Shapiro v. Center Tp., Butler County

• Decision Date: 13 October 1993
• Citation: 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 82,632 A.2d 994
• Parties: Louis SHAPIRO and Leo Stepanian, Appellants, v. CENTER TOWNSHIP, BUTLER COUNTY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 994

632 A.2d 994

159 Pa.Cmwlth. 82

Louis SHAPIRO and Leo Stepanian, Appellants, v. CENTER TOWNSHIP, BUTLER COUNTY.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 16, 1993.

Decided Oct. 13, 1993.

Leo M. Stepanian, for appellants.

Charles F. Flach, III, for appellee.

Before CRAIG, President Judge, and COLINS, PALLADINO, McGINLEY, PELLEGRINI, FRIEDMAN and KELLEY, JJ.

McGINLEY, Judge.

Louis Shapiro and Leo Stepanian (landowners) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County (trial court) relating to liens imposed on their property by Center Township (Township) arising from municipal claims based on two assessments for water lines abutting their property. This appeal is taken from an order on post-trial motions that the trial court entered after the appeal period ran following the original order.

The subject property is approximately seventeen acres bounded on the north by Holyoke Road and on west by Sunset Drive. A separate, unrelated property occupies the corner where these streets intersect. In 1983 the Township purchased all the assets of a private water company that served the Northvue Plan located north of Holyoke and incorporated them into the Township's water system. Part of the purchase included an eight-inch water line along Sunset Drive, which ran from the south, turned right on Holyoke and connected to another line serving the Northvue Plan. The developer of the Northvue Plan chose not to install an expensive eight-inch connection and water meter; instead, he spanned the gap with a section of one-and-one-half-inch pipe, which provided all of the supply to an eight-inch line going north. Complaints concerning the private company's prices and water pressure led to the 1983 purchase. The landowners did not seek to connect to the water line at the time of purchase because their property is undeveloped.

In 1988 the Township replaced the existing line along Holyoke with an eight-inch water main and extended that line to the east to connect to a different source. It connected this new line with the eight-inch line at the corner of Sunset Drive (thereby reversing the flow so that it now runs from north to south below Holyoke) and also extended the new line along Sunset Drive to the north of Holyoke Road. In 1989 the Township adopted a resolution assessing properties by the front-foot rule along Sunset Drive for the cost of the acquisition of that line in 1983. At the same time the Township adopted a similar resolution assessing properties along Holyoke Road for the cost of acquisition and of the 1988 construction. For the subject property, the assessments were for 826.76 feet along Sunset Drive at $4.11 per foot, a total of $3,398.00, and for 492.80 feet along Holyoke Road at $11.26 per foot, a total of $5,548.93.

The Township filed municipal claims for the assessments, which, by statute, became liens against the property upon filing. Section 3(a) of the Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended (Act), 53 P.S. § 7106(a). The landowners did not pay the assessments, and the Township then praecipied for writs of scire facias sur municipal claim and sought to prosecute the liens to judgment. The landowners filed affidavits of defense to the writs of scire facias and sought to strike the liens. See Section 14 of the Act, 53 P.S. § 7182. Following a hearing, in an opinion and order dated June 20, 1991, the trial court rejected the defenses raised by the landowners and denied their motions to strike the liens, with the exception of that portion of the claim associated with costs of construction of the line along Sunset Drive to the north of Holyoke Road, which the court ordered deducted from the assessment. Both the landowners and the Township filed motions for post-trial relief pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1. By order of July 9, 1991, the trial court scheduled oral argument on the post-trial motions for September. After oral argument the trial court denied the motions on November 4, 1991, and reaffirmed the previous order. The landowners filed an appeal to this court on December 6, 1991. ¹

On December 19, 1989, the Supreme Court adopted an amendment to Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1, relating to post-trial relief, effective January 1, 1990, which added subsection (g): "A motion for post-trial relief may not be filed in an appeal from the final adjudication or determination of a local agency or a Commonwealth agency as to which jurisdiction is vested in the courts of common pleas." ² Therefore, if the scire facias proceeding is a statutory appeal subject to Rule 227.1(g), then the appeal to this court from the denial of the motion for post-trial relief was not timely. Following oral argument on the merits of the challenge to the assessments before a panel, we directed that the case be argued before the court en banc to address (1) whether the appeal to this court was timely, and, in regard to that issue, (2) whether the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable and (3) whether the proceeding in the trial court was a statutory appeal governed by Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1.

In supplemental briefs, the landowners argue that the proceeding before the court of common pleas was a "non-jury trial" and a "civil action" originally commenced in the trial court within the meaning of the Rules. They assert that the post-trial motions were properly filed under Rule 227.1 because such motions have replaced the procedure for filing exceptions following the decision of a judge without a jury. See "Note" following Rule 227.1(a). The Township contends that proceedings on a scire facias sur municipal claim are most like those under the Eminent Domain Code, to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, and that this was a "statutory appeal," and post-trial motions are inappropriate.

In Pennsylvania a writ of scire facias is purely statutory. ³ Procedures under Chapter 25, "Municipal Claims and Tax Liens," of Title 53 of Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7505, are unusual in several respects. First, Section 3(a) of the Act, 53 P.S. § 7106(a), declares that all lawfully assessed or imposed municipal "claims" are "liens" upon the property that arise when lawfully imposed and assessed. The assessment and imposition of the lien occur without any form of hearing. A scire facias proceeding is an action in rem, but the imposition of a new lien upon property obviously has a significant effect on the property rights of the owner. ⁴ The definition of "Adjudication" provided in 2 Pa.C.S. § 101 for purposes of that title is, "Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties in which the adjudication is made." ⁵

If the owner does not dispute the claim and assessment, the owner simply pays and removes the lien. If the owner does dispute the claim, the Act provides no mechanism for a direct "appeal." Instead, to contest the claim or amount of assessment and to force the issue to an original hearing, the owner may file and serve a notice upon the claimant municipality to issue a scire facias. ⁶ In the proceeding commenced by the writ of scire facias, the owner then files an "affidavit of defense." In that affidavit the owner may raise all defenses that he or she has to the municipal claim. LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 117 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 260, 544 A.2d 1053 (1988). ⁷ Alternatively the municipality may pursue a writ of scire facias without waiting for prompting from the owner, which is what occurred in the present case. ⁸ Either way, there is no requirement that the owner "appeal" within a specified period from the initial filing of the municipal claim or forever forego the right to challenge it. ⁹

Therefore, the precise effect of the procedure renders the proceeding in common pleas court the owner's "appeal" even though the municipality is the moving party. Regardless of which party seeks the writ of scire facias to force the matter to a hearing, the owner's initial refusal to pay and subsequent filing of an affidavit of defense constitute an "appeal" from the local agency adjudication of the imposition of the lien. Jurisdiction of this appeal from an adjudication of a local agency is vested by statute in the court of common pleas, and the matter is a statutory appeal within the meaning of Rule 227.1.

However, another general principle applicable to certain post-trial proceedings in courts of common pleas is set forth by the Supreme Court in Appeal of Borough of Churchill, 525 Pa. 80, 575 A.2d 550 (1990), a case involving a real estate tax assessment appeal. In Borough of Churchill the trial court had issued oral findings and conclusions setting the fair market value of the property, to be followed by a written opinion and order, and informed counsel that after filing of the transcript they could appeal or file exceptions. The parties filed exceptions and briefs. The court considered those and then issued an order dismissing the exceptions, from which the landowner appealed. This court quashed the appeal as untimely, citing our precedent that post-trial proceedings are not permitted in statutory appeals, which proceedings are not governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court reversed.

The Supreme Court noted that historically the practice had been to permit the filing of exceptions in tax assessment appeals. The Court observed that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to actions formerly asserted in assumpsit or trespass and to those actions where the Court has incorporated the Rules by reference, providing a listing of such actions, which does not include actions on municipal claims. ¹⁰ The Court held that where the Rules do not apply, they cannot be imposed on the trial courts. Where the question is not provided for by statute or by local rule, the trial court possesses the inherent discretion to regulate...