Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 78-2437
| Decision Date | 31 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-2437,78-2437 |
| Citation | 637 F.2d 1255 |
| Parties | Donna Sue RUSSELL, a widow; Gary Robert Russell and Kirsten Hope Russell, minors, by their Guardian, Donna Sue Russell, Petitioners, v. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, United States Department of Justice, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael Korn, Korn & Marblestone, Sherman Oaks, Cal., for petitioners.
Howard Gest, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
Petition for Review of a Final Action of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice.
Before TRASK and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, * District Judge.
The petitioner, for herself and her minor children, petitions for review of the denial of her application for benefits under the Public Safety Officers Death Benefits Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796-3796c (1976) (Benefits Act). The benefits were sought on account of her police sergeant husband's death in the line of duty. We take jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3758(a), 3759 (1976), and reverse.
Sergeant Edward Russell worked as a detective for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. He was required to bring his own car to work and used it extensively during investigations.
On January 15, 1977, he was working as the weekend duty detective, handling custodial cases and responding to emergency investigative needs. He reported to work at 8:00 a. m., worked on investigations at the station and in the field all day, and left for home at 11:00 p. m. At about 11:45, his car was forced out of its lane by an errant auto, colliding head-on with an oncoming car. Russell was killed.
Russell's wife and children received county employee death benefits and state workers' compensation payments. Mrs. Russell then applied for payments under the Benefits Act, which provides a death benefit of $50,000 to the dependents of a police officer who dies from an injury sustained "in the line of duty." The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which administers the Benefits Act, denied the application on the ground that Sergeant Russell did not die in the line of duty. Mrs. Russell petitions for review of that denial.
The threshold question is whether we have jurisdiction to review LEAA denials of applications for Benefits Act payments.
The jurisdiction of the United States courts of appeals is limited to that conferred by statute. Young Properties Corp. v. United Equity Corp., 534 F.2d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 90, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). We turn to the LEAA statute, chapter 46 of title 42 of the United States Code, to determine whether Congress has directed us to review Benefits Act denials. This examination is a frustrating exercise, because Congress has delivered a set of opaque and conflicting signals. Nevertheless, we must try to ascertain and apply the legislative intent.
In order to understand the judicial review provisions of the LEAA Act it is necessary to understand the structure of the Act, which comprises chapter 46 of title 42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976). Chapter 46 has nine subchapters. Subchapter I, section 3711, charters LEAA. Subchapters II-IV, sections 3721-3750d, authorize grants for various state and local law enforcement programs. Subchapter V, sections 3751-3774, establishes the procedural regime; its key provisions are section 3751, authorizing promulgation of rules and regulations, section 3758, authorizing administrative review, and section 3759, authorizing judicial review. Subchapters VI-VII, sections 3781-3795, contain minor technical provisions. Subchapter IX, sections 3796-3796c, is the Benefits Act.
Russell contends that jurisdiction is straightforwardly conferred by the judicial review provision, section 3759, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) If any applicant or grantee ... is dissatisfied with (LEAA's) final action under section 3757 or section 3758 of this title, such applicant or grantee may, within sixty days after notice of such action, file with the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which such applicant or grantee is located a petition for review of that action.
In order to decide whether judicial review is available under this section, we must apply the "throwback" clause and determine whether denial of an application for Benefits Act payments constitutes "final action under section 3757 or section 3758." 1 The answer hinges on our interpretation of section 3758. 2
Section 3758 has three subsections. Subsection (a) precludes review except as "hereafter provided." Subsections (b) and (c) establish the procedure for administrative review of denials of financial and technical assistance grants.
The government insists that section 3758 applies only to actions covered by subsections (b) and (c): applications by state and local law enforcement agencies for financial and technical assistance grants. It then characterizes an application for Benefits Act payments not as an "application for a grant" but rather as a "claim for a benefit," which, it contends, is outside the scope of subsections (b) and (c). We disagree.
We conclude that subsection 3758(a), read in conjunction with section 3759, authorizes review independent of subsections 3758(b) and (c). Subsection (a) provides:
In carrying out the functions vested by this chapter in (LEAA), the determinations, findings, and conclusions of (LEAA) shall be final and conclusive upon all applicants, except as hereafter provided.
(emphasis added). Admittedly, this language is susceptible of two interpretations. The government asserts that it precludes judicial review of any LEAA action except to the extent that the action is subject to the administrative review provisions of subsections (b) and (c), thus restricting review to applications for grants. Alternatively, it merely establishes the manner and extent of review of all LEAA final actions, including those under the Benefits Act, limiting review to the manner and extent provided by section 3759. 3 We adopt the latter interpretation. 4
Our conclusion is supported by the recent revision of the LEAA statute contained in the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub.L.No.96-157, 93 Stat. 1167 (1979) (Revised Act). 5 The Revised Act makes no substantive changes in the judicial review provisions of the LEAA statute or in the Benefits Act, and neither the Revised Act nor its legislative history mentions judicial review of Benefits Act cases. There is, however, a significant reorganization of the relevant provisions. Former subsections 3758(b) and (c), establishing the procedure for administrative review of grant application denials, are now subsections 3783(a) and (b). Former subsection 3758(a), limiting the manner and extent of review, is now an independent section, 3784. Former subsection 3759, providing judicial review, is now section 3785. It authorizes judicial review if "any ... recipient is dissatisfied with a final action with respect to section 3783, 3784, or 3789(c)(2)(G) ..." (emphasis added). 6
LEAA contends that, to the extent that the statute is ambiguous regarding judicial review of denials of applications for Benefits Act payments, the legislative history reveals that judicial review was not intended. We find the legislative history at best inconclusive. As noted above, the statutory provisions relating to LEAA are all contained in chapter 46 of title 42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976). Most of chapter 46 was enacted as title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L.No.90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (Omnibus Act). The Omnibus Act created LEAA and authorized it to provide financial and technical assistance grants to state and local law enforcement agencies. It was rewritten, without substantive change in any of the provisions relevant here, by the Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub.L.No.93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (1973). In 1976, the Benefits Act was added to chapter 46, as subchapter IX. There is little discussion of judicial review in the legislative history of either the Omnibus Act or the Crime Control Act, and judicial review is not mentioned in either the text or the legislative history of the Benefits Act.
LEAA insists that because the Omnibus Act and the Benefits Act are substantively different and use different language, Congress would have made explicit an intention to extend the judicial review provisions of the Omnibus Act to Benefits Act cases. It is, however, just as logical to argue that because the Benefits Act was added to chapter 46 and the existing programs in that chapter were all subject to judicial review, Congress would have made explicit an intention to withhold review of Benefits Act cases. Such barren legislative history, susceptible as it is to easy syllogistic manipulation, does not aid our inquiry.
Since section 3758(a) precludes judicial review of all LEAA final actions except in the manner and to the extent provided by 42 U.S.C. § 3759, were we to find that a denial of an application for Benefits Act payments was nonreviewable under section 3759, it could not be reviewed at all. Courts have always disfavored such a result, and the Supreme Court has stated that " 'judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.' " Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501, 97 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-2419, 53 L.Ed.2d 506 (1977) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67, 90 S.Ct. 832, 837-838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970); Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, ---...
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