Lopez v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 20 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 08–99021.,08–99021.
• Parties: Samuel Villegas LOPEZ, Petitioner–Appellant,v.Charles L. RYAN,* Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

630 F.3d 1198

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 815

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1085

Samuel Villegas LOPEZ, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Charles L. RYAN,* Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 08–99021.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 11, 2010.Filed Jan. 20, 2011.

Kelley J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Capital Habeas Unit, Nashville, TN, Denise Irene Young, Tucson, AZ, for the petitioner-appellant.Susanne Bartlett Blomo, Assistant Attorney General, and Kent Ernest Cattani, Chief Counsel, Capital Litigation Section, Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for the respondent-appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:98–CV–00072–SMM.Before: SUSAN P. GRABER, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

We consider here a challenge to the denial of habeas relief from a death sentence. Samuel Villegas Lopez, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his capital sentence for first-degree murder. Lopez argues that, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, he was denied an individualized sentencing determination because of then-binding Arizona law requiring that mitigating evidence be causally related to the crime; Lopez also argues that his attorney at his resentencing rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to furnish his psychiatric expert with eyewitness testimony and background information necessary to an assessment of pathological intoxication, “a condition, quite rare, in which an individual exhibits sudden and unpredictable behavior very shortly after ingesting a very small amount of alcohol.” State v. Lopez (“ Lopez II ”), 175 Ariz. 407, 857 P.2d 1261, 1267 (1993). Finally, Lopez argues that, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the government suppressed exculpatory evidence regarding an unrelated sexual assault arrest. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

The record belies Lopez's arguments. The sentencing court expressly indicated that it considered all the mitigating evidence at Lopez's sentencing proceedings, and the Arizona Supreme Court independently reviewed the record on appeal. Id. at 1264–71. There is no basis to presume that the state court imposed a causal nexus requirement sub silentio. Although Arizona has a checkered past on this issue, the Arizona courts did not uniformly impose a causation requirement in capital sentencing cases during the time period in question. The state court examined all the mitigating evidence and found that it did not warrant leniency.

Lopez's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as well. Even assuming the district court erred in addressing procedural default sua sponte, Lopez is independently barred from seeking relief through his expanded allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not develop the factual basis for this claim in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Although Lopez raised in state court his narrower claim that counsel failed to provide his expert with eyewitness testimony, he cannot show that counsel's failure caused him prejudice. The trial court found the murder especially heinous, cruel, or depraved, and underscored that he had never seen a case “as bad as this one.” There is no “reasonable probability” that the duplicative testimony cited by Lopez would have changed the sentence.

Lopez's Brady claim is also without merit. The information in the undisclosed note was not “material” for Brady purposes. The note included legal opinions, which are not covered by Brady in the first instance, and facts cumulative of information available in previously released police reports. Lopez also cannot demonstrate that had the note been properly disclosed, the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different. Consequently, under the deference owed to the state court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Background

In 1987, Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of sexual assault, kidnapping, and burglary for the rape and murder of a fifty-nine-year-old woman, Estefana Holmes.¹ The trial court sentenced him to death on the basis of two aggravating circumstances: a prior felony conviction “involving the use or threat of violence on another person,” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13–703(F)(2) (1992), and the commission of an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, id. § 13–703(F)(6) (1992); see also State v. Lopez (“ Lopez I ”), 163 Ariz. 108, 786 P.2d 959, 962 (1990). The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but held that Lopez's prior conviction for resisting arrest did not qualify as a felony offense under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–703(F)(2) (1992). The court accordingly remanded for resentencing on the murder count. Lopez I, 786 P.2d at 965, 967.

Lopez's resentencing was held in 1990. The trial court again sentenced Lopez to death, finding that the murder was committed in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner and that no mitigating circumstances were sufficient to warrant leniency. Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1264. After an independent review of the record, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 1271.

Lopez petitioned for post-conviction relief. The trial court held that “no material issue of fact or law exist[ed] which would be served by any further proceedings” and dismissed the petition. With respect to Lopez's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Lopez failed to show that his counsel's “performance fell below prevailing professional norms” and that there was no “reasonable probability that the result of the trial or sentencing procedures would have been different [but for] counsel's alleged ineffective assistance.” The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Lopez's petition for review.

Lopez then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied Lopez's petition. In particular, the district court rejected claim 7 of Lopez's petition, which alleged that the trial judge failed to consider mitigating evidence at sentencing due to Arizona law impermissibly precluding consideration of such evidence absent a causal nexus to the crime. The district court also found that portions of claim 1(C)—Lopez's ineffective assistance claim challenging counsel's failure to prepare his psychiatric expert at sentencing—substantially altered the claim he had presented in his state post-conviction proceeding and were therefore procedurally barred. The district court denied the exhausted portion of claim 1(C) on the merits. The district court also denied Lopez's Brady claim as procedurally defaulted because Lopez failed to present the issue in state court. The district court held that even if the government's failure to disclose the information constituted cause to excuse the procedural default, Lopez failed to establish that the note was prejudicial.

Analysis

Because Lopez filed his habeas petition in 1998, AEDPA applies. We review de novo a district court's denial of a § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 959, as amended, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.2002). In conducting review of a state court decision, we “look to the last reasoned state-court decision.” Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir.2003). Under AEDPA, courts may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–09, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). This is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), which “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam). In addition, a petitioner may be entitled to relief if the state court's factual determination rested on an unreasonable evidentiary foundation. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, state court findings of fact are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).

I. Whether Lopez was denied an individualized sentencing determination (claim 7)

We begin with Lopez's claim that he was denied an individualized sentencing determination because the state court ignored relevant mitigating evidence. As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial judge—at both Lopez's original sentencing in 1987 and resentencing in 1990—expressly stated that he considered all the mitigating evidence and found that it did not warrant leniency. The Arizona Supreme Court also affirmed the sentencing court's analysis after an independent review of the record. Lopez I, 786 P.2d at 966; Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1264–68, 1270–71. Nonetheless, Lopez argues that, at the time of his sentencing, Arizona law unconstitutionally barred consideration of mitigating evidence that was not causally related to the crime. Because the state court presumably adhered to this rule, Lopez argues, we should infer that it did not consider all the mitigating evidence and thus denied him an individualized sentencing in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the individualized consideration of all mitigating factors in capital cases); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (same).

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