Miller v. St. Louis & Kansas City Railway Company

• Decision Date: 14 May 1901
• Parties: MILLER v. ST. LOUIS & KANSAS CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

63 S.W. 85

162 Mo. 424

MILLER v. ST. LOUIS & KANSAS CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

May 14, 1901

Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. W. Wood, Judge.

Affirmed.

Geo. P B. Jackson for appellant.

(1) In a case where the answer is a virtual admission of plaintiff's cause of action, but asks affirmative relief on equitable grounds, the entire case is converted into one in equity, to be governed by the rules of equity practice. O'Day v. Conn, 131 Mo. 325; Schuster v Schuster, 93 Mo. 443; Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo 591; Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 289. (This was an action on promissory notes -- the defense was equitable, asking the court to decree specific performance of an alleged contract for the cancellation of the notes. Defendant failed below, and there was judgment on the notes, but the case was treated on appeal as one in equity.) McCollum v. Boughton, 132 Mo. 620; Hodges v. Black, 8 Mo.App. 389; s. c. 76 Mo. 537. When a court of equity once gets jurisdiction of a case, it retains that jurisdiction until complete justice be done. Woodward v. Martin, 106 Mo. 362; McCollum v. Boughton, 132 Mo. 621. (2) The plaintiff Miller, under the evidence in the case, is estopped to claim that the contract signed by him was not intended to cover the land actually occupied by the railroad company. Provolt v. Railroad, 57 Mo. 256; Baker v. Railroad, 57 Mo. 265; Kanaga v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 207; Gray v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 126; Cory v. Railroad, 100 Mo. 282; Dodd v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 295; Planet Co. v. Railroad, 115 Mo. 613; Webster v. Railroad, 116 Mo. 114; Scarritt v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 298; Farley v. Pettes, 5 Mo.App. 321; Imboden v. Ins. Co., 31 Mo.App. 321; Lumber Co. v. Kruger, 52 Mo.App. 418. In Hosher v. Railroad, 60 Mo.App. 330, this rule of estoppel was applied where the railroad had been built on land known to be outside of that contracted for. (3) The contract must be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and with reference to the objects intended to be accomplished. Crawford v. Elliott, 78 Mo. 497; Tureman v. Stephens, 83 Mo. 22; Belch v. Miller, 32 Mo.App. 397; Dobbins v. Edmonds, 18 Mo.App. 307; Moser v. Lower, 48 Mo.App. 85. (4) The parties by their conduct have given to the contract a construction which applies it to the land actually occupied by the railroad as constructed. Goldman v. Wolff, 6 Mo.App. 490; Mathews v. Danaby, 26 Mo.App. 660; Brewing Co. v. Waterworks Co., 34 Mo.App. 49; Strauss Saddlery Co. v. Kingman & Co., 42 Mo.App. 208; Dentman v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo.App. 624; Ridge v. Transfer Co., 56 Mo.App. 133. (5) Conceding that at the outset the agreement signed by Miller was a mere "option," and therefore unilateral, yet it became a valid mutual contract as soon as the railroad company entered upon the land and commenced the construction of its railroad. At that time the company had the right to elect on which condition and at what price it would take the land -- still it was bound to take it at one price or another stated in the written agreement. When it formally determined to take it at the price of $ 600 and so notified Miller and demanded a deed, the terms and conditions all became fixed, and there was a valid binding mutual contract between the parties for the conveyance of the land for $ 600. Bigelow v. Ames, 108 U.S. 10; Miller v. Cameron, 15 A. 842; Woodruff v. Woodruff, 16 A. 4; Richards v. Green, 8 C. E. Green (N. J.), 536; Ivory v. Murphy, 36 Mo. 543; Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 571; Curran v. Rogers, 35 Mich. 221; Corson v. Mulvaney, 49 Pa. St. 88; Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 489; Moses v. McClain, 2 So. Rep. 741; Johnson v. Trippe, 33 F. 530; Bishop on Contracts, secs. 784-844; Martin v. Grimes, 88 Mo. 478; Bradford v. Foster, 9 S.W. 195. (6) Even if the contract had been intended to apply to the first line, the plaintiff would only have been entitled to damages for the amount of land actually taken south of the hundred-foot strip. 3 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 937; 1 Rorer on Railroads, 313; R. S. 1889, sec. 2734; Clark v. Railroad, 36 Mo. 224; Munkers v. Railroad, 60 Mo. 334; Benson v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 513; Abbott v. Railroad, 83 Mo. 271; Jones v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 151; Moss v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 86; Cory v. Railroad, 100 Mo. 292; McCord v. Railroad, 21 Mo.App. 92; Edwards v. Railroad, 82 Mo.App. 96. (7) The evidence considered as a whole establishes that the contract of May 31, 1895, was made with reference to the second line on which the railroad was built. The plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to recover any damages, and the final judgment in the case should have been a decree in accordance with the prayer of defendant's answer. (8) In any event the court erred in requiring the jury to include interest in the assessment of damages. R. S. 1889, sec. 4430; R. S. 1899, sec. 2869; State ex rel v. Hope, 121 Mo. 34.

