State v. Bradshaw, 20-414
| Decision Date | 01 December 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-414,20-414 |
| Citation | 54 Or.App. 949,636 P.2d 1011 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. James E. BRADSHAW, Appellant. ; CA A20459. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before GILLETTE, P. J., and ROBERTS and YOUNG, JJ.
Defendant appeals his convictions for first degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants and driving while his license was revoked. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements he made after he requested counsel. We reverse.
Defendant had been asked to accompany an Oregon State Police officer, who was investigating a fatal automobile accident, to the Rockaway Police Department for questioning, and there is no dispute that he went voluntarily. The officer considered defendant a suspect; he was advised he was not in custody and was free to leave. Once at the station, defendant was advised of his Miranda 1 rights. He denied involvement with the automobile accident. He was charged with furnishing liquor to a minor and was placed in custody. At this point defendant indicated he wanted an attorney.
Sometime thereafter, either prior to or during the course of his transfer to the Tillamook County jail, defendant inquired of the officer "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" Defendant recalls this was while he was enroute by automobile from the police station to the county jail; the state interprets the record as indicating the query was made while he was still at the police station. The officer testified that he told defendant "You do not have to talk to me * * * since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will." He said the defendant told him he understood, and, as the officer testified, they "had a conversation from then on." They discussed what defendant would be charged with and where he was going to go. Then, the officer testified, "I believe I put him in the front seat-I am sure of this-so we could talk and then I proceeded to the Tillamook County jail and we had a considerable amount of conversation on the way there." During this time, the police officer reiterated to defendant his own theory of the auto accident, which apparently implicated defendant to some degree. The officer suggested defendant could take a polygraph examination and "clear this matter up." Defendant agreed to talk to the polygraph examiner.
The next day the polygraph examiner, who was not told defendant had requested counsel, administered a polygraph examination. Before the examination, defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver card. After the examination, defendant says, the officer administering the test told him he was not telling the truth and that "they had ways of breaking it down to prove that I was driving the truck." According to the officer's testimony, he told defendant that based on the results of the examination, he did not believe defendant was telling the truth and that he believed defendant was driving the truck at the time of the accident.
The court found that the police made no threats, promises or inducements to talk, that defendant was properly advised of his rights and understood them and that within a short time after requesting an attorney he changed his mind without any impropriety on the part of the police. The court held that the statements made to the polygraph examiner were voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent.
While we are bound by the historical facts as found by the trial court, where they are supported by the evidence, the question of whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel is a question to be determined by this court pursuant to our duty to interpret constitutional standards and require conformance thereto. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 488, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). This case is controlled by the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); we hold that the statements defendant made to police were not made after a valid waiver of his rights.
In Edwards the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant and taken to the police station, where he was informed...
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...v. Bradshaw, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (quoting 54 Or.App. 949, 952, 636 P.2d 1011, 1012 (1981)), beyond the proper inducements inherent in informing him of the gravity of his situation and the advantages to be gained from......
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State v. Jackson
...the presence of counsel before speaking to the police. See State v. Taylor, 56 Or.App. 703, 643 P.2d 379 (1982); State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or.App. 949, 636 P.2d 1011 (1981), rev. den. 292 Or. 568 (1982); State v. Fuller, 54 Or.App. 815, 636 P.2d 447 (1981), rev. den. 292 Or. 356 (1982). Thus, E......
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Oregon v. Bradshaw
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U.S. v. Obregon
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