Perkins v. Freedom of Information Com'n

Citation228 Conn. 158,635 A.2d 783
Decision Date21 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 14733,14733
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Parties, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 725 Karen PERKINS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, et al.

Regina M. Hopkins-Griggs, Commission Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, for appellant (named defendant).

William J. Dolan, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is the proper scope of the "invasion of personal privacy" exception codified in General Statutes § 1-19(b)(2) 1 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 2 The defendant freedom of information commission (FOIC), ordered the defendant John Gawrys, superintendent of the New Fairfield public schools, to disclose the sick leave records of the plaintiff school teacher, Karen Perkins, to the defendants Arthur E. Azzarito and the New Fairfield Taxpayers Association (association). The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the decision of the FOIC on the ground that the FOIC lacked authority to require disclosure because the request in question was purely for information rather than one for specifically identifiable records. The FOIC 3 appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We disagree with the trial court's ruling and therefore reverse its order sustaining the plaintiff's appeal.

The material facts are undisputed. On June 17, 1991, Azzarito, the president of the association, made a written request to the holder of records of the New Fairfield board of education for information pertaining to sick leave records regarding the psychologist position held by the plaintiff at Consolidated School. The purpose of his request was to ascertain the number of sick days that she had accumulated, the amount of money that had been paid to her to the date of his request, and the date on which she had last worked.

On June 17, 1991, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-20a (b), 4 Gawrys sent a letter to the plaintiff notifying her that the school district had received a request for the disclosure of her accumulated sick leave prior to the commencement of her sick leave for the current year, and that the district had denied the request on the grounds that disclosure would constitute an invasion of her privacy. The letter also informed the plaintiff that she had four business days from the receipt of the letter to notify the school district as to whether she had an objection to the disclosure of those records, and that the records would be disclosed absent such an objection.

The plaintiff filed a timely objection with Gawrys, who, in turn, sent a letter to Azzarito denying the records request. Thereafter, Azzarito and the association sent a letter to the FOIC urging it to require compliance with their request.

After an evidentiary hearing, the FOIC rendered its final decision ordering Gawrys to provide copies of the requested records to Azzarito and the association. The FOIC found that Azzarito had requested information limited to records concerning the plaintiff's sick pay rather than information about the nature of her illness or the state of her health. The FOIC determined that the plaintiff "has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality regarding the characterization of her compensation and absence from work so long as the characterization [is congruent with] the terms of her contract...." Stating that "a reasonable person would not suffer embarrassment as a result of the disclosure of information concerning sick time and compensation, because sick time is an ordinary benefit of employment that is generally used by employees in accordance with specific contract provisions"; the FOIC decided that the "invasion of personal privacy" exception of § 1-19(b)(2) did not apply because "the exemption was not intended to shield the misconduct of public officials from public knowledge." Id., 3. The FOIC concluded, therefore, that Gawrys and the plaintiff had not met their burden of proof with respect to the invasion of privacy exception.

The plaintiff filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court. After a hearing, the trial court sustained her appeal. Having first determined that the plaintiff was aggrieved by the FOIC decision requiring disclosure of her sick leave records, the court then, sua sponte, framed and resolved an issue concerning the nature of the request for disclosure made by Azzarito and the association. Relying on the definition of "public records or files" contained in General Statutes § 1-18a (d), 5 the court determined that Azzarito's request was one "for answers to questions and not a request for access to public records which might contain the answers to his questions. His request [sought] pure information and not specifically identifiable records." (Emphasis in original.) Explaining that this distinction was "not a formal or hypertechnical one," the court concluded that Azzarito had failed to meet his burden of identifying the records that he sought to inspect. In the absence of a proper request, the court held that the FOIC had no way of knowing the type of documents or materials that were being sought and, thus, could not properly determine whether a FOIA violation had occurred or a FOIA exemption was applicable.

The FOIC has appealed from the trial court's judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal. The FOIC first maintains that the trial court mistakenly concluded that the form of the request made by the defendants, Azzarito and the association, deprived the FOIC of authority to find a FOIA violation. Second, the FOIC argues that the trial court should have found that, under General Statutes § 4-183(j) 6 the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the commission's order of disclosure and that its order is justified by an appropriately limited construction of the "invasion of personal privacy" exception found in § 1-19(b)(2). We agree with both contentions.

I

We must first resolve the issue of the nature of the request that Azzarito and the association made to Gawrys. 7 All of the parties to this case, including the FOIC, 8 treated the request as one for the plaintiff's sick leave records and, thus, within the province of the FOIA. The trial court nonetheless, sua sponte, characterized the request as one for "pure information," "answers to questions," and "not specifically identifiable [public] records," outside the scope of the FOIC's authority. (Emphasis in original.) We disagree with the trial court's characterization.

Our resolution of this issue is guided by the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.; to the determinations made by an administrative agency. 9 "[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion." Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 397, 604 A.2d 351 (1992). Even as to questions of law, "[t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. (Emphasis added.) ... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). "Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law ... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986); see also New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 205 Conn. at 773-74, 535 A.2d 1297; Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 342-43, 435 A.2d 353 (1980).

The FOIA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute [including the exceptions to the FOIA], all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency ... shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours or to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-15...." 10 General Statutes § 1-19(a). The act specifically defines " '[p]ublic records or files' " to include "any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency...." General Statutes § 1-18a(d).

Azzarito and the association made a written request to Gawrys 11 pertaining to the plaintiff's sick leave records that was consistently treated, by all the parties, as a request for records. See footnote 8. Neither the plaintiff nor Gawrys ever asked for any clarification regarding the specific information that Azzarito and the association sought, and none of the parties to this case ever made any suggestion that the requested information was not part of the plaintiff's existing public record.

Although we have not previously had the occasion to articulate an interpretation of what constitutes a FOIA records request, this issue is similar to others in which courts must defer to the exercise of administrative judgment. "The FOIC has full authority to determine the existence of public records and the...

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