Carpet Installation and Supplies of Glenco v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 628 So.2d 560
• Parties: CARPET INSTALLATION AND SUPPLIES OF GLENCO, a partnership composed of Daniel C. Gregerson and John T. Gregerson; William Thomas Harris; and Jeffrey Mark West v. ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. 1921119.
• Decision Date: 29 October 1993
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 560

628 So.2d 560

CARPET INSTALLATION AND SUPPLIES OF GLENCO, a partnership composed of Daniel C. Gregerson and John T. Gregerson; William Thomas Harris; and Jeffrey Mark West v. ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

1921119.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 29, 1993.

James C. Stivender and James W. McGlaughn of Inzer, Stivender, Haney & Johnson, P.A., Gadsden, for appellants.

Jack W. Torbert of Torbert and Torbert, P.A., Gadsden, for appellee.

HOUSTON, Justice.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company ("Alfa"), denying coverage to the defendants, Carpet Installation and Supplies of Glencoe ("Carpet Installation"), William Thomas Harris, and Jeffrey Mark West. We affirm. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Harris owned a Ford cargo van and was the named insured on an automobile liability policy issued by Alfa. On October 8, 1991, West, an employee of Carpet Installation, while driving the van to Dalton, Georgia, to pick up a load of carpet, collided with another vehicle. The van bore Carpet Installation's name and logo on its side and at the time was being used in the business of Carpet Installation.

Neither West nor Carpet Installation was named as an insured on the policy issued to Harris. The policy provided that only the named insured, family members, or those using the vehicle with the express permission of the insured or a family member would be covered, ¹ and that there would be no liability coverage for "[a]ny covered car while rented to others by a covered person." Alfa filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that Kevin L. Patterson had been injured in the collision and seeking a declaration that under the policy it had no obligation to provide a defense in the event Patterson sued West or Carpet Installation, or to pay any judgment resulting from such a suit.

The trial court found that there was a rental agreement between Harris and Carpet Installation, and it held, therefore, that Harris's policy had not covered Carpet Installation or West. From May through October 1991, Carpet Installation had made seven consecutive monthly payments on Harris's truck, paying by checks made out to Farmers and Merchants Bank and drawn on Carpet Installation's account. ² Carpet Installation also had paid Harris $125.30 for "truck insurance" and $60.93 for reasons none of the defendants could remember.

The defendants argue that the word "rent," as used in the policy, was ambiguous and therefore should be construed in their favor. See, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Chilton-Shelby Mental Health Center, 595 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Ala.1992). We disagree. The policy stated: "We do not provide Liability Coverage for ... [a]ny covered car while rented to others by a covered person," but it did not specifically define "rent."

The trial court referred to dictionaries for a definition of "rent." It stated:

"Rent is defined by Webster as a usual fixed periodical return made by a tenant or occupant of property to the owner for the possession and use thereof--. It is also defined as the amount paid by a hirer of personal property to the owner for use thereof. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, it is consideration paid for use or occupation of property."

The defendants advance two theories for their argument that the court erred. The first is that using the dictionary as a tool to clarify vague or ambiguous language is contrary to our policy that language in an insurance policy must be construed in light of the interpretation that an ordinary person--not a lawyer--would place on it. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Leeds, 530 So.2d 205, 207 (Ala.1988); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge Memorial Hospital, 584 So.2d 1316, 1322 (Ala.1991); and McKissick v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 429 So.2d 1030, 1033 (Ala.1983).

What is a dictionary definition if not an assertion of that very meaning that an ordinary person would give a particular word? It is exactly the result of an examination into the interpretation that ordinary people would give the word. The defendants would leave individual judges to apprehend the substance of the ordinary person's interpretation rather than allow them the assurance afforded by a reliable reference.

The defendants' other theory is that any ambiguity in the policy must be resolved in their favor; they cite the following rule:

"[W]hen doubt exists as to whether coverage is provided under an insurance policy, the language used by the insurer must be construed for the benefit of the insured. Likewise, when ambiguity exists in the language of an exclusion, the exclusion will be construed so as to limit the exclusion to the narrowest application reasonable under the wording. Guaranty National Ins. Co. v. Marshall County Board of Educ., 540 So.2d 745 (Ala.1989)."

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Chilton-Shelby Mental Health Center, 595 So.2d...