United States v. Gonzalez, 85-721-CR-SPELLMAN.

Decision Date12 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-721-CR-SPELLMAN.,85-721-CR-SPELLMAN.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Rudolfo GONZALEZ, Maria Elena Miro, Cesar Montes De Oche, Tom Lee, Luis Triana, Alfonso Caliviero, Miguel Hernandez and Rolando Hernandez, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Judy Hunt, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

Mark Skipper, John George, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Robert Stone, Hollywood, Fla., Stuart Abrams, Miami, Fla., Anthony Dieguez, Hialeah, Fla., Melvin Schlesser, Chris Cloney, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING ORDER OF FEBRUARY 12, 1986 DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

SPELLMAN, District Judge.

This CAUSE comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for this Court to Reconsider its Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment entered on February 12, 1986. The Defendants, Rudolfo Gonzales and Rolondo Hernandez, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on the grounds that the actions of the Defendants did not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320. The Defendants contended that because the products were of such obvious inferior quality, they are not "counterfeit" within the meaning of the statute and that the requirement that there be an intent to deceive or to defraud the purchaser of the goods is lacking. This Court issued an Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. The Defendants herein have requested that this Court Reconsider said Order in light of an Order of Dismissal entered on February 10, 1986 by the Honorable Norman C. Roettger. After having reviewed the file, the Motion, the Memoranda of law, and Judge Roettger's Order of Dismissal, it is hereby,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this Court's Order of February 12, 1986 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment by the Defendants is AFFIRMED.

The Defendants refer to the watches at issue as "replicas" of the more expensive products. They claim, however, that the products are of such obvious inferior quality that they are not "counterfeits" within the meaning of the Statute. Title 18, United States Code, Section 2320 provides:

(a) Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

The Statute defines "counterfeit mark" as:

(A) a spurious mark—
(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods or services;
(ii) that is identified with, or substantially indistinguishable from a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; and
(iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.

In the Order of February 10, 1986, Judge Roettger found that "goods allegedly transferred—two replica or fake Rolex watches—were not, in fact, counterfeit under 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1) in that the use of the goods was not likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive." Judge Roettger further explained:

The Court finds it unlikely—to the point of absurdity—that the purchaser of a replica or fake Rolex watch that sold for $27.00 would be confused, mistaken or deceived into thinking that he was purchasing a genuine Rolex watch, which may sell for approximately $1,000 to $8,000. Although the purchaser of the replica Rolex may be attracted by the possibility of confusing and impressing others, it is unlikely that the purchaser himself would be confused, mistaken or deceived.

United States v. John Torkington, Case No. 85-6168-CR-ROETTGER. This Court declines to accept the position espoused by Judge Roettger's Order for two reasons.

First, this Court adheres to its initial determination that the Defendant's contention that the goods constitute "replicas" rather than "counterfeits" should be established at trial before a jury. Although this Court will not endeavor to resolve the question...

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9 cases
  • U.S. v. Hon
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 21, 1990
    ...31,67 3, 31,675 (1984). See also United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1351-52 & n. 4 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F.Supp. 894, 896 (S.D.Fla.1986). Hon argues that the confusion requirement under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2320 must be read more narrowly than its Lanham Act cou......
  • U.S. v. Torkington
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • March 20, 1987
    ...1114(1) of the Lanham Act. See H.R.Rep. No. 997, at 8, 12; Joint Statement, Cong.Rec. at H12,078; see also United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F.Supp. 894, 896 (S.D.Fla.1986). The current version of section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act differs from the original version in that it does not contain t......
  • U.S. v. McEvoy, 86-5542
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • July 6, 1987
    ...United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Infurnari, 647 F.Supp. 57 (W.D.N.Y.1986); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F.Supp. 894 (S.D.Fla.1986). It is telling that the trial record reveals that appellants were very much aware that their actions in selling the watch......
  • U.S. v. Song
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 31, 1991
    ...States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 902, 108 S.Ct. 243, 98 L.Ed.2d 201 (1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F.Supp. 894 (S.D.Fla.1986).2 Section 2320(d)(2) defines "traffic" to mean "transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration......
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