U.S. v. Medina-Verdugo, MEDINA-VERDUG
| Citation | 637 F.2d 649 |
| Decision Date | 20 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | 79-1309 and 79-1314,D,Nos. 79-1042,MEDINA-VERDUG,s. 79-1042 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier Alvaroefendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lanita Harriet WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Douglas ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Frank T. Vecchione, John H. Tannenberg, San Diego, Cal., argued for defendants-appellants; Jerrold Ladar, San Francisco, Cal., on brief.
John J. Robinson, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., argued for plaintiff-appellee United States; Michael H. Walsh, U.S. Atty., John J. Robinson, Eve Bermingham, Asst. U.S. Attys., San Diego, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before SNEED and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, and EAST, * District Judge.
These consolidated appeals from convictions of persons who participated in a drug transaction raise questions concerning the search of a purse carried by one participant and a later search of luggage contained in an automobile. We affirm the conviction resulting from the search of the purse because the appellant has no standing to object to it. We are required by Supreme Court authority, however, to reverse the conviction resulting from the search of the luggage.
All appellants were convicted for both conspiracy and substantive offenses for possession and distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In addition, appellant Medina-Verdugo was convicted for conspiracy and substantive offenses relating to illegal importation of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963.
DEA agents in central California began surveillance of appellants Adams and Williams on receipt of a tip that they were about to engage in a narcotics transaction. A check showed that Williams had a previous narcotics arrest. Under surveillance, the suspects registered at a motel in El Centro, California, Adams using a fictitious name "L. Cain." After Williams had made several phone calls from a public pay phone and had received calls from a Spanish speaking person, Adams and Williams left for the border town of Calexico. The surveillance continued.
The agents lost sight of the vehicle when it took a circuitous route but found it within a few minutes. At that point it contained two additional occupants, a male and female, both of Mexican descent and later identified as appellant Medina-Verdugo and Maria Quintero-Vargas. The car stopped behind a gas station for approximately five minutes. Medina-Verdugo and Quintero then exited the car and proceeded on foot to the Mexican border. The agents requested assistance in stopping and questioning the Mexican couple at the border checkpoint and continued to trail Adams and Williams, who returned by car to El Centro.
When Medina-Verdugo and Quintero displayed their local border crossing cards, U.S. Customs inspectors confiscated the cards and led the pair to two rooms seventy-five feet away, where they were separated and subjected to a pat-down search. They also searched Quintero's purse. Inside the purse customs officials found $1,300 in cash, some airline tickets issued for trips between Los Angeles and San Francisco, and a card with the address, telephone number, and room number of Adams' and Williams' motel. The card also had the words "El Cain," approximating the alias being used by Adams.
DEA agents at the border station, when advised of the contents in the purse, read Medina-Verdugo his constitutional rights and interrogated him. He first denied, and then admitted, meeting persons in Calexico. He claimed ownership of half of the money in the purse and said the tickets were Quintero's. In a separate interrogation Quintero told agents that Medina-Verdugo owned all the money, the tickets, and the card. Contrary to Medina-Verdugo's statement, Quintero denied having entered a car with him to meet anyone.
The DEA agents at the border gave the above information to the agents trailing Adams and Williams. It was agreed that Medina-Verdugo and Quintero would be detained until the rented car was stopped.
In the interim, Adams and Williams had returned to the motel at El Centro, retrieved their luggage, and continued north. Their car was stopped near the town of Imperial, twenty-five minutes after the agents had received the information from the border station. Adams denied going to Calexico or meeting or visiting anyone in the area. When asked if there were any narcotics or weapons in the car, Adams replied there was a small amount of marijuana in his key holder.
The agents then made a nonconsensual search of the automobile, and found a garment bag and a gym bag in the trunk of the car. They opened the gym bag, searched it, and discovered two packages of heroin wrapped in women's underwear and placed inside a man's shoe. At this point, Adams and Williams were placed under arrest. The agents radioed the information to officers at the border, who then arrested Quintero and Medina-Verdugo.
Williams, Adams, Medina-Verdugo, and Quintero were indicted together, but Quintero's case was severed and eventually dismissed on the Government's motion. The district judge denied appellants' motion to suppress evidence and statements resulting from the allegedly unlawful searches and seizures. Subsequently, Williams and Medina were convicted after a jury trial, and Adams was convicted after a bench trial on stipulated facts.
On appeal Medina-Verdugo challenges the lawfulness of the search of Quintero's purse and contends that the statements he made at the border resulted from an illegal detention. Adams and Williams challenge their detention as an arrest without probable cause and allege further that the search of the gym bag which disclosed the narcotics was invalid because no search warrant had issued. In addition, Medina makes certain procedural claims.
We first discuss the detention and search at the border challenged by Medina-Verdugo. We hold that he may not challenge the search of Quintero's purse because he lacked the requisite privacy interest. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Appellant's ownership of the money, the tickets, and the card found in the purse is not determinative of the privacy inquiry. Rather, ownership is but one factor to consider in determining whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Salvucci, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). Here, as in Rawlings, Medina-Verdugo had no right to exclude others from opening Quintero's purse. Further, as in Rawlings, the "precipitous nature of the transaction" for sale of the drugs and transporting the money indicate that in permitting Quintero to hold proceeds of the sale Medina-Verdugo did not take reasonable precautions to maintain its privacy. To the contrary, it is likely that he feared detection at the border and gave the incriminatory evidence to Quintero precisely so that he could disclaim ownership, which he later did at trial. Consistently with Rawlings and Salvucci, we conclude that Medina-Verdugo lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his companion's purse and cannot challenge the lawfulness of the search.
The detention of Medina-Verdugo was justified by well-founded suspicion. It was brief and narrowly circumscribed considering the requirements for supervision and control at a border checkpoint, and in this light we think the officers complied with the standards of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Once the purse was opened, which was immediately after the stop, there was probable cause to arrest him. In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to inquire whether customs agents have authority to stop, detain, and search persons suspected of leaving the country with the fruits or evidence of a crime, although we think there is merit to the contention. See United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
We examine next the automobile stop and search challenged by Adams and Williams. The search of the gym bag in the automobile they were driving is controlled by Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), and albeit without much discussion, it appears we have adopted the rule that Sanders is retroactive at least to searches which have occurred after United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). United States v. MacKay, 606 F.2d 264 (9th Cir....
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