The Mary Garrett

• Decision Date: 29 October 1894
• Docket Number: 10,701.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: THE MARY GARRETT. ANDERSON V. THE MARY GARRETT.

63 F. 1009

THE MARY GARRETT. ANDERSON V. THE MARY GARRETT.

No. 10,701.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

October 29, 1894

G. M Spencer and John C. Hughes, for libelant.

Woods &amp Levinsky and W. G. Holmes, for claimant.

MORROW District Judge.

The action in this case is in rem against the steamboat Mary Garrett, and is brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by libelant while in the employment of said vessel. The case is now before the court upon exceptions by claimant to the amended libel filed October 8, 1894. The exceptions are directed to the jurisdiction of the court, it being contended that it is sought, by the cause of action set out in the amended libel, to recover damages for an injury sustained on a wharf; or, in other words, that the damage was inflicted on land, and not on water, and that, therefore this court, as a court of admirality, has no jurisdiction. It appears from the amended libel that on June 9, 1893, the libelant entered into the service of the claimant as a seaman on board of the Mary Garrett, then lying in the port of San Francisco, and destined on a trip to the city of Stockton, an inland port in the state of California; that the vessel arrived on or about June 10, 1893, at the port of the city of Stockton, with libelant on board; that at said last-named time the libelant was injured by and through the negligence and carelessness of the mate of the vessel in discharging a portion of the cargo of said vessel. The fifth article of the amended libel contains the averments of fact which, it is claimed, are fatal to the jurisdiction of this court. It is as follows:

'And the said libelant further alleges that by reason of the carelessness and negligence of said libelee in receiving a portion of the cargo aforesaid, from the consignors thereof in an unsafe and dangerous condition for shipment, in that a portion of said cargo aforesaid, consisting of a large amount of sheet iron, was received by said libelee for shipment, loosely placed, unbound, upon a wheeled vehicle, and carelessly and negligently handled, by reason of the commands of the said mate, in that said wheeled vehicle, on which said sheet iron lay loose and unbound, was, by the commands of said mate, caused to be wheeled down a steep descent along the gang plank from said vessel to the dock, at the time and place aforesaid, while said gang plank was in a steeply inclined position, and by reason of the carelessness and negligence of said libelee in not providing suitable and safe machinery and appliances for the proper unloading of said portion of said cargo, and by reason of the carelessness and negligence of said libelee in not causing said portion of said cargo to be put in a safe and suitable condition for being handled at said time and place aforesaid, said portion of the cargo of said vessel was discharged upon and fell upon libelant, and thereby said libelant received and suffered the injuries and damages hereinbefore set forth.'

It is also further averred in other articles that the injury was due to the carelessness and negligence of the claimant, the California Navigation & Improvement Company, in failing to provide suitable machinery and appliances for the unloading of the cargo, and also in making use of the wharf, knowing that it was in an unsafe and dangerous condition.

While the language employed in the amended libel does not clearly, and in so many words, state that libelant received the injury on the wharf, yet the reasonable interpretation of the language used in narrating the manner in which the injury was sustained is hardly susceptible of a different conclusion. In fact, it was conceded at the argument that libelant was injured on the wharf. That a wharf is, figuratively speaking, regarded, in the admiralty, as land, and not as water, is well settled. It is deemed but an improvement or extension of the shore for commercial purposes. The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; The Ottawa, 1 Brown's Adm. No. 12,145; The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137. The proposition is elementary in the admiralty law that the test of the jurisdiction of admiralty courts over torts is the locality of the injury. The question which is conclusive upon the jurisdiction of this court as a court of admiralty is, where was the injury sustained? On land or on water? If upon the land, then the admiralty cannot take cognizance of the tort; if upon the 'water,' this term comprehending in this country the high seas and the navigable waters, this court has exclusive original jurisdiction of an action in rem for damages. Henry, in his work on Admiralty Jurisdiction, etc., (page 68, Sec.26), thus states the general proposition:

'This jurisdiction, as far as it concerns torts, depends entirely upon the locality; but it must be committed on the water, and not on the land.'

The authorities all affirm the same principle in unequivocal terms. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; The Neil Cochran, 1 Brown's Adm. 162, Fed. Cas. No. 10,087; The Ottawa, 1 Brown's Adm. 356, Fed. Cas. No. 10,616; The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137; The Arkansas, 17 F. 383; The Professor Morse, 23 F. 893; The H. S. Pickands, 42 F. 239; The John C. Sweeney, 55 F. 540.

Nor does it make any difference whether the tort had its inception, its origin, upon water, if the consequential effects of the wrong, the consummation of the tort, happened on land. It is immaterial, so far as the admiralty jurisdiction is concerned, that the tort originated on water, if the injury happened on land. This was decided in the case of The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. In that case the steam propeller Falcon anchored beside the wharf of Hough & Kershaw, in Chicago river, which was a navigable stream. There were large packing houses on the wharf, filled, at the time, with valuable stores. Owing to the negligence of those in charge of the Falcon, the vessel took fire; and the flames spreading to the wharf and packing houses, these were wholly consumed, with the stores therein contained. Mr. Justice Nelson, who, said:

'It will be observed that the entire damage complained of by the libelants, as proceeding from the negligence of the master and crew, and for which the owners of the vessel are sought to be charged, occurred, not on the water, but on the land. The origin of the wrong was on the water, but the substance and consummation of the injury on land. It is admitted by all the authorities that the jurisdiction of the admiralty over marine torts depends upon locality,--the high seas, or other navigable waters within admiralty cognizance; and, being so dependent upon locality, the jurisdiction is limited to the sea or navigable waters, not extending beyond high-water mark. * * * Since the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, navigable waters may be substituted for tide waters. This view of the jurisdiction over maritime torts has not been denied. But it has been strongly argued that this is a mixed case, the tort having been committed partly on water and partly on land; and that, as the origin of the wrong was on the water,-- in other words, as the wrong began on the water,-- where the

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