In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
Decision Date | 24 November 1980 |
Docket Number | Docket 80-7079.,No. 1069,1069 |
Citation | 635 F.2d 987 |
Parties | In re "AGENT ORANGE" PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Thomas E. Moseley, John C. Sabetta and Leonard Rivkin, New York City (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Townley & Updike, New York City, Clark, Gagliardi & Miller, White Plains, N.Y., Kelley, Drye & Warren, New York City, and Rivkin, Leff & Sherman, Garden City, N.Y., on brief), for defendants-appellants.
Irving Like, Babylon, N.Y., and Victor John Yannacone, Jr., Patchogue, N.Y. (Edward F. Hayes, III and Malerba, Abruzzo, Clancy, Hayes, Downes & Frankel, Huntington, N.Y., Reilly & Like, Babylon, N.Y., W. Keith Kavenagh, Bayport, N.Y., Albert J. Fiorella, Mineola, N.Y., Yannacone & Yannacone, Patchogue, N.Y., Paul F. Corcoran, Mineola, N.Y., Aaron D. Twerski, Far Rockaway, N.Y., and Dorothy Thompson and Greenwald & Greenwald, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, and VAN GRAAFEILAND and KEARSE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal presents the question whether claims asserted by veterans of the United States armed forces against companies which supplied the United States government with chemicals that are alleged to have been contaminated and to have injured the veterans and their families, are governed by federal common law. Defendants-appellants Diamond Shamrock Corporation, Monsanto Company, Thompson-Hayward Chemical Company, Hercules Incorporated and the Dow Chemical Company were the manufacturers of various herbicides including "Agent Orange" (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Agent Orange") for use by the military as defoliants in the Vietnam War. The plaintiffs, veterans of that war and their families, allege that they have sustained various physical injuries by reason of the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange. Plaintiffs seek redress of those injuries under federal common law, and have invoked the "federal question" jurisdiction of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). Defendants contest the existence of a federal common law cause of action, and moved below to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, George C. Pratt, Judge, denied their motion. Defendants obtained certification of the jurisdiction issue and took this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).1
We agree with defendants that there is no federal common law right of action under the circumstances of this litigation. Accordingly, we reverse.
The present litigation began in late 1978 and early 1979, when several individual veterans and their families commenced actions in the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, claiming injury from the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange and purporting to represent several classes of injured persons and persons allegedly "at risk" of injury. The plaintiffs in most of these actions were represented by the same attorney, who filed substantially identical complaints in all actions, naming the same defendant manufacturers. By order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, thirteen such actions, involving thirty named plaintiffs, were transferred to the Eastern District of New York and assigned to Judge Pratt for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). Subsequently, additional actions were filed and were transferred to the Eastern District. It appears that there are presently more than 800 named plaintiffs in these proceedings.
After the transfer plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the action that the district court had designated as the lead action for purposes of pretrial proceedings. Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds, and by opinion dated August 14, 1979, the district court dismissed a number of claims2 and directed that a new complaint be filed. The second amended complaint was filed on August 20, 1979, asserting causes of action under the federal common law3 and premising subject matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).4 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion was argued on October 3, 1979, and after argument but prior to decision plaintiffs proffered a third amended complaint. Defendants consented to the filing of the new complaint, and the district court, at the urging of the defendants, treated defendants' motion to dismiss as having been made with respect to that complaint. Accordingly, it is the third amended complaint (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Complaint") that is before us on this appeal.
The basic thrust of the Complaint is relatively simple: defendants manufactured a "phenoxy herbicide," Agent Orange, for use by the military in Vietnam. The herbicide was allegedly contaminated with certain toxic organic chemicals, including 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin ("dioxin"), which plaintiffs describe as "one of the most toxic substances ever developed by man." (Plaintiffs' Brief on Appeal at 2.) The plaintiff veterans assert that they were exposed to Agent Orange, and thus to the dioxin it contained, while serving in Vietnam. They claim to have sustained various physical injuries, or to be "at risk" of such injuries, by reason of that exposure. Plaintiffs seek relief on a number of theories, including strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.
(Complaint ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction against further manufacture of Agent Orange.
Defendants deny that there is any causal connection between exposure to Agent Orange and the injuries that plaintiffs claim to have sustained, and vigorously contest the propriety of the various remedial measures that plaintiffs seek to impose on them. This case, however, is still at the pleading stage, and for purposes of deciding the jurisdictional question before us, plaintiffs' factual allegations must be accepted as true.
Plaintiffs argue that federal common law should be applied to their claims principally because of the unique federal nature of the relationship between the soldier and his government, relying chiefly on United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1606, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (). They contend that this interest brings the case within the doctrine of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S.Ct. 573, 574, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), which held that, in order to ensure uniformity and certainty, "the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law." Plaintiffs argue that the government similarly has an interest in having all of its veterans compensated by government contractors who manufactured or marketed Agent Orange, and that application of the respective state laws would impede recovery on a uniform basis.
The district court rejected the contention that Clearfield Trust stated the controlling principle, recognizing that the United States, a party to Clearfield Trust, is not party to the plaintiffs' claims here.6 Rather, the court recognized that since the present action involves only private parties, the federal common law issue is controlled by the principles set forth in Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977), and Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). After reviewing the latter decisions, the district court applied a three-factor test to determine whether federal common law governs plaintiffs' claims:
(1) the existence of a substantial federal interest in the outcome of a litigation; (2) the effect on this federal interest should state law be applied; and (3) the effect on state interests should state law be displaced by federal common law.
With respect to the first factor, the district court recognized two principal federal interests that may be affected by the present lawsuits: the federal government's interest in its relations with members of the armed forces, and its interest in its relations with suppliers of war materiel. As to the government's interest in the welfare of its veterans, the court stated that:
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IN RE" AGENT ORANGE" PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
...Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under federal common law for jurisdictional purposes. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.1980), cert. d?nied sub nom. Chapman v. Dow, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S.Ct. 980, 71 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981). Accordingly, the ......
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In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
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