People v. Eulo

• Citation: 63 N.Y.2d 341,472 N.E.2d 286,482 N.Y.S.2d 436
• Parties: , 472 N.E.2d 286, 42 A.L.R.4th 723, 53 USLW 2250 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John EULO, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert BONILLA, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 30 October 1984
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 436

482 N.Y.S.2d 436

63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 42

A.L.R.4th 723, 53 USLW 2250

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John EULO, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert BONILLA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 30, 1984.

Robert F. Quinlan, Shoreham, for appellant in the first above-entitled case

Patrick Henry, Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Mark D. Cohen, Riverhead, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled case.

David Samel and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled case.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Rebecca J. Clement and Barbara D. Underwood, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled case.

Jeffrey M. McCrone, Syracuse, for Organ Procurement Agencies of the State of New York, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

These appeals involve a question of criminal responsibility in which defendants, charged with homicide, contend that their conduct did not cause death.

The term "death", as used in this State's statutes, may be construed to embrace a determination, made according to accepted medical standards, that a person has suffered an irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat or, when these functions are artificially maintained, an irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain stem. Therefore, a defendant will not necessarily be relieved of criminal liability for homicide by the removal of the victim's vital organs after the victim has been declared dead according to brain-based criteria, notwithstanding that, at that time, the victim's heartbeat and breathing were being continued by artificial means.

I People v. Eulo

On the evening of July 19, 1981, defendant and his girlfriend attended a volunteer firemen's fair in Kings Park, Suffolk County. Not long after they arrived, the two began to argue, reportedly because defendant was jealous over one of her former suitors, whom they had seen at the fair. The argument continued through the evening; it became particularly heated as the two sat in defendant's pick-up truck, parked in front of the home of the girlfriend's parents. Around midnight, defendant shot her in the head with his unregistered handgun.

The victim was rushed by ambulance to the emergency room of St. John's Hospital. A gunshot wound to the left temple causing extreme hemorrhaging was apparent. A tube was placed in her windpipe to enable artificial respiration and intravenous medication was applied to stabilize her blood pressure.

Shortly before 2:00 a.m., the victim was examined by a neurosurgeon, who undertook various tests to evaluate damage done to the brain. Painful stimuli were applied and yielded no reaction. Various reflexes were tested and, again, there was no response. A further test determined that the victim was incapable of spontaneously maintaining respiration. An electroencephalogram (EEG) resulted in "flat," or "isoelectric", readings indicating no activity in the part of the brain tested.

Over the next two days, the victim's breathing was maintained solely by a mechanical respirator. Her heartbeat was sustained and regulated through medication. Faced with what was believed to be an imminent cessation of these two bodily functions notwithstanding the artificial maintenance, the victim's parents consented to the use of certain of her organs for transplantation.

On the afternoon of July 23, a second neurosurgeon was called in to evaluate whether the victim's brain continued to function in any manner. A repetition of all of the previously conducted tests led to the same diagnosis: the victim's entire brain had irreversibly ceased to function. This diagnosis was reviewed and confirmed by the Deputy Medical Examiner for Suffolk County and another physician.

The victim was pronounced dead at 2:20 p.m. on July 23, although at that time she was still attached to a respirator and her heart was still beating. Her body was taken to a surgical room where her kidneys, spleen, and lymph nodes were removed. The mechanical respirator was then disconnected, and her breathing immediately stopped, followed shortly by a cessation of the heartbeat.

Defendant was indicted for second degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of manslaughter. The Appellate Division, 97 A.D.2d 682, 467 N.Y.S.2d 464, unanimously affirmed the conviction, without opinion.

People v. Bonilla

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on February 6, 1979, a New York City police officer found a man lying faceup in a Brooklyn street with a bullet wound to the head. The officer transported the victim in his patrol car to the Brookdale Hospital, where he was placed in an intensive care unit. Shortly after arriving at the hospital, the victim became comatose and was unable to breathe spontaneously. He was placed on a respirator and medication was administered to maintain his blood pressure.

