Anderson v. Morris, 80-1534
| Decision Date | 17 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1534,80-1534 |
| Citation | 636 F.2d 55 |
| Parties | John B. ANDERSON; D. A. Bert Booth; Kevin P. McCleaf; Gerald M. Eisenstat, Appellees, v. Willard A. MORRIS, in his official capacity as State Administrator of the Election Laws, State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Theodore N. Clark, in his official capacity as Chairman of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; James W. Johnson, in his official capacity as Vice-Chairman of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Reginald A. Aspen, in his official capacity as a member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Karen Lancaster, in her official capacity as a member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; Sylvia Raphael, in her official capacity as a member of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws; State Administrative Board of Election Laws, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Robert A. Zarnoch, Diana G. Motz, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. of Md., George A. Nilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellants.
George T. Frampton, Jr., Washington, D.C. (Mitchell Rogovin, Ellen S. Semonoff, Rogovin, Stern & Huge, Washington, D.C., Henry R. Lord, Michael C. Powell, Thomas J. Gisriel, Piper & Marbury Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, C. J., and WINTER and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
At the instance of presidential candidate John B. Anderson and various of his supporters, the district court ruled that Maryland's filing deadline for candidates for the presidency of the United States who seek nomination by petition was unconstitutional. Accordingly, it ordered Maryland election officials to place Mr. Anderson's name on the general election ballot as an independent candidate if, on or before August 4, 1980, the petition for his nomination otherwise complied with the requirements of Maryland law. Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.Supp. 1095 (D.Md.1980). The state election officials have appealed, and we affirm.
We find ourselves essentially in agreement with the opinion of the district court both as to the facts and the applicable law. 1 While we are content to affirm primarily on the opinion of the district court, we append the following comments in summary of our own views:
In Maryland a candidate for the presidency who is not the candidate of a major political party may obtain access to the general election ballot by petition. Ann. Code of Md. Art. 33, § 7-1(a). 2 A candidate seeking nomination by petition must file a certificate of candidacy at the time and place and in the manner provided in Subtitle 4A of Article 33 and comply with other applicable provisions of law. Section 4A-3 requires the certificate of candidacy to be filed on the Monday which is ten weeks or seventy days before the day on which the primary election shall be held. 3 In a presidential election year the primary is held on the second Tuesday in May; thus for 1980, certificates of candidacy for nomination by petition were required to be filed by March 3, 1980.
A major party candidate for the presidency need never make any application or file any declaration of candidacy for either the primary or general election ballot. His name may appear on the primary ballot at the instance of the Maryland Secretary of State or by filing a petition containing the signatures of registered voters. § 12-2. 4 Even if the candidate does not participate in the primary or, if he does participate in the primary and is defeated, he may appear on the ballot for the general election if his nomination is certified by the persons whose duty it may be "by party usage" to declare the result of an election by convention, §§ 8-1(a); 5-1, and that certification need not be made until sixty-five days before the general election, § 8-4. In other words, a major party presidential candidate who does not choose to campaign in the Maryland primary or loses the primary may still appear on the Maryland ballot in November if he is nominated by the party convention.
It is manifest that Maryland imposes harsher restrictions on an independent candidate for the presidency than on the candidate of a major party, and, in particular, that an independent candidate for the presidency must formally declare his candidacy at an earlier date than one who subsequently appears on the general election ballot as the candidate of a major party. 5 In determining the validity of such a restriction, we perceive that we must consider two factors: first, is the restriction necessary to serve a substantial state interest, and, second, if so, is it unduly burdensome on the right of an independent candidate to gain access to the ballot. Elections Board v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). We think that, with respect to presidential candidates, Maryland's early filing date in issue fails the first test.
Before us, Maryland vigorously argues that the early filing date furthers stability in the political process. 6 We do not doubt the legitimacy of the asserted interest. A state may properly conclude that intraparty disputes should be settled in party primaries, that the general election ballot is reserved for major political struggles, that it should not be the forum for continuing intraparty feuds and that losers in primaries should not be permitted to continue the struggle, all to the end that the general election ballot shall present the electorate with understandable choices and the winner shall have sufficient support to govern effectively. See, e. g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 735, 94 S.Ct. at 1281; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31-33, 89 S.Ct. at 10-11. We cannot conclude, however, that the early filing date under attack achieves or helps to achieve these objectives.
Maryland has a "sore loser" statute, § 8-2, which prohibits a person defeated in a party primary for the nomination for an office, other than judge, from appearing on the general election ballot. But § 8-2, by its terms, contains certain exceptions for presidential candidates. In the instant case, Maryland concedes that it has no application in this case, that is, that Mr. Anderson is not barred by § 8-2 from appearing on the general election ballot notwithstanding that he was technically a defeated candidate in the Maryland Republican presidential primary. 7 If it were possible for a state to adopt a sore loser law applicable in all circumstances to presidential races, this would be a means of serving the interests that Maryland asserts. 8
But we cannot conclude that Maryland's early filing date is in the nature of a sore loser statute or that it furthers the asserted state interests in any respect. This conclusion follows from the fact that Maryland does not prohibit a presidential candidate from both participating in his party's primary and seeking nomination by petition simultaneously for the same general election. 9 Thus, there is no relationship whatsoever between (1) a presidential candidate's deciding by March 3 to seek nomination as an independent, and (2) entering, winning or losing Maryland's primary. 10
Failing to achieve a legitimating purpose, Maryland's early filing date for presidential candidates for...
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