United States v. Southern Pac. R. Co.

Citation63 F. 481
Decision Date11 October 1894
Docket Number587.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
PartiesUNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO. et al.

George J. Denis, U.S. Atty., and Joseph H. Call, Spec. Asst. U.S atty.

Joseph D. Redding, for defendants.

ROSS District Judge.

This is a suit in equity brought by the government to quiet its alleged title to a large number of townships, sections, and parts of sections of land situated within this judicial district, in which it is alleged the defendants claim an interest under and by virtue of an act of congress approved March 3, 1871, entitled 'An act to incorporate the Texas Pacific Railroad Company and to aid in the construction of its road, and for other purposes' (16 Stat. 573), and to enjoin the defendants from cutting or removing from said lands timber, wood, minerals, or other valuable deposits. To the bill the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, alleged to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of California; D. o. Mills and Gerrit L. Lansing trustees, alleged to be citizens of the state of California and residents of the city of San Francisco, of that state the Central Trust Company of New York, alleged to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York; the Southern Pacific Company, alleged to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Kentucky; and the Colorado River Irrigation Company, alleged to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Colorado,-- are made parties defendant. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the Southern Pacific Company, and Gerrit L. Lansing have appeared specially, and filed pleas in the nature of pleas in abatement, objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. The plea of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company sets up that it is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of California, and while admitting that it operates a line of railway through this judicial district, and maintains a ticket and freight office and depot therein, alleges that it is not an inhabitant of this district, but that it has its principal office, habitat, and domicile in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California. The plea of the Southern Pacific Company alleges that it is not an inhabitant or resident of this judicial district, but is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Kentucky, and having its habitat and domicile in that state. The plea of Gerrit L. Lansing alleges that he does not reside in this judicial district, but is an inhabitant and resident of the city and county of San Francisco, in the northern district of this state. Each of the defendant so appearing pray that the suit against them be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On motion of the government the pleas were set down for argument. The question, therefore, is whether, under the facts as alleged in the bill and in the pleas, the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and proceed in the cause.

The court, of course, takes judicial notice of the fact that the state of California is divided into two judicial districts. It is further aware of the fact that it is the established law that a corporation organized in one of the United States and in that state only, cannot be considered a citizen, an inhabitant, or a resident of any other state, and that a corporation created by a state in which there were two or more judicial districts is to be considered an inhabitant of that district in which its general offices are situated, and in which its general business, as distinguished from its local business, is transacted. Railway Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 14 Sup.Ct. 401, and cases there cited. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company, and D. O. Mills and Gerrit L. Lansing, trustees, are therefore to be regarded as citizens and inhabitants of the northern district of California; the Central Trust Company, as a citizen and inhabitant of the state of New York; the Southern Pacific Company of Kentucky, as a citizen and inhabitant of the state of Kentucky; and the Colorado River Irrigation Company, as a citizen and inhabitant of the state of Colorado. And as the government is not a citizen or inhabitant of any particular state or district, but is everywhere present within the territorial limits of the United States, none of the parties to the suit can be regarded as citizens or inhabitants of this judicial district; but the lands which constitute the subject of the suit are situated within this judicial district. By the act of congress of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat 552), as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. 433), the circuit courts of the United States are given 'original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which controversy the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners * * *;' and, by a subsequent provision of the same section, it is declared: 'No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant * * * .' It has been held by the supreme court that suits falling within the last clause quoted-- that is to say, suits in which jurisdiction depends solely upon the diverse citizenship of the parties--cannot be brought in the district of the residence of the plaintiff unless, where there is more than one plaintiff, all of the plaintiffs reside in the district, nor, unless all of the defendants reside in the same district, can suit be brought therein, because the statute does not confer the right to bring the suit in a district wherein a part only of the defendants reside. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 10 Sup.Ct. 303. One of the reasons assigned for that conclusion was that the court found, from the history of the legislation respecting the jurisdiction of the United States courts, a manifest purpose upon the part of congress, in passing the act of 1887, as corrected by the act of 1888, to restrict, rather than to enlarge, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The reasons which induced the court to hold that, in cases where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, each plaintiff must be competent to sue, and, if there are several defendants, each defendant must be liable to be sued, or the jurisdiction cannot be entertained, would seem to apply with equal force to that clause of the act of 1887, as corrected by the act of 1888, which declares that 'no civil suit shall be brought, before either of said courts, against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant. ' That is to say, each defendant must be an inhabitant of the district in which he is sued, because the provision of the statute quoted expressly so declares; and, if this provision of the statute is the law which applies to and controls the present case, the result must necessarily be that the suit cannot be maintained in any district, because the defendants are inhabitants of different districts. Yet the suit was instituted by the attorney general pursuant to an act of congress approved March 3, 1887, entitled 'An act to provide for the adjustment of land grants made by congress to aid in the construction of railroads, and for the forfeiture of unearned lands, and for other purposes' (24 Stat. 556), by which the secretary of the interior was authorized and directed to adjust, in accordance with the decisions of the supreme court, each of the railroad land grants made by congress to aid in the construction of railroads, and for the forfeiture of unearned lands, and for other...

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3 cases
  • United States v. Bink, C-16937.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon)
    • September 30, 1947
    ...117; Weber Showcase & Fixture Co., Inc. v. Waugh, D.C., 42 F.2d 515. See Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 26 L.Ed. 52; United States v. Southern Pac. R. Co., C.C., 63 F. 481; Spencer v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., C.C., 56 F. 12 28 U.S.C.A. § 115; Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed.Cas. 660, No. 8......
  • Clarke v. Boysen, 40-48
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • May 14, 1930
    ...clearly proper under the provisions of section 57, supra. Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 15 S. Ct. 124, 39 L. Ed. 201; United States v. S. P. R. Co. (C. C.) 63 F. 481. The bill alleges the requisite diversity of citizenship between the Burlington Company and Wertz. The only defendants who ......
  • Dahlgren v. Pierce
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • January 6, 1920
    ...56 L.Ed. 990; Fayerweather v. Ritch (C.C.) 89 F. 385; York Bank v. Abbott (C.C.) 139 F. 988, 993, and cases cited. See, also, U.S. v. So. Pac. (C.C.) 63 F. 481, and cases We conclude that the court below had ample power to bring in Dahlgren, Jr., under section 57, and subject him to a decre......

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