Pate v. Smith

Decision Date09 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-3231,80-3231
PartiesJames Edward PATE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steve SMITH, Warden of Kentucky State Reformatory; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

William M. Radigan, Asst. Public Defender, Frankfort, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.

Steven Beshear, Atty. Gen. of Kentucky, Martin Glazer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Ky., for defendants-appellees.

Before LIVELY and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

LIVELY, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus the question for decision is whether the state court judge who presided at petitioner's murder trial was required to conduct a competency hearing. We adopt the following statement of facts from the district court's memorandum:

The petitioner was indicted in the Daviess Circuit Court in Owensboro, Kentucky, for the offense of the murder of his former wife, and was convicted and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment. Final judgment was entered on February 7, 1978, and Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky was filed.

On March 20, 1979, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the petitioner's conviction. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court of the United States on June 18, 1979, and on October 1, 1979, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petitioner's writ of certiorari, with two Justices dissenting.

Before trial in the Daviess Circuit Court the petitioner's counsel moved to have the petitioner examined by a psychiatrist. The trial court granted this motion and ordered petitioner sent to the Forensic Psychiatry Unit at River Region Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky. The Unit sent back a report, but the report was not included in the original record before the Kentucky Supreme Court.

Thereafter, a motion was made to supplement the record to show the medical report from the Forensic Unit. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted that motion, and in a supplemental hearing the trial judge testified that he personally knew petitioner for twenty years and that he did consider the medical report from the psychiatric unit. No hearing was ever conducted to determine whether the petitioner was competent to stand trial.

At trial the evidence indicated the petitioner shot and killed his former wife on the front porch of her home. Immediately after the shooting the petitioner walked, like nothing had happened, to his car and drove to his mother's house which was located on an adjacent street. The police, who were called to the scene of the shooting, located and approached the petitioner, who was still carrying the gun used in the shooting. After some discussion with the police officers, the petitioner surrendered to the police. The detective who arrested the petitioner described him as being wild drunk "... he didn't want to listen to reason at the time I approached him." Another police officer, a member of the Owensboro Police Department, at the scene of the arrest, agreed that the petitioner was highly intoxicated.

Dr. Bryan Warren, a psychiatrist with the Green River Comprehensive Care Center in Owensboro, testified the petitioner had been under his care and treatment from March 1977 to August 1977. Dr. Warren explained the petitioner suffered from brain damage, possibly a tumor, which was the result of a head injury some years previously. The doctor stated this condition would not affect the petitioner's sanity; however, any severe change in the psysiology of his brain would make the petitioner legally insane. If the petitioner had been drinking on the day of the alleged crime, Dr. Warren was of the opinion "... that he did not have the capacity to appreciate the nature of his act." Further, the witness advised the Court that the petitioner had been hospitalized in mental institutions on four or five occasions.

During the trial, while the questioning of the psychiatrist was continuing, petitioner sought to ask a question and his counsel told him to be quiet. At that point, the record indicates the petitioner caused a disturbance and had to be removed from the courtroom. The petitioner remained out of the courtroom the rest of that day, although the record is silent, he apparently was allowed to resume his place in the courtroom on the following day.

At the subsequent hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to supplement the record on appeal with the report on the petitioner prepared by the Forensic Psychiatry Unit, the trial judge testified, that prior to the petitioner's trial he had considered a forensic report which had been submitted by Dr. James G. Bland, Director of Forensic Psychiatry of Louisville, Kentucky. This report indicated the petitioner was competent to stand trial. After the incident during the trial when the petitioner became violent and had to be removed by deputy sheriffs, the trial judge consulted the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning the trial judge's obligation in regard to competency to stand trial. On the basis of Dr. Bland's report and because the trial judge had known the petitioner for twenty years, the trial judge decided to go ahead with the trial. The psychiatric report was never entered into the record, and the petitioner's counsel was never advised that the trial judge had consulted the report.

Kentucky Criminal Rule 8.06 provides:

"If upon arraignment or during the proceedings there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is insane, the proceedings shall be postponed and the issue of sanity determined as provided by law. If the defendant is found to be insane, the court shall direct that he be confined in a mental institution until his mind is restored, at which time he shall be returned to the court for further proceedings."

The issue to be decided, however, is whether the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was insane at the time of his trial or could not comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceedings or to participate rationally in his defense. Defense counsel made no motion for a competency hearing, and we are left to determine whether the Court, sua sponte, is required to conduct a competency hearing.

The post-trial hearing referred to in the memorandum was held on motion of the prosecution to supplement the record. Its purpose was not to determine whether petitioner was competent to stand trial at the time of trial, and no finding was made on this question. In his brief before the Supreme Court of Kentucky the petitioner contended that the circumstances surrounding the trial were such as to require the trial judge, acting sua sponte, to hold a hearing on his competence to stand trial. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that this claim was without merit. The district court agreed, distinguishing two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).

In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the test of a defendant's competence to stand trial on a criminal charge "must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." The test as stated by the Kentucky courts is similar "whether he has substantial capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceeding pending against him and to participate rationally in his defense." Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky.1964) (citations omitted). It is a violation of due process to convict a person who lacks such competence at the time of trial.

In Pate v. Robinson, supra, the Supreme Court held that where there is substantial evidence of a defendant's incompetence at the time of trial a trial judge has the duty to order a hearing sua sponte. Failure of a court to make this inquiry deprives a defendant "of his constitutional right to a fair trial." 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842 (footnote omitted). In Drope v. Missouri, supra, the Court concluded that information available to the court prior to trial together with testimony during the trial and information concerning an attempted suicide by the defendant during trial "created a sufficient doubt of his competence to stand trial to require further inquiry on the question." 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908. The Court defined the scope of the inquiry:

The import of our decision in Pate v. Robinson is that evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some...

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    ...an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial." Pate v. Smith, 637 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 983 (9th Cir.1976)). Once a sufficient doubt arises regarding the defendant's c......
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