State v. Naujoks

Decision Date15 November 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-1149.,00-1149.
Citation637 N.W.2d 101
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Allen NAUJOKS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Mark C. Meyer, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Roxann M. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, and Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

Michael Naujoks challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a large-scale theft operation gathered as a result of a warrantless search of the apartment where he was staying as an overnight guest. He also argues the search warrant later issued was defective because it violated Iowa Code section 808.3 (1999). Finally, he challenges the trial court's nunc pro tunc order amending his conviction to burglary in the second-degree as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because we find the officers were not justified in securing the apartment, we reverse in part the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. We also reverse the nunc pro tunc order and remand for a new trial.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

On November 21, 1999, at 9:00 a.m. Matthew Grennan awoke to find two strangers in his apartment. The men put clothes in Grennan's gym bag and took money from his wallet. Grennan watched them go into the apartment building across the street carrying these items. The men left their apartment building several more times and entered neighboring apartments. They returned carrying several items, including stereo equipment, a television, and compact discs. On their last trip out, a third man joined the two men. Grennan called the police and described the thieves and loot.

The responding officers went into the apartment building across the street from Grennan's. Upon hearing voices coming from apartment number one, the officers knocked on the door and spoke with two men in the apartment. The men lied twice about who was present. From their position standing in the open door of the apartment, the officers could see an unplugged television and stereo positioned on bar-stools. The officers saw a third man in the apartment and heard movement and other noises coming from inside. They secured the three known occupants, and put them in an empty room across the hall. The officers searched the apartment for other people present which led them to three others, including Naujoks, hiding in a locked bedroom.1 Grennan identified Naujoks as one of the men who stole his clothes and money. On application for a search warrant, an associate judge issued a warrant based on the officers' personal observations and the on-scene identification. The State charged Naujoks with two counts of second-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5. The court denied Naujoks' motion to suppress the evidence concluding the officers had legitimate safety concerns to justify securing the apartment. The case was tried to the court and Naujoks was found guilty of two counts of third-degree burglary. The State filed a motion for order nunc pro tunc and the court granted it, amending the judgment to guilty on two counts of second-degree burglary. The court sentenced Naujoks to two concurrent indeterminate ten-year terms of imprisonment.

Naujoks appeals the judgment and sentences. He asserts the following: (1) the court erred in failing to suppress evidence derived from a warrantless search of the apartment where he was staying as an overnight guest; (2) the warrant application failed to comply with Iowa Code section 808.3, as it was not supported by an appropriate affirmation; and (3) the court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy when it changed the verdict.

II. Standard of Review

Naujoks raises two issues involving an alleged violation of a constitutional right. He first challenges the police officers' warrantless entry into the apartment where he was staying as an overnight guest. Second, he challenges the validity of the search warrant. In assessing an alleged violation of a constitutional right, we review de novo the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 2000). We are not bound by the district court's determinations, but we may give deference to its credibility findings. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we consider both the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. Id. An adverse ruling on a motion to suppress will preserve error for our review. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).

III. Warrantless Search and Seizure

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures the right of people to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. This court has adopted a two-step approach to determine whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 45. The first step requires us to determine whether the person challenging the warrantless search has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Id. If we find the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy, we proceed to the second step which requires us to determine whether the State has "unreasonably invaded that protected interest." Id.

A. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy

The right afforded by the Fourth Amendment is specific to the individual and may not be invoked by third persons. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 473, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 379 (1998). An individual challenging a warrantless search must demonstrate he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched. United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.1999). Specifically, he must show both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy. Id.

We determine whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy on a case-by-case basis. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 46. One relevant factor to consider is the location of the person seeking its safeguards. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88,119 S.Ct. at 473,142 L.Ed.2d at 379. A person's home is covered by the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966). The courts have further held a legitimate expectation of privacy extends beyond a person's home, to afford protection to even an overnight guest in their host's home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99-100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1689-90, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95 (1990). A guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is on the premises merely to conduct a business transaction. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91,119 S.Ct. at 474,142 L.Ed.2d at 381.

Naujoks asserted he was an overnight guest in the apartment searched in both his motion to suppress and appellate brief. During these proceedings, the State has not challenged Naujoks' status as an overnight guest, and has conceded his status. Though slight, the record indicates Naujoks was an overnight guest. As such, we conclude Naujoks had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. We now turn to the issue of the reasonableness of the police officers' actions in entering the apartment without a warrant.

B. Reasonableness of Warrantless Entry

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999). The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents in order `to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion....'" State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979)).

In examining the lawfulness of the officers' actions, we must balance the parties' respective interests. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950, 148 L.Ed.2d 838, 848 (2001); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1988) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d at 674). On the one hand, we consider Naujoks' Fourth Amendment interests. On the other hand, we must also consider the promotion of legitimate governmental interests, including "realistic standards of law enforcement." State v. Wiese, 525 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Iowa 1994), overruled on other grounds by Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 281 (quoting People v. Parisi, 393 Mich. 31, 35, 222 N.W.2d 757, 759 (1974)); Keehner, 425 N.W.2d at 44. This balancing test requires us to determine:

[w]hether the thing done [by government officials], in the sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, impresses as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific situation when the immediate end sought is considered against the private right affected.

State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Iowa 1980)).

Searches and seizures are unconstitutional if they are unreasonable and reasonableness depends on the facts of the particular case. State v. Roth, 305 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1981). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 492. Those exceptions include: (1) consent search; (2) search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances; (3) search of items in plain view; or (4) search incident to a lawful arrest. Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 282. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions. State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Iowa 2000).

Under the circumstances of this case, the reasonableness of the officers' actions is determined by the presence or absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Leg...

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