Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College
| Decision Date | 18 September 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 17202,17202 |
| Citation | 636 P.2d 1063 |
| Parties | 1 Ed. Law Rep. 719 James E. PIACITELLI, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. SOUTHERN UTAH STATE COLLEGE; and Orville D. Carnahan, President, Southern Utah State College, Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
H. Delbert Walker, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Robert L. Gardner, Cedar City, for respondent.
This is an action by a college employee who claims he was terminated without the formal termination procedures required by his contract. The district court denied reinstatement but awarded back pay for a period of approximately six months. The employee appeals the failure to reinstate him, and the College cross-appeals the award of back pay. We affirm on both issues.
In 1973, plaintiff Piacitelli commenced employment as Coordinator of Counseling at Southern Utah State College (SUSC) (hereinafter "the College"). In this position, which was categorized as nonfaculty "classified staff," he was not eligible for tenure like faculty members at the College. In each of the academic years beginning 1973 through 1978, Piacitelli was issued a "Notice of Appointment," signed by the President of the College and effective "for the contract period" of July 1 through June 30. This document specified Piacitelli's job title, department, and salary for the year. For each of those years, Piacitelli signed and returned a form indicating his acceptance of employment for the duration and compensation specified.
Beginning early in his employment, a number of conflicts and disagreements arose between Piacitelli and his supervisors, the Dean and Associate Dean of Students. Some of these problems were resolved; others were not. In December, 1978, Piacitelli's immediate supervisor recommended that the College not continue to employ Piacitelli as a counselor. In a one-sentence letter dated January 24, 1979, the College President informed Piacitelli that his contract would "not be renewed at the end of the current contract period." In a letter dated February 13, 1979, the President advised Piacitelli that the College's action was "not to be interpreted as 'dismissal for cause,' which action, if taken, would result in immediate termination of employment ..." The Dean of Students later explained in an affidavit that the administration preferred nonrenewal to dismissal for cause "out of consideration for his professional future and in accordance with higher education practices ..."
Piacitelli commenced his initial action on April 17, 1979, charging that a failure to renew his employment contract was, in effect, a dismissal for cause and as such violated his "due process rights as set forth in the SUSC Personnel Policies and Procedures." Piacitelli asked for declaratory relief, reinstatement, costs and attorney's fees, and "such other and further relief as the court deems proper."
In the district court, Piacitelli relied on the College's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual (hereinafter "Personnel Manual"), Section II-14 of which sets forth formal procedures to be followed in the "dismissal" of a classified employee who has completed a six-month probationary period. Several passages in the Personnel Manual seem to suggest that all employees are either probationary (terminable at will) or permanent (terminable only after compliance with specified procedures). Consequently, Piacitelli argued, by not renewing a "permanent" employee's contract the College was attempting to circumvent its own procedures and accomplish indirectly what its Personnel Manual prevented it from accomplishing directly.
The College conceded that Piacitelli was a classified employee and that he was not probationary. However, it contended that Piacitelli was employed on a year-to-year basis; that his contract expired by its own terms in June, 1979; and that he was not dismissed at all, but simply not rehired. Therefore, the College concluded, its formal termination procedures did not apply. Those procedures would have applied, according to the College, only if Piacitelli had been dismissed before the expiration of the annual contract period. The College further argued that to equate nonrenewal with dismissal would, in effect, grant tenure status to all nonprobationary classified staff employees, an anomolous result in light of the fact that this status is not conferred on all of the faculty. 1
In January, 1980, the district court ruled that the College's Personnel Manual governed the terms of Piacitelli's employment contract with the College, that Piacitelli had acquired "permanent employment status" under that contract, and that the College's failure to renew Piacitelli's annual employment contract without complying "with due process of law requirements pursuant to (the Personnel Manual) ... constituted plaintiff's termination and thus a breach of contract." The district court thereupon ordered the College to grant Piacitelli "administrative due process procedure pursuant to the (Personnel Manual)."
This was a final order, which, unless reversed on appeal, is res judicata and binding upon these parties. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, Utah, 627 P.2d 528 (1981); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). The order was not appealed. Consequently, for purposes of this case, we must treat Piacitelli as an employee with permanent employment status whose employment contract entitled him to the formal procedures specified in the Personnel Manual before he could be dismissed or terminated, even at the conclusion of the annual contract period. 2
On February 8, 1980, the College Personnel Director issued a formal notice of dismissal to Piacitelli and advised him of his right to appeal. Piacitelli pursued his appeal through three college appellate authorities, 3 all of which upheld the dismissal.
