Hayes v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 18 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-2347,79-2347 |
| Citation | 637 F.2d 483 |
| Parties | Larry Charbert HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James R. THOMPSON * et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Terri Rose Saunders, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Gerri Papushkewych, Springfield, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before SWYGERT and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges, and EAST, ** District Judge.
Hayes appeals from a final judgment on the merits entered against him by the District Court on October 11, 1979 following trial on his § 1983 civil rights action upon a remand from this Court. Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (Hayes I ). Hayes was a prisoner who alleged various procedural deficiencies in prison disciplinary proceedings brought against him. Our jurisdiction to review is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We are satisfied that the District Court improperly applied the holding of our prior review of this case in Hayes I, and we now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Hayes was a prisoner at the Sheridan Correctional Center on May 12, 1975. He had been a prisoner for six years, and had rendered much assistance to other prisoners in drafting grievances, many of which were successful. On May 12, 1975, there was a gathering of prisoners in the prison yard at about 6:00 P.M. during the normal exercise period. This group of about 50 prisoners, apparently led by Hayes, discussed grievances and grievance procedures. Hayes responded to almost every question with an exhortation to "write Springfield," and emphasized the grievance procedures, noting that there were a number of "legal buffs" with typewriters who would assist prisoners. In answer to one question as to what they would do if no action was forthcoming within six months, he replied "You know what we'll do." Three security guards, who had been watching the gathering for most of its duration, dispersed the meeting at approximately 7:30 P.M.
At about midnight that night, Hayes was awakened by security guards, strip-searched, and placed in isolation. The next day he received a copy of a violation report written by the warden, Wolff, based upon reports of the officers at the meeting, charging Hayes with conspiracy to incite to riot and commit mutinous acts.
On May 14, Hayes appeared before the Institutional Adjustment Committee which considered the report filed against him. He presented several motions, including a request that the Committee call approximately 50 witnesses (prisoners who were present at the yard meeting) in his defense. The Committee took all of the motions under advisement and continued the committee meeting until the 15th.
On May 15, Hayes (on his own initiative) reduced his list of requested witnesses to ten. The Committee denied his request for witnesses in total stating the following reason:
"The residents requested would be placed in highly compromising positions with regards to possible retribution from other residents and to call resident witnesses could prove hazardous to both witnesses and institutional security."
Hayes then requested a continuance to obtain affidavits from residents who had attended the group meeting. This was also denied by the Committee, stating that since the administrative regulations did not require sworn affidavits, there was insufficient reason to stay the proceedings.
The Committee then proceeded to find Hayes guilty as charged, based "on the violation report as written and upon the report by the special investigator." This investigator's report was written by a special investigator from the Department of Corrections called in by the Warden the day after the group meeting. The investigator had interviewed Hayes and the other residents charged with conspiracy, and had reported by telephone to the members of the Committee. The Committee ordered that Hayes be kept in segregation for at least ten days, and it further recommended that he forfeit nine months' statutory good time, that he be transferred from Sheridan, and that he be demoted from "A" to "C" grade.
Hayes brought this action in District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the refusal to call witnesses and the guilty finding violated his due process and First Amendment rights as well as the prison's regulations. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and the expunction of the violation from his prison record. The District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court reversed, Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (Hayes I ), and remanded for trial with instructions.
At the trial upon remand, the members of the Committee testified to their understanding of the relevant procedural requirements and to why they reached the decisions they did with regard to Hayes' case. On October 11, 1979, the District Court entered judgment for the defendants and against Hayes on all issues, adopting verbatim the defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Hayes appeals from this final judgment. Our jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
In May of 1977, in Hayes I, we remanded this case to the District Court for trial after ruling that the action should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim. The District Court was instructed to inquire whether the record indicated an abuse of discretion by the Committee in refusing to call any of Hayes' witnesses or to allow affidavits to be prepared. This Court also found that the Committee acted wrongly in merely adopting the contents of the reports as the basis for finding Hayes guilty. We found that it was a violation of their own administrative regulations, and "did not meet the minimum due process requirements as set forth in Wolff (v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974))." Further, this Court ruled that on a liberal reading of the complaint there was bad faith alleged regarding the segregation without notice and hearing, and if this could be proved, there would be a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finally, this Court did not discuss the First Amendment claim nor the question of substantive evidence supporting the guilty finding. The case was remanded to the District Court for further inquiry. The present appeal arises from the result of that trial.
In Hayes I, we had occasion to review with some particularity the facts and applicable law concerning Hayes' request for witnesses and his guilty finding. Those portions of Hayes I constitute this Court's statement of the relevant law, as well as being the law of the case, James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978), and are central to our review of the judgment here appealed. Consequently, we will make reference to Hayes I throughout this disposition, and find it appropriate to preface our consideration of Hayes' specific complaints with a review of our holding in that decision.
In Hayes I, we held that the District Court erroneously dismissed the witness denial portion of Hayes' complaint because the record then before the Court did not permit "even limited review" of the Committee's decision:
Our discussion emphasized the meaninglessness of judicial review if such "broad unsupported findings" were allowed to uphold disciplinary convictions. Our remand on this issue was to permit the prison authorities to introduce portions of the Committee's hearing record which may have been previously unavailable, and which would then allow a court to exercise its review function over the Committee's action.
We also held in Hayes I that the Committee did not comply with applicable regulations when it failed to consider each proposed witness individually. 1
Upon reviewing the Committee's statement of reasons for finding Hayes guilty as charged, 2 we held first that it, too, violated applicable regulations in that it merely adopted the violation report and the report of the special investigator. 3 Second, we held that the Committee did not meet minimum due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), because it failed to "give an adequate statement as to the evidence relied on or reasons for the action taken." Thus, we held that the District Court erred in dismissing that portion of the Hayes complaint.
In Hayes I, we also found that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coleman v. Frantz
...Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 314-315 (7th Cir.1983); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1288 (7th Cir.1981); Hayes v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 483, 490-493 (7th Cir.1980); Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 25-26, 28-29 (7th Cir.1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 196-197 (7th Cir.1977); Knell v......
-
Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n
...v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859, 102 S.Ct. 313, 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981); Hayes v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 483, 490 (7th Cir.1980) (same).8 Schor challenges the Commission's Order Denying Review on the ground that "the Commission permit[ted] [the ALJ] deci......
-
Hendrix v. Faulkner
...for witnesses was a proper exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision in Hayes v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1980) (hereinafter Hayes II.) The court Although it may be relevant to other issues in this case, it is clear that under Hayes I this subsequ......
-
Ponte v. Real
...supporting the board's denial of an inmate's witness request. 390 Mass., at 405-407, 456 N.E.2d, at 1116, citing Hayes v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 483, 487-489 (CA7 1980). Petitioner does not dispute that respondent possessed a "liberty" interest, by reason of the provisions of Massachusetts stat......