O. L. Houts and S. T. White for respondent.

(1) There was no evidence before the court of a mistake in the written instrument sought to be reformed. 1. The admitted evidence is that Sommerfield, the right of way agent who negotiated with plaintiff and wrote said instrument, was acting under special and limited powers. He was given by his principal a plat of the railroad as located, surveyed and staked out over and across the plaintiff's farm on May 31, 1895, and authorized to procure an agreement by which defendant would have the right to purchase the right of way on that line and no other. Said agent tells, as a witness, that he was given the printed blank of this instrument which he filled out and plaintiff signed. It is the printed part of the instrument that defendant claims is the part thereof in which lies the mistake, to-wit: "As said center line is located, surveyed, and staked out over and across said above tract." It is the first time that a court of equity was ever called upon to reform the blanks sent out by a company to its agents, and it is not believed that this court will set a precedent for such a proceeding. 2. There was practically no evidence that said instrument did not express the intention of the parties at the time. Not one of the four persons present at the signing really claims that it did not say just what the parties intended it should say. (2) The defendant asks a court of equity to exercise its equitable powers to relieve it of a just and equitable claim of $ 1,800 that plaintiff has against it, by the payment of one-third of that amount. No court of equity will lend itself to such a purpose. Equity will not reform a contract or enforce it specifically in aid of what is inequitable. Veith v. Gierth, 92 Mo. 97; Hollman v. Conlon, 145 Mo. 378. (3) To have the alleged contract reformed and specifically enforced it was necessary for the defendant to show that a mistake had been made in writing the instrument, and the exact terms of the instrument that the parties had agreed upon, not only by a preponderance of the evidence, but by evidence so clear, cogent and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor. Clark v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 255; Fanning v. Doan, 139 Mo. 392; Veith v. Gierth, 92 Mo. 97; Berry v. Hartsell, 91 Mo. 132. (4) The question by defendant denominated estoppel was at request of defendant first tried by the court, then by the court with a jury under instructions not challenged by defendant in his brief. There is nothing set up in the answer that would estop plaintiff from maintaining this action. Plaintiff does not seek to eject defendant or to enjoin the construction of its road, but only to recover for damages done his property. Scarritt v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 303. (5) Plaintiff was entitled to interest on the amount of his damages from the date of the entry on his land by defendant, and there is nothing in the last proposition of defendant's brief. Webster v. Railroad, 116 Mo. 121.

OPINION

VALLIANT, J.

Plaintiff by this suit seeks to recover of defendant compensation for injury to his farm caused by defendant in entering on his land appropriating a strip one hundred feet wide upon which it constructed and is maintaining and operating its railroad.

Defendant by its answer admits all the allegations of the petition, but seeks to avoid liability for the damages claimed, because it says it had a right to enter on the plaintiff's land and appropriate it for the purpose named, by virtue of a written contract executed by plaintiff granting the right of way and authorizing the acts complained of, upon payment of $ 600, which it had tendered the plaintiff before suit, and plaintiff had refused the same. The answer sets out in effect that the written agreement mentioned does not in terms give the defendant for its right of way the hundred-foot strip actually taken, but was intended to do so, and it prays a reformation of the written instrument and a specific performance of the agreement as really intended by both parties..

The written agreement purports, for the nominal consideration of one dollar, to convey to defendant the right to purchase, if it sees fit to do so, within three months from its date, May 31, 1895, for $ 600, a right of way through plaintiff's land of fifty feet wide on each side of the center line of defendant's railroad "as said center line is located, surveyed and staked out over and across said above-described tract of land." At that date there was a center line so surveyed and staked off through the plaintiff's land, but after the agreement had been signed and delivered, to-wit, about June 4, defendant surveyed and staked off another line fifty or seventy feet north of the former line, and it was on the second line that the railroad was constructed. The answer states that the plaintiff objected to the first line, and, whilst it does not say...