636 Fed.Appx. 521 (11th Cir. 2016), 15-12853, White v. Taylor
|Citation:||636 Fed.Appx. 521|
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM:|
|Party Name:||CLORETHA LAVERN WHITE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILLIAM T. TAYLOR, Respondent-Appellee|
|Attorney:||CLORETHA LAVERN WHITE, Petitioner - Appellant, Pro se, TALLAHASSEE, FL. For WILLIAM T. TAYLOR, Respondent - Appellee: Kristen A. Fiore, Pamela C. Marsh, Karen K. Wong, U.S. Attorney's Office, PENSACOLA, FL.|
|Judge Panel:||Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||January 20, 2016|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cv-00312-MP-CJK.
CLORETHA LAVERN WHITE, Petitioner - Appellant, Pro se, TALLAHASSEE, FL.
For WILLIAM T. TAYLOR, Respondent - Appellee: Kristen A. Fiore, Pamela C. Marsh, Karen K. Wong, U.S. Attorney's Office, PENSACOLA, FL.
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Cloretha Lavern White, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1996, a grand jury charged White with (1) conspiracy to (a) commit carjacking, (b) use and carry firearms in relation to a crime of violence, (c) obstruct commerce by robbery, (d) transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, and (e) possess with the intent to distribute cocaine (Count 1); (2) carjacking with intent to cause death and serious bodily harm (Count 6); (3) using and carrying a firearm in connection with the carjacking in Count 6 (Count 7); (4) robbery of Mayor's Jewelers in Lakeland Florida (Count 8); (5) using and carrying a firearm in connection with the robbery in Count 8 (Count 9); (6) possession with intent to distribute cocaine (Count 11); and (7) transportation of stolen goods (Count 13). Regarding the Mayor's robbery in Count 8, the indictment alleged two of White's codefendants committed the robbery, while she was the getaway driver. Concerning Count 1, the indictment alleged White and her codefendants used the carjacked vehicles as getaway cars during jewelry-store robberies, then sold the stolen merchandise to purchase cocaine. The indictment further alleged White and a codefendant robbed at gunpoint the Maier and Berkele jewelry store in Alpharetta, Georgia, as one of the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
At trial, White was found guilty on Counts 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 13. Concerning Count 6, the carjacking charge, White's judgment stated she was convicted of " carjacking resulting in death" and cited 18 U.S.C. § 2119, but it did not specify the subsection of the statute under which she was convicted. R. at 154. White received a sentence of life imprisonment for Counts 1, 6, 8, and 13, with a consecutive sentence of five years for Count 7 and a sentence of 20 years for Count 9, to be served consecutively to the sentence for Count 7. White appealed and asserted the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. We affirmed.
White filed her first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in March 1999; she asserted several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, two of which related to the sufficiency of the evidence for Count 9, the firearm charge concerning the Mayor's robbery. She attempted to amend her § 2255 motion several times, but the district judge denied her requests, because she repeatedly failed to follow the proper procedure for presenting a proposed amendment. The judge denied White's § 2255 motion. In discussing her claims regarding Count 9, the judge noted the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and described testimony given at trial regarding White's involvement
in the robbery of the Maier and Berkele jewelry store. White subsequently filed a second § 2255 motion, which the district judge dismissed as successive.
White filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in 2011 and challenged her conviction and sentence on Count 6, the carjacking charge. White asserted she was charged with simple carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), which carried a maximum penalty of 15 years, but was convicted of and sentenced to life imprisonment for carjacking resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3). She further contended we misinterpreted § 2119 in affirming her carjacking conviction on direct appeal.
In support of her claims, White cited Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). To satisfy the intent element of § 2119, Holloway held the government need prove only the defendant possessed the conditional intent to harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the vehicle. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12, 119 S.Ct. at 972. Jones explained § 2119 created three separate offenses with distinct elements that must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52, 119 S.Ct. at 1228. White stated she filed her original § 2255 motion before Holloway...
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