In re Detention of Williams, 99-2055.
Decision Date | 31 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-2055.,99-2055. |
Citation | 628 N.W.2d 447 |
Parties | In re DETENTION OF Harold WILLIAMS. State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Harold Williams, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Thomas J. Gaul and Catherine Johnson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Scott D. Brown and Roxann M. Ryan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
This is another in a series of appeals concerning the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Iowa Code chapter 229A (1999)1. See In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2000)
; In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 2000). The case before us is distinguished by the fact that the respondent, Harold Williams, demanded and received a jury trial. See Iowa Code § 229A.7(2) (Supp. 1999). The jury's unanimous verdict found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams is a sexually violent predator. That means he must be committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Human Services (DHS) for control and treatment until he is "safe to be at large." Id. § 229A.7(3).
Williams' appeal includes several issues resolved in Garren that need not be revisited here. To begin, his claim that chapter 229A is criminal in nature, not civil, has been decided to the contrary. Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 283. Because commitment proceedings under chapter 229A are civil, neither ex post facto nor double jeopardy principles apply. See id. at 283-84. Our opinion in Garren also rejected the same substantive due process claim urged here by Williams. We held that although chapter 229A affords no less-restrictive alternative than placement in a secure facility, the statute nevertheless passes constitutional muster because a "reasonable fit" exists between the State's goal of protecting the public "and the means chosen to advance that purpose." Id. at 285 (quoting In re B.B., 516 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Iowa 1994)).
Turning to Williams' remaining issues, we shall address his equal protection argument because it turns on a different classification than similar claims urged, and rejected, in Morrow and Garren. Williams also challenges the size of the jury impaneled to try him, the admissibility of evidence concerning prior bad acts, and the court's refusal to instruct the jury on two topics: less-restrictive treatment alternatives and Williams' claim that commitment requires proof of a "high" likelihood of reoffending.
The State cross-appeals the court's refusal to permit victim testimony in its case in chief. It also challenges the court's pre-trial ruling regarding jury unanimity.
Pertinent facts will be detailed as they relate to the issues addressed.
Our appellate review of this action, tried at law, would ordinarily be for the correction of legal error. Iowa R. App. P. 4. To the extent Williams' arguments rest on constitutional principles, however, we review them de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 547. For the reasons that follow, we affirm on Williams' appeal and affirm in part and reverse in part on the State's cross-appeal.
Williams argues that Iowa Code chapter 229A violates both his federal and state rights to equal protection because "it treats mentally ill sexual offender commitments differently than other mentally ill civil commitments." His argument rests on the premise that individuals subject to commitment under chapter 229A are similarly situated to mentally ill persons committed pursuant to chapter 229. The State counters that the two classes are not similarly situated because they do not have the same treatment needs. Urging the application of a rational basis test—not strict scrutiny, as Williams seeks—the State contends no equal protection violation can be shown. We agree.
A. Fundamental legal principles. Both the United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantee equal protection under the law to all persons. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. Both require that similarly situated persons be treated alike under the law. Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548. Conversely, persons who are not similarly situated need not be treated the same for equal protection purposes. Id. When two groups are similarly situated, the court must determine the rights implicated by the challenged classification and the appropriate level of review. See generally 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.3, at 213-26 (3d ed. 1999).
The first step in any equal protection analysis is to determine what level of scrutiny applies. The determination rests on the rights implicated by the statutory classification. Because his liberty is at stake, Williams urges us to apply strict scrutiny to his challenge. This highest level of review is applied only when the challenged statute classifies persons in terms of their ability to exercise a fundamental right or when it classifies or distinguishes persons by race or national origin. Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Iowa 1994). Such a statute is not presumed constitutional. Rather, the State carries the burden of showing that the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 286.
The State asserts that the challenged classification need only satisfy the rational basis test. Under this familiar test, differential treatment is allowed so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See Miller v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 609 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 2000)
. Because statutes not subject to strict scrutiny enjoy presumptive constitutionality, a challenger must prove that the statutory classification is arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Id.
In Garren we noted that other states have not been uniform in deciding which level of scrutiny to apply when faced with an equal protection challenge to a sexually violent predator (SVP) statute. See Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 286 (citing jurisdictions). Without resolving the issue, we elected to apply strict scrutiny, confident that chapter 229A "passes muster" even when judged by the highest standard. Id.; cf. Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548 n. 1 ( ).
It is significant, we think, that the equal protection challenges addressed in Morrow and Garren differ markedly from the one urged here by Williams. Morrow's claim of inequality asserted that he was being treated differently than other "violent offenders with ... antisocial personality disorder[s] who have served their prison sentences and are due for release." Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548 (alterations in original). Garren claimed unequal treatment as compared to "all other recidivists." Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 286.
Here Williams challenges classification by type of mental illness or abnormality. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor other state courts have ever applied a strict scrutiny standard in this circumstance. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643-47, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 271-76 (1993)
( ); Illinois v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1976) ( ). Importantly, "mentally ill" is not a suspect classification. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 324 (1985). As the Arizona Court of Appeals recently observed, governmental classifications of the mentally ill have historically been analyzed under the rational basis test even when individual liberty was at stake. Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779, 796 (1999).
We therefore hold that the classification at issue here was properly reviewed by the district court using a rational basis standard.
Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548 (quoting State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 1999)) (citations omitted).
Iowa Code § 229A.1. Contrasting those committed under chapter 229, the legislation states that sexually violent predators "have antisocial personality features that are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and that render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior." Id. Finally, the legislation recognizes that the mental condition of sexually violent predators makes "the existing involuntary commitment procedure under chapter 229...
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