John v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. S222726.,S222726. |
| Citation | 369 P.3d 238,63 Cal.4th 91,201 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | Aleyamma JOHN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Sylvia Chan, Real Party in Interest. |
Aleyamma John, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Charles Kinney, Oakland, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Kathleen Bales–Lange, County Counsel (Tulare), Crystal E. Sullivan, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Amy–Marie Costa, Abel C. Martinez and Kevin Stimmel, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Cyrus Sanai as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Ronald Mazzaferro as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Paul Den Beste as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
David Delman as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Zakari Law, Raymond Zakari, Pasadena; Law Offices of Brian J. Ward and Brian J. Ward, Woodland Hills, for Real Party in Interest.
The vexatious litigant statutory scheme ( Code Civ. Proc. §§ 391 – 391.7 )1 applies exclusively to self-represented litigants. Section 391.7, subdivision (a), authorizes a trial or appellate court to enter, "on its own motion or the motion of any party," a prefiling order that prohibits a self-represented vexatious litigant from "filing any new litigation in the courts of this state ... without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed." ( § 391.7, subd. (a), Stats.2011, ch. 49, § 1.) It is settled that section 391.7's prefiling process applies to self-represented plaintiffs who have been declared vexatious litigants. (See Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169–1170, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 253 P.3d 266 (Shalant ).) Section 391.7's prefiling provision applies to plaintiffs even when they appeal in propria persona an adverse judgment in the action they filed originally. (See Mahdavi v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 32, 41, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 121 (Mahdavi ).) We granted review to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal over whether section 391.7's prefiling requirements apply to declared vexatious litigants who are self-represented defendants appealing from an adverse judgment in litigation they did not initiate.
We conclude that section 391.7's prefiling requirements do not apply to a self-represented litigant previously declared a vexatious litigant seeking to appeal an adverse judgment or interlocutory order in an action where he or she was the defendant. A different interpretation would impede his or her right of access to the appellate courts without advancing the underlying purpose of the vexatious litigant statutes. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing defendant's appeal in this case to proceed.
Defendant Aleyamma John (John) rented an apartment in Alhambra in December 2008. Real party in interest, plaintiff Sylvia Chan, doing business as STC Realty (Chan), was the agent for the apartment building's owners. In 2011, Chan served a 60–day notice on John for her failure to pay rent and comply with other tenant obligations. When John did not pay the rent she owed, Chan initiated an unlawful detainer action in November 2011. John represented herself in the lawsuit until shortly before the jury trial began, in April 2012. After the jury returned a verdict in Chan's favor, John's attorney substituted out of the case, and John resumed self-representation. The court issued a writ of possession in May 2012, and John vacated the premises after receiving notice from the sheriff's department that it intended to enforce the writ. In July 2012, Chan was also awarded approximately $40,000 in attorney fees in her action against John. John filed two notices of appeal in June and July 2012 on her own behalf: one from the underlying judgment, and one from the attorney fees award. The court consolidated the two appeals in the appellate division. (Case No. BV030258 (Chan v. John action).)
On March 8, 2012, on its own motion, in a separately filed action against the company that managed John's apartment building, in which John was the plaintiff and appellant ( , Division Three of the Second District Court of Appeal "issued an order to show cause whether John should be declared a vexatious litigant and a prefiling order entered against her pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision (a)." The court also stated that it would entertain a motion by the defendant for an order requiring John to furnish security pursuant to section 391.1. The court allowed John the opportunity to brief the issues and present oral argument.
On April 18, 2012, Division Three of the Second District Court of Appeal declared John a vexatious litigant plaintiff in the Riegel action. The court took judicial notice of court records indicating that in the preceding seven years, as a plaintiff in propria persona, John had prosecuted at least five litigations that were concluded against her. The court also entered a prefiling order under section 391.7 that prohibited John from filing any new litigation in California courts in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge. The order "directed the clerk of the court to provide the Judicial Council with a copy of the prefiling order." After finding that there was no "reasonable probability" that John would prevail in her appeal in the Riegel action, the court ordered her to furnish security in the amount of $10,000 within 30 days as a condition to going forward with her appeal. The court dismissed the appeal after John failed to comply with the court's order to furnish security under section 391.1.
On May 1, 2014, after briefing was complete in the separate Chan v. John action, the trial court's appellate division Presiding Judge McKay stayed all further proceedings in that action under section 391.7, subdivision (c), which automatically stays the filing of any new litigation after a party has been declared a vexatious litigant. Presiding Judge McKay noted that Division Three of the Second District Court of Appeal had declared John to be a vexatious litigant in the Riegel action. Presiding Judge McKay directed John within 10 days either to obtain permission from the Presiding Justice of the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, to continue the Chan v. John consolidated appeal, or to file a substitution of attorney with the name of a California State Bar member before proceeding further. On May 6, 2014, John submitted a request to file new litigation by a vexatious litigant in the Chan v. John action and an application to vacate the prefiling order and remove her name from the vexatious litigant list. On May 12, 2014, Presiding Judge McKay denied John's motion to file new litigation on the ground she failed to demonstrate that her appeals "had merit and were not filed for the purpose of harassment or delay." The presiding judge declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the prefiling motion under section 391.8 (). The court then dismissed John's consolidated appeals in the Chan v. John litigation.
On May 30, 2014, John petitioned the present Second District Court of Appeal (in Div. Seven) for a writ of mandate directing the appellate division in the Chan v. John consolidated appeals to vacate its dismissal and decide the appeals on their merits. Chan filed a brief opposing John's petition. In June 2014, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause why John's relief should not be granted under Mahdavi, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at page 37, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 121 (). In July, Chan filed her written return to the petition, and in August, John filed her reply. The Court of Appeal heard oral argument on October 30, 2014. It held that a defendant's status as a vexatious litigant plaintiff in one matter cannot limit that same defendant's ability to pursue her appeal in an action she did not initiate as a plaintiff. It ordered the appellate division to vacate its order dismissing John's appeals in the Chan v. John action. We granted Chan's petition for review.
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. ( Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1119, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211.) ( Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 601, 330 P.3d 912.) We construe the statute's words in context, and harmonize statutory provisions to avoid absurd results. (Ibid. ) If we find the statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or purpose to inform our views. ( Id. at pp. 1039–1040, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 601, 330 P.3d 912.) We also strive to avoid construing ambiguous statutes in a manner that creates doubts as to their validity. ( Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1054, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 331 P.3d 136.) With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us.
Section 391, subdivision (b)(1) defines a " ‘Vexatious litigant’ " as a party who "[i]n the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations ... that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at...
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