Lawrence v. State

Decision Date24 January 1906
PartiesLAWRENCE v. STATE.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; Henry Stockbridge Judge.

John B Lawrence was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses and he appeals. Reversed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER JONES, and BURKE, JJ.

William Colton, Richard B. Tippett, and Thomas G. Hayes, for appellant.

Eugene O'Dunne and Atty. Gen. Bryan, for the state.

JONES J.

The appellant in this case was indicted in the criminal court of Baltimore City jointly with one William Hooper and Virginia Hamilton. The indictment consisted of two counts. The first charged that on the 18th day of July, 1904, the parties named conspired by divers false pretenses to obtain and acquire from John Rose certain moneys and properties, and to cheat and defraud him thereof; and the second count, that on said day they by a certain false pretense obtained from John Rose $5,450 current money, also one check, dated the 18th day of July, 1904, drawn on the Baltimore Trust Company, made payable to the order of the appellant, signed by John Rose, good and valid for the payment of $4,050 current money, with intent to defraud, etc. The appellant was convicted upon the second count of the indictment. The two parties indicted jointly with him were acquitted on both counts. This appeal is from the judgment rendered against the appellant upon the verdict so found.

The appeal is based upon alleged errors in the rulings of the trial court upon the evidence which are set out in 22 exceptions in the record before us. The issues in the case, to which the proofs were to be directed, were: Under the first count, whether the parties accused, or any two of them, had formed a conspiracy to cheat and defraud John Rose, involving the inquiry, first, was a conspiracy formed? and secondly, if so, did it exist with the intent to cheat and defraud John Rose? 3 Greenl. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 96. Under the second count, whether said parties, or any of them, made such false and fraudulent representation of an existing or past fact as to constitute the false pretense alleged, and employed such false pretense to defraud. 2 Bish. New Crim. Law, §§ 415, 471. In determining the admissibility of evidence, regard is to be had both to the nature and character of the evidence adduced, as respects its pertinency to the issue to be decided and to the means and instruments through which it is furnished. As affecting questions presented by some of the exceptions now coming under consideration, it may be premised that upon a charge of conspiracy, such as is involved in the first count of the indictment here in question, the acts and declarations of each co-conspirator made during the progress of the execution of the object of the conspiracy and in furtherance of such object may be given in evidence against all the others; but as a general rule "a foundation must first be laid by proof sufficient in the opinion of the judge to establish prima facie the fact of conspiracy between the parties, or proper to be laid before the jury, as tending to establish such fact. *** Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are admitted in evidence before sufficient proof is given of the conspiracy; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish such proof in a subsequent stage of the cause. But this rests in the discretion of the judge, and is not permitted, except under particular and urgent circumstances, lest the jury should be misled to infer the fact itself of the conspiracy from the declarations of strangers." 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 111. See, also, 3 Greenl. on Ev. § 92. This doctrine has been illustrated in many cases in which the general rule stated and its qualifications have both been recognized. We need refer to none of these, however, other than that of Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521, in which this court fully recognized the rule and the qualification as stated in the learned author just cited. In that case, which was one involving only the charge of conspiracy, the court said: "Before any act can be evidence against a man, it must be shown to be an act done by himself, or another acting by his authority, or in pursuance of a common design"--and then proceeded to state the qualification of the rule which has been noticed, concluding with a quotation from 1 Taylor on Ev. 540, that "on this subject it is difficult to establish a general inflexible rule, but each case must in some measure be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." The court then approved of the action of the court below in that case in admitting evidence of an act of an alleged co-conspirator before the prima facie case of conspiracy had been shown, when coupled with the requirement that the state would have to prove, before the traversers could in any way be held responsible, that they conspired and agreed together to do the improper act, and "that it was done by conspiracy." In conspiracy, the question is one of participation in design; but "it is not necessary to prove that the defendants came together and actually agreed in terms to have that design and to pursue it by common means. In nearly all cases a conspiracy must be proved by circumstantial evidence; that is, by the proof of facts from which it may be fairly implied that the defendants had a common object, and that the acts of each, though they may be different in character, were all done in pursuance of a common end and calculated to effect a common purpose. It must be made to appear that the parties steadily pursued the same object, whether acting separately or together, by common or different means, all leading to the same unlawful result. Concurrence of action on a material point is sufficient to enable a jury to presume concurrence of sentiment, and from this the actual fact of conspiracy may be inferred." Wright on Criminal Conspiracies with Am. Cases by Carson, 212. See, also, 3 Greenl. on Ev. (8th Ed.) § 93; 8 Cyc. 621, 622, 685. It may be said, in addition to the above, that the acts and declarations of a co-conspirator, to be received as evidence against others confederating with him, "must occur during the life of the combination; that is, after the formation and before the consummation or abandonment of the object of the conspiracy." 8 Cyc. 680, 681.

The questions presented by the exceptions will now be considered. In the first of these it appears that the prosecuting witness, Rose, testified that he, about two years previously, had met the traverser Hamilton, and had since met her about a dozen times; that she talked to him about gold mines and about Mr. Hooper, who, she said, was an agent of gold mines; that on the 12th of July, 1904, he met her on Franklin street, Baltimore, when she stopped and chatted with him and commenced on the old subject of gold mines; that while they talked two gentlemen came down the street and she said, "There is Mr. Hooper," and she then introduced him to Mr. Hooper; after a little talk he left, and next saw Mr. Hooper, one of the traversers, on the 13th of July, when he came, with a man by name of Bell, to witness' boarding house; they asked him if he had any Cripple Creek Temple Gold Mining Stock. Witness was then about to state what the man Bell had said, beginning with: "This Mr. Bell made a special point," when counsel for traverser, Lawrence, objected to the declarations of Bell. The court overruled the objection, remarking that the evidence was admissible as far as the traverser, Hooper, was concerned, and that, as to its possible effect on the others, it was difficult then to see whether it would "be evidence tending to establish the conspiracy"; and as to these others the evidence would be admitted, "subject to be stricken out if it is not followed up." The witness then went on to state, when "they" asked him about the stock mentioned he told them he was very much surprised; that he had never had any stock of the kind, and "they said they positively understood that he had." "They" further said, "Here is a matter that is of considerable interest to you," and told him of the mine in Colorado; that Bell stated "he was a lawyer by profession and was an agent of a syndicate, and he was looking for all the stock of this Cripple Creek Temple Gold Mining Company"; that the reason they wanted him (Bell) as agent was that "these big fellows were after" the mine; "they wanted to gobble it up"; and explained what had been done to conceal its value, and wanted witness to come up to "Hazazer's Hall," where, from other evidence, it appears Hooper (traverser) had an office; that witness told them he could not go, and gave his reason. The next day a letter purporting to be from Hooper was delivered to him by special messenger at his place of abode.

Before discussing the matter of this first exception, that of the fourth and fifth will be noticed. In the fourth counsel for the state (some other testimony having intervened) asked the witness to go back to where Bell and Hooper left his house after the conversation he had narrated, and asked him "How did you come to go to Rennert's hotel?" The witness was proceeding to say, "This man Bell, and Hooper being present," told him "that a man by the name of Lawrence" (meaning the appellant)--when objection was made on behalf of appellant, and the court permitted the evidence to be given, which was to the effect that what was told him was that Lawrence (appellant) had a lot of "Cripple Creek Mining Stock," and that if witness would go up there "they" would show him "this man who had this stock"; that he told them he "could not go on the 14th, but they came again--this man Bell came again in the evening and beckoned me to see." Witness then stated that he "went with...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT