Adamson v. Cathel
| Decision Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09–3526.,09–3526. |
| Citation | 633 F.3d 248 |
| Parties | Henry ADAMSON, Appellantv.CATHEL, Administrator of New Jersey State Prison; Paula T. Dow, The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lon Taylor [Argued], Office of Public Defender, Trenton, NJ, for Appellant.Steven E. Braun [Argued], Office of County Prosecutor, Paterson, NJ, for Appellees.Before: SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
Henry Adamson, a New Jersey prisoner convicted in 1998 of holding up a pool hall and robbing its patrons, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Adamson claims that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when, at trial, the government introduced confessions of his alleged accomplices for the purpose of impeaching Adamson's testimony that his own confession had been fabricated by a police officer. Because admission of the accomplices' statements without a limiting instruction was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we will reverse the District Court's decision and grant Adamson's habeas petition.
I. Factual Background and Procedural HistoryA. Factual Background
In the early morning of December 14, 1996, several masked and armed men entered Brother's Candy Store, a pool hall and social club in Passaic, New Jersey, and robbed several patrons. A police officer arriving at the scene saw three men flee in one direction, and two flee in another. The officer pursued the latter two and ultimately apprehended one of them, Darren Napier. When the officer returned to headquarters with Napier, he recognized the second man he had chased from the robbery scene, Gaumaal Aljamaar,1 in a holding cell. Both Napier and Aljamaar provided statements to the police (the “accomplice statements”), which detailed their involvement in the robbery and implicated Adamson.
Three days later, Adamson received a call from his girlfriend, Yvette Robinson, whose car had been used in the robbery. She informed him that the police were going to charge her with conspiracy to commit robbery and that they were looking for him. Adamson then surrendered himself peacefully to the police. After waiving his Miranda rights, he gave a statement to Detective Julius Cirelli, which, like Napier's and Aljamaar's statements, was transcribed. According to Detective Cirelli, he took Adamson's statement by asking questions and typing Adamson's answers on a computer. Adamson's statement described the planning and execution of the robbery. It detailed how and where he and his co-conspirators met to plan the robbery, the number and types of guns used in the robbery, the attempt by one co-conspirator to back out of the robbery, and the step-by-step execution of the robbery, including specifics such as who went into the club first, who held which gun, who hit a patron with a shotgun, who took jewelry and money from patrons, and how the assailants disposed of their weapons. After giving his statement, Adamson read a printed version of it, initialed each answer in it, and signed it.
Adamson was later indicted for numerous offenses related to the robbery. He was tried in the New Jersey Superior Court, separately from his co-conspirators, and his confession was admitted against him at trial through Detective Cirelli's testimony. Because the patrons of Brother's Candy Store could not identify the masked robbers, the confession was key to the prosecution, and Adamson attacked its validity, testifying on direct examination that it was false. He claimed that Detective Cirelli had threatened to charge his girlfriend if he did not confess, that he signed the confession but never read it, and that the details in it came from the written statements of Napier and Aljamaar, which were provided to Adamson before he made his own statement. He also claimed that Detective Cirelli supplied additional details that were included in the confession.
During cross-examination at trial, the prosecutor attacked Adamson's testimony regarding the motive for and content of his confession. The prosecutor began by clarifying Adamson's position on the accomplice statements:
Prosecutor: Now, you said during your direct testimony that you were given two other statements to read prior to giving [your] statement. Is that right?
Adamson: Yes.
Prosecutor: And that's your testimony. That's how you knew these details. Is that what you're trying to tell us?
Adamson: Yes.
Prosecutor: Whose other statement specifically was it that you were given?
Adamson: Aljamaar and Darren Napier.
Adamson: Yes.
The Court: Before you gave your statement.
Adamson: Yes.
(App. at 78.)
The prosecutor then marked the accomplice statements for identification and began to impeach Adamson by questioning him on the differences between them and his confession. In the colloquy that followed, the prosecutor recited and paraphrased significant portions of the accomplice statements. Importantly, those portions not only highlighted the differences between the accomplice statements and Adamson's confession, they also directly implicated Adamson in the robbery, as the following cross-examination excerpts demonstrate:
Prosecutor: You used the four door green colored Acura in your girl friend's name?
Adamson: I didn't use no car for the robbery.
Prosecutor: That's what Mr. Napier says?
Adamson: In his statement, yes.
Adamson: That's what he said.
Adamson: That's what he said in his statement, yes.
Prosecutor: He said you started thinking this was a good place to hit. Is that right?
Adamson: That's what he said, yes.
Adamson: Yes.
Prosecutor: All right. [Mr. Aljamaar] further said that you and General [, another alleged accomplice,] were going to walk around to see how many people were inside the pool hall. That's what he said?
Adamson: That's what he says, yes.
Prosecutor: And he further stated that you and General came back and said that there were between nine to twelve people inside the pool hall and that you said let's do it. That's what [Mr. Aljamaar] said?
Adamson: I need to see that because I don't remember that part.
Prosecutor: Okay. Look to the fifth line down, page 2 of Mr. Aljamaar's statement.
Adamson: Then, they said let's do it.
(App. at 81–82.) Adamson did not object to the use of the accomplice statements by the prosecutor on cross examination.
During closing argument, the prosecutor focused on the inconsistencies between Adamson's confession and the accomplice statements, arguing that those inconsistencies showed that Adamson's story about his confession being based on the accomplice statements could not be believed. The prosecutor also criticized Adamson's claim that the police fabricated the confession, wondering aloud, “if Sergeant Cirelli was trying to get [Adamson] to fabricate, why [would he] not pick one of the statements and follow it to the T, follow it by the letter?” (App. at 87.) The prosecutor then drew the jury's attention to how Adamson's confession was consistent with the account of events given by some of the victims and officers. The conclusion pressed by the prosecutor was that the “statement ... given by Henry Adamson ... clearly and unequivocally establishes his involvement and his guilt in this particular offense.” (App. at 88.) Adamson did not object to the use of the accomplice statements during closing arguments.
The day after closing arguments, the Superior Court instructed the jury. At no point did the Court provide an instruction to the jury limiting consideration of the accomplice statements to impeachment purposes or otherwise preventing the jury from considering those statements for their truth, nor did Adamson seek such an instruction. The jury found Adamson guilty on all counts except for attempted murder, and the Court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment with a consecutive ten-year sentence and a total of thirty years of parole ineligibility.
B. Procedural History
Adamson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Superior Court Appellate Division. On appeal, he asserted, among other things, that the government's use of the accomplice statements during his cross-examination violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, especially since no limiting instruction was given to the jury. In an October 5, 2000 opinion, the Appellate Division rejected that challenge, explaining that “[a]n accomplice's out-of-court statement may be used for a purpose other than proving the truth of what it asserts without violating a defendant's right of confrontation.” (App. at 52 (quotations omitted).) In so holding, the Appellate Division relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Street, in which the Supreme Court approved the use of a co-conspirator's statement to impeach a defendant who claimed that his own statement to police was fabricated and based upon the co-conspirator's. 471 U.S. 409, 413–14 & 417, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985).
Although a limiting instruction had been given in Street to prohibit the jury from considering the co-conspirator's statement for its truth, id. at 414–15, 105 S.Ct. 2078, the Appellate Division in Adamson's case decided that, although Street applied, the lack of a limiting instruction was not fatal to Adamson's conviction. “While we agree that a limiting instruction should have been given,” the Court said, “we nevertheless conclude [that] its omission...
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