Daine v. Price
| Citation | 63 A.2d 767 |
| Decision Date | 11 February 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 726.,726. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
| Parties | DAINE v. PRICE et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.
Replevin action by Sigmund and Rose Price, trading as Price Refrigeration Company, against Frank Daine. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Josiah Lyman, of Washington, D. C. (Kathryn M. Schwarz, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Dan Piver, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
Plaintiffs Price sued in replevin to recover an electric delicatessen case and computing scale having a total value of $1,085 from defendant's store. They based their claim upon a conditional sales contract signed by defendant. He defended upon the ground that he had previously purchased the chattels from plaintiffs and had never transferred title back to them and therefore there was no basis for the replevin suit. Judgment was given against defendant by the trial court and he prosecutes this appeal.
It is not disputed that the articles were sold by plaintiff's by an oral agreement under which defendant gave three checks. The first, for $600, was dated on the date of the sale and was cashed by plaintiffs. The others, for $400 and $85, respectively, were postdated. Delivery of the chattels was made to defendant at or shortly after delivery of the checks. Subsequently the $400 postdated check was dishonored by defendant's bank. One of plaintiffs thereupon called upon defendant, who executed a promissory note, a certificate of installation, and the conditional sales contract which is in dispute.
The conditional sales contract, in the usual form of such documents, was phrased as though it represented the first contract between the parties. It was dated about seven weeks after the original transaction. It treated the $600 already paid as ‘cash with order’ and provided for the payment of the balance, together with a finance charge, in 12 monthly installments. Under it title to the chattels would ‘remain’ in the seller (Price) until payment in full was made. The certificate of installation recited that the chattels had been delivered and installed in defendant's store in accordance with the conditional sales contract.
Although one of plaintiff testified regarding the transaction, the transaction, he gave no details of the conversation leading up to the signing of the conditional sales contract. Defendant said he had signed without having read the document or having it read to him and after plaintiff Price had told him he warnted the paper so that he could obtain money on it from his bank. He said plaintiff had added that the document would make it possible for defendant to pay in small monthly installments. Defendant made none of the monthly payments called for by the promissory note and the conditional sales contract and about four months later plaintiffs began this action and had the chattels seized.
Defendant urges that the conditional sales contract was invalid and ineffective because plaintiffs did not have title or any property in the chattels at the time it was executed and that they could not ‘retain’ a title they did not have. He also charges that the conditional sales contract was secured fraudulently and without consideration. While the trial judge made only a general finding in favor of plaintiffs, it must be presumed that he considered the question of fraud and found against defendant on that score. There is nothing in the record which would support a contrary finding, 1 and on this issue the decision of the lower court must stand. Defendant's other points merit further consideration.
Examining the conditions existing when the chattels were delivered, we conclude that property in the chattels passed at that time to defendant. Nothing remained to be done but the completion of payment. The Uniform Sales Act, in force in the District of Columbia, provides that in a sale of specific goods property is transferred to the buyer at such times as the parties to the contract intend. 2 It provides further that unless a contrary intention appears in an unconditional contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable state property passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether time of payment or delivery be postponed. 3 Here not only does no contrary intention appear but all the facts indicate that the parties intended a completed sale. The chattels were delivered. In the case of a so-called cash transaction in which the passage of title depends upon payment, a check is generally considered conditional payment only and does not operate to effect payment unless the check is itself paid. 4 But it is clear that this was not a ‘cash’ transaction. Although one of the checks was dated as of the date of the sale and was cashed immediately, the other two were postdated. Postdated checks are considered as negotiable instruments similar to bills of exchange payable at a future date, 5 and the purpose of a postdated check is to obtain an extension of credit. 6 It follows that under the Sales Act property in these chattels passed to defendant when the first sale was made, several weeks before the signing of the conditional sales contract.
It also follows that the plaintiffs retained no lien on the chattels when they were sold to defendant. A seller's lien is predicated upon possession and is lost when the buyer lawfully obtains possession of the goods. 7
The effectiveness of the conditional sales contract must be considered in light of the statute of the chattels at the time the contract was made. Defendant's contention that it was ineffective because it lacked consideration is not well founded. The antecedent debt could furnish valid consideration for a security transaction of this nature. 8 Regardless of the question of consideration, however, it remains true that there is no evidence that property in the chattels was ever transferred back to plaintiffs prior to the making of the conditional sales contract. Possession was not redelivered to ...
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Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 98
...... Price v. Goodman, 226 N.C. 223, 37 S.E.2d 592; 11 Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 140. The District of Columbia in 1937 adopted the Uniform ...Page 316. In Daine v. Price, D.C.Mun.App.1949, 63 A.2d 767, 768, the Court said: 'In the case of a so-called cash transaction in which the passage of title depends ......
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Newman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Newman), 17516–96.
......903 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.1990). In the District of Columbia, a check is generally considered conditional payment. Daine v. Price, 63 A.2d 767, 768 (D.C.1949). Under the law of the District of Columbia, in effect in 1992, “A check or other draft does not of itself ......
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Price v. Daime, 872.
...... . This case is before us for the second time. Plaintiffs Price had brought suit against Daime to recover an electric delicatessen case and computing scale. They prevailed in the trial court but on appeal to this court the case was reversed in favor of defendant Daime. Daine (sic) v. Price, D.C.Mun.App., 63 A.2d 767. Upon remand plaintiffs Price moved to have further proceedings in accordance with that opinion and mandate. After a hearing the trial judge denied the motion and ordered final judgment of possession in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs now appeal. ......
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