United Steelworkers of America v. Logan Park Care Center, Civ. A. No. 2:86-0303.

Decision Date24 April 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 2:86-0303.
Citation634 F. Supp. 182
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
PartiesUNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC, on Behalf of LOCAL UNION NO. 14505, Plaintiffs, v. LOGAN PARK CARE CENTER, INC., Defendant.

James F. Wallington, Robin Jean Davis, William T. Payne, Hostler & Segal, Charleston, W.Va., for plaintiffs.

Charles F. Woody, Spilman, Thomas, Battle & Klostermeyer, Charleston, W.Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to a hearing held on April 7, 1986, the Court granted the Plaintiff union's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Defendant employer now moves to stay the preliminary injunction order.

The employer supports its motion with the recently announced decision of AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of America, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). This Supreme Court decision was handed down on the same date as the above referenced hearing. For the reasons enunciated below, the Court is unpersuaded that this case in any manner affects the correctness of the Court's earlier announced ruling.

The parties to this action entered into a labor contract on September 20, 1984. The contract was signed by the president of the employer and by several officials of the district and local union. The contract covered all aspects of the employment relationship in its 42 pages. Appended as Exhibit "A" to the contract was a scale of the wages to be paid over the life of the contract. The parties disagree over how this scale is to be applied. Not surprisingly, the employees would be paid less under the employer's interpretation than under the union's interpretation.

The union filed a grievance and sought to arbitrate the disputable wages. The employer has refused to arbitrate. The employer's position — asserted throughout these proceedings and reasserted here — is that it does not have a contract with the union and, therefore, does not have an obligation to proceed to arbitration. The employer's theory of the case is that since it interprets the wage scale one way and the union interprets it another way, there was no meeting of the minds on an essential element of the contract and, consequently, the contract is void. The employer further argues that the Court should, in the first instance, decide the question of whether a contract exists between the parties, and that this question should not be deferred to the arbitrator. A few general principles have evolved in the area of labor arbitration. Foremost, there is no legal obligation to submit to arbitration. "Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Therefore, whether a given issue must be arbitrated is decided "on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties." Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1320, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). The question of whether the parties have entered into an agreement containing an arbitration requirement is not for the arbitrator to decide; it must be decided by the Court. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra; Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Service Emp. Union, Local No. 80, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 605 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir.1979). These principles, established more than twenty-five years ago in the famous steelworkers trilogy, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., supra; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), have established a strong presumption of arbitrability in the area of labor relations. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974).

Keeping in mind the above principles, the Court is cognizant of its limited role in this type of case. That role can be summarized in the form of two dispositive questions: (1) "Is there a valid agreement to arbitrate?" (2) "Does the agreement cover the asserted dispute?" International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 139 v. Carl A. Morse, Inc., 529 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.1976).

In AT & T Technologies, the lower courts ran afoul of the principle that the court's province is to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular dispute. The lower courts had deferred to arbitrability question to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court reversed. The issue in AT & T Technologies involved an interpretation of the arbitration clause contained in the parties' contract. In the case at bar, however, there is no attack on the arbitration clause itself. Setting aside the wage clause dispute momentarily, the parties surely cannot contend that they did not have an agreement to arbitrate disputes which developed under the contract. The parties agreed that the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the contract would be the "sole and exclusive means to resolve disputes" which arise "out of or under the contract, the interpretation, application or performance thereof, the terms and conditions of employment or local trouble of any kind."

The Court, in fulfilling its role in this type of process, explicitly held at the April 7 hearing that the parties had agreed to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract and that the instant dispute was covered by that agreement. In arguing that the current contractual dispute over wages manifests a failure of the respective minds to meet, the employer seeks to have the Court step up on a slippery slope indeed. The inevitable slide down that slope would result in the evisceration of the national labor policy favoring arbitration of contractual disputes.

In almost every instance involving a dispute over the interpretation of a labor contract, a party could claim that there was no "meeting of the minds" even where the contract is tendered in evidence for the Court to scrutinize. Extensions of such an approach would inevitably entangle the Court in the substantive terms of the contract. In AT & T Technologies, the Seventh Circuit held that deciding the arbitrability issue "would entangle the court in interpretation of substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and thereby involve consideration of the merits of the dispute." Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 751 F.2d 203, at 206 (7th Cir. 1984). As noted, the Supreme Court reversed. That reversal was based, however, on the fact that the threshold question of arbitrability had been deferred to the arbitrator. Again, the Court here is not confronted with the proper scope or validity of the arbitration clause. It must be remembered that "it is the arbitration clause, not the substantive contract clause in controversy, which governs whether a dispute must be submitted to arbitration." Haig Berberian, Inc. v. Cannery Warehousemen, 535 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1976).

It is true in a certain sense that the Court must determine whether a contract exists between the parties. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Ratner Corp., 602 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1979). But that general principle cannot be applied to reach the result desired by the employer here. If the Court decide to determine whether the parties had a "meeting of the minds" on the terms of wage increases, the role of the arbitrator would in all probability be reduced to a hollow formality. The Court believes that when parties enter into a labor contract and agree to...

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3 cases
  • Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • February 10, 1989
    ...Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1320, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962); United Steelworkers of America v. Logan Park, 634 F.Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.W.Va.1986). Indeed, "... the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the pa......
  • Eastern Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • September 25, 1987
    ...any case. ALPA, on the other hand, has cited two cases that are factually similar to this case. In United Steelworkers of America v. Logan Park Care Center, 634 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.W.V.1986) the union sought to arbitrate a dispute over wages arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. Th......
  • Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • December 27, 1988
    ...of disagreement under previously adopted language. See Continental Can, 821 F.2d at 1351; United Steelworkers of America v. Logan Park Care Center, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.W.V.1986). Cf. Restatement, supra, at Sec. 20 comment b ("material differences of meaning are a standard cause ......

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