Schooley v. Ingersoll Rand, Inc.

Citation631 N.E.2d 932
Decision Date29 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. 46A04-9301-CV-20,46A04-9301-CV-20
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,904 Jackie (Campbell) SCHOOLEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INGERSOLL RAND, INC. and Mauer Industrial Supplies, Inc., Appellees-Defendants.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Douglas A. Mulvaney, Stutsman & Mulvaney, Elkhart, for appellant-plaintiff.

Frederick D. Emhardt, Foley & Pool, Indianapolis, for appellees-defendants.

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant Jackie Campbell Schooley (Schooley) appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Ingersoll Rand, Inc. (Ingersoll) and Mauer Industrial Supplies, Inc. (Mauer). We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

Schooley raises the following restated issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that the hoist hook involved in the accident had been substantially altered;

2. Whether the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that the danger was open and obvious, thus negating her negligence claim;

3. Whether her negligence and product liability claims were barred by the doctrine of incurred risk; and

4. Whether Ingersoll and Mauer breached the duty to warn.

Ingersoll and Mauer contend the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in their favor and raise the following issue:

1. Whether Schooley's product negligence and strict liability claims were barred because neither Ingersoll nor Mauer proximately caused her injuries.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August, 1983, Schooley was injured during the course of her employment with Arrow Tool Company (Arrow Tool). She was directed by her supervisor to clean and move a 1500 pound steel plate hanging on a hoist hook. She observed that the plate was not restrained by the chains typically attached to both the hook and the plate, but was hanging on the hook. Realizing the danger of moving the plate, but with the belief that the job could be safely accomplished, Schooley began to operate the hoist upon which the hook was attached. The plate came loose from the hook and fell on her. Schooley's right foot was sheared at the ankle, leaving only the main artery intact. Following surgery Schooley brought a product strict liability and product negligence suit against Ingersoll, the manufacturer of the hoist hook, Maurer, the supplier of the hoist hook, and others. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ingersoll and Maurer, and dismissed the case against the other defendants. 1 In granting summary judgment, the trial court stated:

Schooley's foot was reattached, leaving her with a twenty-five percent permanent partial impairment of her right leg below the knee.

1. The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine cases of the general class of the proceedings to which this case belongs and there has been sufficient notice over the parties or they have entered their appearance in this case.

2. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the following:

(a) That the hoist hook was designed to have a safety latch;

(b) That the hoist hook when purchased by Arrow Tool had a safety latch;

(c) That at the time of the accident, there was no safety latch on the hoist hook;

(d) That at the time of the accident, the hoist hook was substantially altered from its original condition;

(e) That the danger of lifting the steel plate by the plaintiff was open and obvious;

(f) That the defendant[s] [are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(R. 786-787).

Additional facts are presented below as needed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue before the trial court was whether the facts presented when viewed in the light most favorable to Schooley, the non-moving party, presented any genuine issue of material fact. See Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. East Chicago Sanitary District (1992), Ind.App., 590 N.E.2d 1067, 1071. Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate if conflicting inferences could be drawn from those facts. Newhouse v. Farmers National Bank (1989), Ind.App., 532 N.E.2d 26, 28.

The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets, Inc. (1993), Ind.App., 618 N.E.2d 10, 12, trans. denied. The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. T.R. 56(C); Campbell v. Criterion Group (1993), Ind.App., 613 N.E.2d 423, 428, on reh'g 621 N.E.2d 342. Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing of the non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. T.R. 56(E); Campbell, 613 N.E.2d at 428.

On appeal, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court and we must consider all matters which were designated at the summary judgment stage in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. T.R. 56(C); Campbell, 613 N.E.2d at 428. On appeal, however, the party that lost in the trial court has the burden to persuade the appellate tribunal that the trial court erred. Id. (quoting Oelling v. Rao (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 189, 190). Summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the evidentiary matter designated to the trial court. T.R. 56(C); Fawley, 618 N.E.2d at 12. Our role is to closely scrutinize the trial court's determination in order to assure that Schooley was not improperly denied her day in court. See, Campbell, 613 N.E.2d at 428.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE 2

Ingersoll contends that summary judgment was proper because Schooley failed to show that the alleged defect in the hoist hook was the proximate cause of her injuries.

Ingersoll argues that Arrow Tool's failure to replace the hoist hook's safety latch operated as a superseding cause of Schooley's injuries.

Proximate cause rules applicable to negligence actions are also applicable to strict product liability actions. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg (1990), Ind.App., 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1156, reh'g denied, trans. denied. Proximate cause is established if the injury to the plaintiff is a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's act or omission "which was, or should have been, reasonably foreseen or anticipated in light of attendant circumstances." Id. (citing Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc. (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 10, 14). The intervening act or omission of a third party will not operate to defeat recovery from the defendant if the act or omission would necessarily, or might reasonably, have been foreseen by the defendant. Conder, 435 N.E.2d at 14 (citing Shanks v. A.F.E. Industries, Inc. (1980), Ind.App., 403 N.E.2d 849, rev'd on other grounds, 275 Ind. 241, 416 N.E.2d 833). The foreseeability of an intervening act or omission is usually a question for jury determination. Montgomery Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 1156.

In the present case, Professor Allen McDonald stated during his deposition that Schooley's accident could have been prevented had a safety latch been present on the hoist hook. Furthermore, he stated that the screw used to hold the safety latch in place was not strong enough for the assigned task. Harry Leidich, a design engineer for Ingersoll, stated in his deposition that hoist hooks manufactured by Ingersoll would have been equipped with safety latches. He acknowledged, however, that the safety latches were very fragile and were frequently damaged in use. He further acknowledged that they are missing in many industrial plants. Leland Slough, the owner of Arrow Tool, could not recall whether the hoist hook used by Schooley at the time of the accident came equipped with a safety latch; however, he believed the latch was not standard on all hoist hooks. Schooley stated that she had not seen safety latches on any of the hoist hooks used at Arrow Tool and she was not cognizant of their existence in general.

The facts discussed above establish a basis for a jury determination that the accident would not have happened if the safety latch would have been in place on the hoist hook used by Schooley. The same facts would also support a determination that Ingersoll manufactured hoist hooks which were equipped with safety latches that were easily broken. Furthermore, a jury determination could be warranted that Ingersoll knew that the safety latches would be broken and would not be repaired. In short, there is sufficient designated evidence to establish genuine issues of material fact on the question of proximate cause.

II. SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION

Schooley contends the trial court erred in concluding that the hoist hook was substantially altered after its sale to Arrow Tool. She argues that a product is not "substantially" altered if the manufacturer of the product could foresee the alteration.

Legislation imposing strict liability in product liability actions is found at IND.CODE 33-1-1.5-1 et seq. I.C. 33-1-1.5-3 states:

(a) One who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that product to the user or consumer or to his property if that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition, and if:

(1) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product; and

(2) the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in which it is sold by the person sought to be held liable under this chapter.

(b) The rule stated in subsection (a) applies although:

(1) the seller has exercised all reasonable care in the preparation, packaging, labeling, instructing for use, and sale of his...

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