Jackson v. Buice

• Decision Date: 17 February 1909
• Citation: 63 S.E. 823,132 Ga. 51
• Parties: JACKSON v. BUICE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

63 S.E. 823

132 Ga. 51

JACKSON v. BUICE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 17, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a suit is brought by one to recover upon a quantum meruit for services rendered by him to another, and the petition alleges that the services were rendered upon the faith of the promise of such other person to pay therefor, in order to sustain such allegation it is not necessary to prove that there was an express promise, but it will be sufficient to show an implied promise.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Work and Labor, Cent. Dig. § 43; Dec. Dig. § 24. ^[*]]

There was no error in the charges complained of, requiring a new trial.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators Cent. Dig. § 1880; Dec. Dig. § 451. ^[*]]

There were no errors upon the trial requiring a new trial, and the verdict was authorized by the evidence.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 1878; Dec. Dig. § 451. ^[*]]

Error from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Geo. F. Gober, Judge.

Action by J. S. Buice against Olivia Jackson, administratrix. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Brooke & Henderson, for plaintiff in error.

H. L. Paterson, for defendant in error.

HOLDEN J.

1. This is an action brought by the defendant in error to recover from the estate of his deceased father-in-law compensation for services rendered to the latter during his lifetime. The plaintiff in the court below obtained a verdict and judgment for $200, and to the order of the court denying a new trial the defendant excepts.

Paragraph 6 of the petition alleges: "That at the special instance and request of the said Tolbert Strickland, and his oft-repeated promises to amply compensate and pay your petitioner for the same, petitioner rendered all necessary services to the said Tolbert Strickland during said four years next preceding his death, and during each and every spell of sickness which he had waited upon him, nursed him, cared for him, and attended to all of his wants both night and day, rendering him the most disagreeable, filthy, and menial services, all of which was absolutely necessary for the comfort and well-being of the said Tolbert Strickland, and required the constant presence and attention of your petitioner, and was of the value of $125 per year." And paragraph 7 alleges: "That services were rendered to the said Tolbert Strickland by your petitioner in pursuance of the promise of the said Tolbert Strickland that your petitioner should have pay for the same, and with the intention on the part of your petitioner to charge for the same, and with the expectation that he would be paid for the same, and were accepted by the said Tolbert with full knowledge of the fact that petitioner was charging him for such services and intended to claim compensation for the same, and expected to be compensated for the same by him, the said Tolbert Strickland, and upon the faith of the promises of him, the said Tolbert Strickland, that he should be well and fully paid for all services rendered by him to the said Tolbert Strickland."

Upon the trial there was no evidence of any express contract, or of any express promise on the part of the deceased for the services rendered; and the assignments of error made as to the admission of certain testimony, and the delivering of certain charges by the court, raise for decision the question as to whether or not the plaintiff can recover upon proof of sufficient facts and circumstances from which the jury could infer an implied contract on the part of the deceased with the plaintiff in the court below to pay him for the value of the services which he rendered. The petition alleges that the plaintiff rendered the services with the intention on his part to charge for the same, with the expectation that he would be paid for them, and they were accepted by the deceased with full knowledge of these facts. The petition further alleges that the services were rendered upon the faith of the promises of the deceased that the plaintiff would be paid for such services. Where one sues another for the value of services rendered, or property transferred to the latter, which he accepted, and there is an allegation that the party receiving the services or property promises to pay for the same, it would not be necessary ordinarily to prove an express promise. Generally, where one receives services or valuable property from another, the law implies a promise to pay therefor. To meet an allegation that a party receiving valuable property or services from another promised to pay the latter for them, it is sufficient, in order to authorize a recovery, to show either an express promise or an implied promise; and ordinarily, in order to prove the latter, it would only be necessary to show that one rendered services, or transferred valuable property to another, and that the latter accepted the same, which raises a presumption of a promise to pay therefor.

This presumption, however, does not usually arise in the case of every near relative. The rule is stated in the case of Hudson v. Hudson, 90 Ga. 581, 16 S.E. 349, as follows: "Ordinarily, where one renders in behalf of another valuable services, which are accepted by the latter the law raises in favor of the former an implied promise to pay for the same, although no formal or express contract to pay has been made. Where, however, the parties sustain towards each other the relation of parent and child, and the services performed are in the nature of care and attention bestowed by a son upon an old and infirm father, no such presumption arises by operation of law. In order, therefore, to sustain a recovery by the son for such services, it must affirmatively appear, either that they were rendered under an express contract that the son was to be paid for them, or the surrounding circumstances must plainly indicate that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made, and negative the idea that the services were performed merely because of that natural sense of duty, love, and affection arising out of this relation." Where services of the kind referred to are rendered, and the surrounding circumstances show that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made, and negative the idea that the services were performed merely because of the natural sense of duty, love, and affection arising out of the relations existing between the parties, a promise on the part of the...