The next morning, the victim was examined by a neurologist. Due to the nature of the wound, routine tests were applied to determine the level, if any, of the victim's brain functions. The doctor found no reflex reations and no response to painful stimuli. The mechanical respirator was disconnected to test for spontaneous breathing. There was none, and the respirator was reapplied. An EEG indicated an absence of activity in the part of the brain tested. In the physician's opinion, the bullet wound had caused the victim's entire brain to cease functioning.

The following day, the tests were repeated and the same diagnosis was reached. The victim's mother had been informed of her son's condition and had consented to a transfer of his kidneys and spleen. Death was pronounced following the second battery of tests and, commencing at 9:25 p.m., the victim's kidneys and spleen were removed for transplantation. The respirator was then disconnected, and the victim's breathing and heartbeat stopped.

An investigation led to defendant's arrest. While in police custody, defendant admitted to the shooting. He was indicted for second degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. A jury convicted him of the weapons count and of first degree manslaughter. The conviction was affirmed by a divided Appellate Division, 95 A.D.2d 396, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599.

II

Defendants' principal point in each of these appeals is that the respective Trial Judges failed to adequately instruct the juries as to what constitutes a person's death, the time at which criminal liability for a homicide would attach. It is claimed that in New York, the time of death has always been set by reference to the functioning of the heart and the lungs; that death does not occur until there has been an irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat.

There having been extensive testimony at both trials concerning each victim's diagnosis as "brain dead," defendants argue that, in the absence of clear instruction, the juries may have erroneously concluded that defendants would be guilty of homicide if their conduct was the legal cause of the victims' "brain death" rather than the victims' ultimate state of cardiorespiratory failure. In evaluating defendants' contentions, it is first necessary to review: how death has traditionally been determined by the law; how the principle of "brain death" is now sought to be infused into our jurisprudence; and, whether, if at all, this court may recognize a principle of "brain death" without infringing upon a legislative power or prerogative.

(a)

A person's passing from life has long been an event marked with a variety of legal consequences. A determination of death starts in motion the legal machinery governing the disposition of the deceased's property (see, generally, EPTL arts. 3, 4, 5 and 6). It serves to terminate certain legal relationships, including marriage (see N.Y.Jur., Domestic Relations, § 1), and business partnerships (see Partnership Law, § 62, subd. 4). The period for initiation of legal actions brought against, by, or on behalf of the deceased is extended (see CPLR 210). And, in recent times, death marks the point at which certain of the deceased's organs, intended to be donated upon death, may be transferred (see Public Health Law, § 4301, subd. 1). In the immediate context, pertinent here, determination of a person's "death" is relevant because our Penal Law defines homicide in terms of "conduct which causes the death of a person" (Penal Law, § 125.00 ).

Death has been conceptualized by the law as, simply, the absence of life: "Death is the opposite of life; it is the termination of life" (Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 90). But, while erecting death as a critical milepost in a person's legal life, the law has had little occasion to consider the precise point at which a person ceases to live. ¹

When the question arises as to when death occurs, it has been deemed one of fact (see Matter of Di Bella, 279 App.Div. 689, 107 N.Y.S.2d 929), in which the fact finder may be called upon to evaluate expert medical testimony (seeid.; Matter of Bucci, 57 Misc.2d 1001, 293 N.Y.S.2d 994; Matter of Rose, 201 Misc. 470, 106 N.Y.S.2d 235). This has usually been in the context of an attempt by parties to prove the relative survivorship of two or more people killed in a common disaster, when the order of death affected the distribution of the decedents' estates. ² And, while many of the efforts by parties attempting to prove survivorship are based on circumstantial evidence as to the relative times of death (see Matter of Di Bella, supra Matter of Bucci, supra Matter of Hayward, 143 Misc. 401, 256 N.Y.S. 607 see, also, People v. Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 457 N.Y.S.2d 451, 443 N.E.2d 925), it is clear that the criteria used for determining death have been the medical standards (see Matter of Bausch, 100 Misc.2d 817, 818, 420 N.Y.S.2d 181) of irreversible cessation of cardiac and respiratory functions (cf. Matter of Rose, 201 Misc....