Golla v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 4-93-0539,4-93-0539
• Citation: 261 Ill.App.3d 143,633 N.E.2d 193,198 Ill.Dec. 731
• Parties: , 198 Ill.Dec. 731, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,949 Sister Marie GOLLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 193

633 N.E.2d 193

261 Ill.App.3d 143, 198 Ill.Dec. 731,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,949

Sister Marie GOLLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-93-0539.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Argued Feb. 23, 1994.

Decided April 29, 1994.

Cheryl A. Handy (argued), D. Cameron Dobbins, Dobbins, Fraker, Tennant, Joy & Perlstein, Champaign, for plaintiff-appellant.

R. Michael Henderson, Alice M. Stevens (argued), Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, Peoria, for defendant-appellee.

Presiding Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Sister Marie Golla appeals from an order of the circuit court of Champaign County granting summary judgment to defendant General Motors Corporation in this products liability action. The only issue raised by plaintiff is whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because (a) the discovery rule was misapplied, or (b) a genuine issue of material fact remained to be determined. We affirm.

On August 8, 1989, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that on June 21, 1984, she purchased a 1984 Buick Skylark four-door sedan which was not reasonably safe because the seat adjustment and locking mechanism on the driver's seat was subject to failure during a collision. The complaint further alleged that on September 3, 1985, plaintiff was operating this Buick when it was involved in a collision with another automobile. At that time, the plaintiff, who was wearing the three-point passenger restraint with which the vehicle was equipped, was injured when the driver's seat slid forward. As a result, plaintiff allegedly suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD).

Defendant asserted an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations contained in section 13-202 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-202) and filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant also filed a request to admit facts to which plaintiff never replied (134 Ill.2d R. 216). The request to admit facts asked plaintiff to admit that (1) she was involved in an automobile accident on September 3, 1985; (2) directly following the accident on that date, she was seen by Dr. Sol Barnett; (3) she was also seen by Barnett on September 4, 1985, at which time she complained of discomfort and swelling in her left wrist; and (4) on April 8, 1986, she was seen by Barnett and complained of discomfort in her left shoulder and arm.

In opposition, plaintiff asserted that the discovery rule in section 13-213(d) of the Code applied. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-213(d).) According to plaintiff, because the RSD did not manifest itself until November 1987 and was not diagnosed until March 1988, the cause of action was not time-barred. Plaintiff's affidavit stated she first experienced symptoms on November 1, 1987, and saw Barnett on that date. Barnett referred her to Drs. Wayne A. Rubinstein and Barry G.W. Arnason, who diagnosed her condition as RSD on March 23, 1988.

After concluding that the discovery rule pertained and that plaintiff's response to the motion for summary judgment sufficiently raised a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for summary judgment. In addition to the request to admit facts previously referred to, several additional documents were attached as exhibits.

In a letter to Mr. Sun Nurmohammed, dated June 4, 1986, plaintiff described the accident as follows:

"On September 3, 1985, our car, a 1984 Buick Skylark[,] was involved in an accident in which in [sic ] sustained considerable damage. So violent was the impact of the crash that the front seat broke loose from the floor causing considerable physical hurt from the seat belt which forced me to remain in place."

The medical records of Barnett, dated September 3 and 4, 1985, as well as Barnett's discovery deposition, indicated that it was Barnett's impression that on September 3, 1985, plaintiff suffered a contusion of the chest as a result of the accident and on September 4, 1985, she suffered a sprain or contusion of the left wrist. Had he thought there was something more serious, he would have ordered X rays. Plaintiff did not appear to be in acute distress. His examination revealed tenderness in the chest wall and tenderness and swelling of the left wrist. He felt there could have been a stretching phenomenon of the wrist. Plaintiff had full range of motion.

