Wallace v. Chappell, 79-3172

• Decision Date: 02 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-3172,79-3172
• Citation: 637 F.2d 1345
• Parties: 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,293 Vernon WALLACE, Robert Lemons, Cornelius Hickey, James Richardson and George Shannon, Appellants, v. Commander George C. CHAPPELL, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Viafore, Lieutenant Clarence Schultz, Lieutenant Barron Bianco, Lieutenant Kenneth Jordan, EMC Richard McCannon, ICC David Lamser, MSC Lumberto Papa, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1345

637 F.2d 1345

27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,293

Vernon WALLACE, Robert Lemons, Cornelius Hickey, James

Richardson and George Shannon, Appellants, v. Commander George C. CHAPPELL, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth

Viafore, Lieutenant Clarence Schultz, Lieutenant Barron

Bianco, Lieutenant Kenneth Jordan, EMC Richard McCannon, ICC

David Lamser, MSC Lumberto Papa, Appellees.

No. 79-3172.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 1980.

Decided Feb. 2, 1981.

John Murcko, Oakland, Cal., for appellants.

Edward F. Kolker, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before BROWNING, Chief Judge, GOODWIN, KENNEDY, SKOPIL, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, FERGUSON, NELSON and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, enlisted United States Naval personnel, sued certain of their superior officers for money damages and injunctive relief for alleged racial discrimination in job assignments, schooling, punishment, quarterly marks and skill ratings. They sought redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The district court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appeal.

The district court entered final judgment on January 30, 1979, and thirty-five days later, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. In civil cases under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1), the notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from; but if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days of such entry." The timely filing of the notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).

The case was taken en banc to determine whether the plaintiffs, who sued the defendants in both their personal and official capacities, are entitled to 60 days under Rule 4(a)(1) to file their notice of appeal.

The complaint alleged in general terms of a number of grievances claimed by each of the plaintiffs against various defendant officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, acting as individuals, violated various constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also characterized the conduct of the defendants as malicious and unlawful. The district court concluded that the action was essentially one for money damages against the defendants individually, partly because the plaintiffs had so framed their claim in order to avoid the various defenses that might be tendered by military officers sued for their actions taken in the line of duty.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants acted "ultra vires" and outside the scope of their official duties. ¹ But the complaint also alleged acts and omissions of the defendants that could occur only in their line of duty as naval officers, and prayed for injunctive relief to change their behavior. The district court, as noted, dismissed the action on the grounds that the acts complained of were nonreviewable military decisions, that defendants were entitled to intra-service immunity, and that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

In Michaels v. Chappell, 279 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940, 81 S.Ct. 1663, 6 L.Ed.2d 851 (1961), we held in effect that a party could not take inconsistent positions. We said that a plaintiff who contended (in order to avoid a defense of immunity) that the government agent was acting as a private citizen, could not, upon appeal, contend that the defendant was a government officer on government business in order to avail himself of the 60-day rule. 279 F.2d at 602. The Michaels decision has fostered confusion of the jurisdictional and substantive issued by making the time for appeal turn upon the form of the pleading.

The defendants argue, however, that Michaels should be followed at least in actions for money damages, and rely upon Hare v. Hurwitz, 248 F.2d 458 (2nd Cir. 1957) (cited in Michaels). ² In Hare, the court construed "officer of the United States" in the predecessor to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) by examining the purpose intended to be served by the rule. The advisory committee notes indicated that the allowance of an additional 30 days was necessary to permit cases against government agencies and officers to be routed to the various government officials responsible for deciding whether or not to take an appeal. ³ The court found, on this reasoning, that no government agency had any interest in the case (a personal injury case arising out of an automobile collision) and that the 60-day rule was not applicable.

Although the policy behind Rule 4(a) was correctly applied in Hare v. Hurwitz, it does not follow that Rule 4(a) should be narrowly construed to foreclose appeals. The Ninth Circuit has expressed a preference for a liberal reading of Rule 4(a) in order to alleviate uncertainty when the government has even an indirect interest. In a case where the timeliness of the appeal depended on whether or not the United States was a party (and not whether an officer of the United States was a party), this court stated: "We agree with Judge Friendly and Professor Moore that a literal reading of the 60-day exception is the preferred view in order to eliminate the element of uncertainty created by a 'hidden exception or qualification' in a critical procedural rule." In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 578 F.2d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).

Here, the crucial language is "officer of the United States," and a "literal reading" is not entirely dispositive. Some interpretation of the language is required. The defendants are "officers of the United States" ⁴ within a literal reading of Rule 4(a) and the 60-day rule is strongly indicated. We believe, however, that Congress intended the reference to officers of the United States to be read in context with their activities, authority, and duties.

A workable rule would be one that looks at who represents the parties ⁵ and the relationship of the parties to each other and to the government during the course of the conduct that gave rise to the action. Whenever the alleged grievance arises out of a government activity, the 60-day filing period of Rule 4(a) applies if: (a) the defendant officers were acting under color of office, ⁶ or (b) the defendant officers were acting under color of law or lawful authority, ⁷ or (c) any party in the case is represented by a government attorney. In this case, all of the relevant indicators point to the 60-day rule.

To the extent that Michaels v. Chappell, supra, is inconsistent with this holding, it is overruled. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied, and the case is remanded to the original panel which heard oral argument to address the merits of the appeal.

POOLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent both from the en banc order and from the majority's disposition.

Taking this case en banc in order to overrule Michaels v. Chappell, 279 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940, 81 S.Ct. 1663, 6 L.Ed.2d 851 (1961), seems to me plainly unnecessary.

Michaels held that a pleader who intentionally tailors his complaint so as to charge a governmental official with engaging in tortious conduct in his individual, not official, capacity is not charging him officially; that is, the complaint does not charge "the United States or an officer or agency thereof," within the meaning of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; and that if such a plaintiff appeals from an adverse decision of a district court, he must file his notice of appeal within 30, not 60, days. That seems to me a clear, understandable and entirely workable rule of procedure.

The Michaels court reasoned that, given plain English language meaning, allegations that federal agents "were acting completely without authority throughout," Id. at 601, means that they were doing things as individuals. When the appellant there lost after engineering his way into federal court and then further neglected to file a timely notice of appeal within 30 days, he tried to invoke the enlarged period of 60 days (which is reserved for cases where people sue or are sued by the government). He said that his allegations really ought to be read as if he had charged the agents as "officers of the United States, * * * because (a)cting 'in excess of authority,' * * * is different than acting 'outside of authority.' " Id. at 602. That panel 20 years ago, remarkably unpersuaded by "such a hot and cold change of position," simply rejected it. Id. Today's en banc majority, however, scanning quite analogous language, sees it differently. The district court found that plaintiffs had fashioned their language specifically so as to charge individual, not official, conduct for the simple reason that plaintiffs foresaw the adverse consequences of suing their superiors as officials. Nonetheless, the majority in a feat of true Delphic skill has uncovered inferences and nuances of meaning which signify that official action is truly at issue.

I do not think Michaels can be as easily distinguished as does the majority; but if they are right in thinking so, there was a simple way of avoiding taking this case en banc. The original panel declined to construe Michaels differently and asked for en banc review. The majority here finds the difference which the panel could not see. If so, this appeal is not untimely and Michaels is not a bar. But instead of pursuing the route of avoiding the precise obstacle which its rationale had just circumvented, the court yields to the temptation to decree new meaning to FRAP 4(a)(1), a labor most uncompelled.

By failing to distinguish Michaels, the majority of course must deal...