federal system." Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. at 354, 222 A.2d at 208. This requires that "a court apply the law of no state which does not have substantial connection with the total facts and with the particular issue being litigated." Id.; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 131 N.H. at 18, 549 A.2d at 1194. As noted above, every aspect of the employment relationship that allegedly gave rise to Mr. Ferren's injuries occurred in Kansas. Indeed, the plaintiffs admit that the employment relationship between Mr. Ferren and GMC "arose entirely within the State of Kansas," and "had no link whatsoever with the State of New Hampshire." The fact that the Ferrens now reside in New Hampshire "is not enough standing alone to warrant application of New Hampshire law." Labounty v. American Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 738, 743, 451 A.2d 161, 164 (1982); see John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182, 57 S.Ct. 129, 131, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (postoccurrence change of residence to forum state insufficient in and of itself to confer choice of forum law).

The plaintiffs argue that if they...