Subsequently, he saw her for an injury to the left fourth finger on October 15, 1985, and discomfort in the lower rib cage--possibly chest wall pain on April 2, 1986. The reasons for the April 8, 1986, February 17, 1987, and June 18, 1987, visits were not explained in his deposition. She was seen for a migraine headache and contusion of the right thumb on September 3, 1986, falling to her knees on January 6, 1987, pain in the right elbow and discomfort in both hips on January 13, 1987, and cysts on April 21 and May 14, 1987. On June 24, 1987, she was seen because she had passed out. Barnett suspected a functional syncope. He did not suspect a brain tumor "or anything serious." After a few more unexplained visits, plaintiff was sent to Dr. J. Timothy Sehy on December 29, 1987. In his notes, Sehy said plaintiff's chest discomfort had been "long standing and unchanged." Barnett testified that prior to December 29, 1987, plaintiff had been suffering from chest discomfort.

The doctors treating her started to suspect she had Raynaud's phenomenon because her left hand became cold and bluish. Barnett conceded he knew nothing about RSD. Plaintiff did not respond to treatment for Raynaud's phenomenon, and she was finally sent to a neurologist, who diagnosed RSD.

A review of the record does present a question of fact as to whether plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the extent of her injuries, specifically the time of diagnosis of RSD. Drs. Rubinstein, Robert W. Quigg, Terri Dallas and Frederick Brown variously stated RSD could develop at different time periods after trauma, from immediate, within a few days, weeks, months, and up to two years. However, under the facts of this case, the time of diagnosis of RSD did not extend the limitations period.

Plaintiff filed a reply to the motion for reconsideration and a supporting memorandum. Plaintiff pointed out that her June 4, 1986, letter to Nurmohammed was a complaint about the repairs to the vehicle. Plaintiff also referred to exhibits to the discovery depositions of Rubinstein and Quigg. The trial court considered the doctors' depositions as well. On reconsideration, summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant.

Section 13-202 of the Code provides for a two-year statute of limitations after the accrual of the cause of action for personal injury. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-202.) In a products liability case, if the user of a product sustained an injury within 12 years from the date of first sale or 10 years from the date of alteration of the product or the sale to the initial user (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, pars. 13-213(b), (c)), then the user may commence an action to recover damages within two years after the date on which she knew, or through the use of reasonable after the date on which she knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of the personal injury. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-213(d).

As a remedy, summary judgment is drastic and is appropriate only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party's right to it is clear and free from doubt. In evaluating the propriety of granting summary judgment, the trial court should construe pleadings, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the respondent. Although inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, where the material facts are disputed or where reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts, a triable issue precluding summary judgment exists. (Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital (1993), 156 Ill.2d 511, 518, 190 Ill.Dec. 758, 762, 622 N.E.2d 788, 792; Pyne v. Witmer (1989), 129 Ill.2d 351, 357-59, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 560-61, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1307-08.) On review, this court considers de novo the propriety of granting the motion for summary judgment, and an abuse of discretion standard is not employed. Larson v. Decatur Memorial Hospital (1992), 236 Ill.App.3d 796, 801, 176 Ill.Dec. 918, 922, 602 N.E.2d 864, 868. The application of the discovery rule to determine when a party knows or reasonably should have known the injury occurred and it was wrongfully caused such that the statute of limitations begins to run is a question of fact. However, if the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn from them, summary judgment will be an appropriate disposition. (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill.2d 161, 171, 52 Ill.Dec. 1, 5-6, 421 N.E.2d 864, 868-69.) It was pointed out in Nolan that it was unnecessary for the complaining party to know of a particular defendant's negligent conduct in order for the statute of limitations to begin running. Instead, plaintiff should be on notice sufficient to warrant investigating into the cause of the wrongfully inflicted injury. See also Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill.2d 146, 156, 52 Ill.Dec. 6, 11, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874; Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (1992), 225 Ill.App.3d 882, 895-96, 167 Ill.Dec. 1063, 1072, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1202.

There are two elements to the discovery rule: (1) plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known of the injury, and (2) plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that the injury was wrongfully caused. These are two separate elements which are not concomitant (Dockery v....