Piacitelli then took the controversy back to the district court, which on June 2, 1980, issued an order to show cause why the College should not be held in contempt of court or reinstate Piacitelli to his former position and pay him back wages. After a hearing on this order, the district court ruled that the College had substantially complied with its procedures, that Piacitelli was rightfully terminated as of February 8, 1980, that there were no grounds for ordering the College to reinstate him, and that he was entitled to back pay for the period July 1, 1979, through February 8, 1980.
Piacitelli's sole argument on appeal is that the district court should have ordered him reinstated because, contrary to the court's conclusion, the College had not adequately complied with the contractual termination procedures contained in its Personnel Manual. 4 This argument is based entirely on sections of the Personnel Manual that provide for "progressive discipline," the imposition of increasingly severe sanctions before dismissal. Section II-14 of the Manual outlines four steps of progressive discipline: (1) oral warning, (2) written warning, (3) suspension, and (4) dismissal. We need not decide whether the College was obligated to follow the progressive discipline requirements of the Personnel Manual on the facts of this case because we agree with the district court's finding that the College's actions constituted substantial compliance with those requirements in any event.
We underline at the outset the district court's finding, which is now binding in this case, that the terms of Piacitelli's employment were governed by the College's Personnel Manual. This finding comports with the numerous holdings that an educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to observe particular termination formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and regulations governing the employment relationship. Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir.1969); Decker v. Worcester Junior College, 369 Mass. 960, 336 N.E.2d 909 (1975); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314 (1971); Zimmerman v. Minot State College, N.D., 198 N.W.2d 108 (1972). 5 We are, therefore, construing a contract, not declaring statutory or constitutional rights.
The College's Personnel Manual states that "generally there is a required corrective action," which the manual refers to as "progressive discipline," which "may result in dismissal or suspension unless there is a major, serious, or aggravated act of misconduct which requires immediate action." Personnel Manual, II-14, p. 2. The Manual also provides that progressive discipline should be "corrective whenever possible, rather than punitive," should concentrate on "preventing serious personnel problems from occurring," and "should never involve the element of surprise to the employee." Id. at pp. 2 and 5. The Manual also states that "(t)he 'progressive discipline' process used in appropriate circumstances is a follow-through method to ensure that infractions, misconduct, or unacceptable performance is treated in a manner that will eliminate, correct, or resolve such actions or practices, if possible." Id. at p. 5. It is clear from these statements that the purpose of the progressive discipline approach is to prevent major acts of misconduct by giving the employee an early warning of the possible consequences of his persisting in unacceptable behavior.
Circuit Judge Owens, sitting by designation after the initial proceeding in the district court, ruled that substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the Personnel Manual was sufficient so long as it answered the purpose of those requirements:
If the purpose (of progressive discipline) was attained through other means than by strict adherence to the letter of the manual, then this should not be deemed a breach of the contract.
We agree. Because the purpose of the procedural...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.
...v. Ahmad, Nev., 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Pub'g Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.Ct.App.1983); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.......
-
Barger v. General Elec. Co., Civ. A. No. 83-0167-L.
...Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.1983); Tennessee, Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.App.1981); Utah, Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981); Washington, Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See also Shah v. American Synth......
-
Certified Question, In re
... ... This case is controlled by the substantive law of the State of Michigan ... "Mr. Bankey successfully ... Utah, 1981), the Supreme Court of Utah held that its "appellate ... Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Civ.App.1982); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah.1981) ... ...
-
Orr v. Crowder
...634 (4th Cir.1979); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District, 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1974); but see Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981).8 This statement was made in Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d at 817:"To the extent that t......
-
An Employer's Right to Cure
...company, such as the Judicial Arbiters Group ("J.A.G."), or a nonprofit entity, such as the American Arbitration Association. 13. 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981). This article was written by Bill C. Berger, Denver, an associate with Stettner, Miller and Cohn, P.C., (303) 534-0273. LAW PRACT......
-
Utah Employment Law After Berube: the Demise of the At-will Doctrine?
...(Utah 1986); Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987). [6] 850 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988) [7] Id. at 633. [8] Id. [9] 636 P.2d 1063. [10] Because the issue of the manual's status as an employment contract was not appealed, the Utah Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the......