Jackson v. Stinchcomb

Decision Date27 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 78-1702,78-1702
PartiesJames B. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold STINCHCOMB, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Claude H. Tison, Jr., John R. Bush, Tampa, Fla., for defendants-appellants.

Dent & Pflugner, John C. Dent, Jr., Sarasota, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before MORGAN, ANDERSON and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction ordering the appellant "to reinstate ... (appellee) to the position with the City of Sarasota held on the date of his discharge with all rights and prerequisites relating thereto, and to grant the pay and allowances he otherwise would have received had he not been discharged." We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976) governing interlocutory appeals.

Appellants, various employees and officials of the City of Sarasota, Florida, are defendants in a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) by appellee James Jackson, a firefighter-E.M.T.-1 (emergency medical technician) in the City of Sarasota, Florida, Fire Department. 1 Jackson's complaint

alleges three counts and seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. This appeal is concerned only with the preliminary injunctive relief granted by the district court which reinstated appellee Jackson to his job as a firefighter.

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

This litigation began on October 27, 1977, when James Jackson filed a complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) seeking expungement from his personnel file of a notice of reprimand and warning. The reprimand was made on September 13, 1977, after Jackson expressed his views during a radio interview concerning a proposed millage rate increase that would have affected the EMT services provided by the Sarasota Fire Department. In Count I of his complaint, Jackson sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants' conduct was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and sought expungement of the reprimand from his records. He also asked the court to enjoin defendants from interfering with his rights of employment in any way. In Counts I and II, Jackson challenged the constitutionality of the personnel rules he was said to have violated.

Meanwhile, Jackson was in the process of seeking restoration of his civil rights which were lost when he was convicted in 1966 of attempted armed robbery in Louisiana. This conviction disqualified Jackson from serving as a union business agent under Florida law until his civil rights were restored. Fla.Stat. §§ 447.02, 447.04. Needing a letter of recommendation from his current employer as part of his application, Jackson approached his supervisor, Lt. Rhoades, informed him of the conviction and application for restoration of civil rights, and asked Rhoades to write an official letter of recommendation, but not to disclose the conviction to others in the fire department.

Chief Stinchcomb learned of the conviction in January, 1978. Chief Stinchcomb then consulted with the City Attorney, who advised him that under Florida law he was required to terminate Jackson's employment. The Sarasota Fire Department terminated Jackson's employment on February 4, 1978. 2 On February 9, 1978, Jackson Jackson's February 9, 1978, motion for injunctive relief was heard February 16, 1978. On February 21, 1978, the district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring that Jackson be reinstated to his job. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on February 21, 1978. A hearing was held on this motion on March 17, 1978. At this hearing, the court indicated that a supplemental hearing would be scheduled and appellants' appeal rights would be protected. That hearing was held on May 26, 1978. At the end of the May 26 hearing, the district court judge concluded that Jackson had not intentionally misrepresented that he was not a convicted felon in his application for employment as a firefighter. Supp. Record, vol. 2 at 127.

filed an amended complaint adding an additional count (Count III) in which he asked the court to enjoin defendants from dismissing him from his employment and otherwise interfering with his rights and to issue a declaratory judgment declaring that Fla.Stat. §§ 112.011(2)(b) and 633.34 as applied are unconstitutional. Jackson also sought actual, compensatory and punitive damages. Jackson, by letter from his attorney dated February 10, 1978, appealed to the City of Sarasota its decision to fire him.

On March 20, 1978, appellants filed a notice of appeal from the district court's February 21, 1978, order granting Jackson a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, on March 8, 1978, a civil service hearing to consider Jackson's termination was held. A continuation of the hearing of the Civil Service Board was held on March 15, 1978.

On April 14, 1978, Jackson moved to amend his complaint to add supplemental parties and pleadings. In Counts IV and V, Jackson alleged that the post-termination procedures followed by the Civil Service Board were violative of due process and that Civil Service Rule 14, Employee Review Requests, and Section 14.7, Procedure for Appeal of Demotion, Suspension or Dismissal, are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied by defendants-Civil Service Board members.

It will be helpful to isolate which issues are before us on this appeal and which are not. Counts I and II of the complaint, relating to the radio interview, are not before us. Counts IV and V, relating to the adequacy of the post-termination hearing which occurred after the preliminary injunction, are not before us. We consider on this appeal only the propriety of the preliminary injunction reinstating Jackson pursuant to Count III of his complaint.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Normally, the standard governing appellate review of the grant of a preliminary injunction is whether the district court abused its discretion. Morgan v. Fletcher (t)he four factors considered prior to the award of preliminary injunctive relief are mixed questions of fact and law. On review the district court's findings of fact are to be upheld unless 'clearly erroneous.' F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The district court's conclusions of law are subject to broad review and will be reversed if incorrect.

518 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975); Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973). An appellate court does not consider the merits of the controversy except as is necessary to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. 518 F.2d at 238. "The discretion of the District Court, however, is not completely unrestrained; it must be exercised with regard to what this Court has labeled 'the four prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of preliminary injunction' (citations omitted). The four prerequisites are: (1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest (citations omitted)." 518 F.2d at 239. As we indicated in Buchanan v. United States Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259, 267 n. 24 (5th Cir. 1975):

Of the four prerequisites for preliminary injunction, appellants dispute only the substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Specifically, then, we review this conclusion of the district court to determine whether it was based on a clearly erroneous factual determination or an incorrect determination of law.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION

In its February 21, 1978, order, the court found first that the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 112.011(2)(b) 3 modify the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 633.34(2) 4. The court then held that "(i)n view of the defendants' disregard for the modifying effect which Fla.Stat. § 112.011(2)(b) has on Fla.Stat. § 633.34(2), the Court is of the opinion the defendants' action in terminating the plaintiff was arbitrary and unreasonable and amounts to a denial of due process. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973)." Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 451 F.Supp. 494, 496 (M.D.Fla.1978). The court observed next that Jackson was discharged "without the prophylactic pretermination procedures as set forth in Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976) (vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d 1144 (1978))." 5 451 F.Supp. at 496.

The district court then, "having considered ... the prerequisites for granting injunctive relief as set forth in Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975) ...." (451 F.Supp. at 496), held that injunctive relief should be granted. Implicit in the court's order is the conclusion that Jackson was likely to succeed on the merits of one or more of the theories referred to by the court, the substantive due process theory, the procedural due process theory, or a theory

that his discharge occurred in violation of state law.

ANALYSIS

Appellants' argument, briefly stated, is that Jackson cannot succeed in federal court on the merits of his claim for reinstatement because those claims over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction will not support reinstatement, and the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim which might have supported reinstatement. Accordingly, appellants argue, Jackson failed to satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction and the district court should not have granted it. In our analysis, we will review each claim considered by the district court to determine whether it can serve to support ...

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