Church of Scientology of California v. Cazares

• Citation: 638 F.2d 1272
• Decision Date: 09 March 1981
• Docket Number: Nos. 78-3100,79-1840,s. 78-3100
• Parties: 7 Media L. Rep. 1668 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gabriel CAZARES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 1272

638 F.2d 1272

7 Media L. Rep. 1668

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gabriel CAZARES, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 78-3100, 79-1840.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 9, 1981.

Clyde Wilson, Jr., Sarasota, Fla., Bruce S. Rogow, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

John T. Allen, Jr., Walter D. Logan, St. Petersburg, Fla., for defendant-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before FAY, KRAVITCH and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

The Church of Scientology of California (the Church) appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of, and subsequent award of attorneys' fees to, Gabriel Cazares, Mayor of the City of Clearwater, Florida at the time this action was commenced.

Count I of the Church's third amended complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ¹ and contended that Cazares, under color of state law, deprived the Church of its civil rights by prohibiting it from practicing its First Amendment privilege of freedom of religion. Count II alleged defamation under Florida law with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. ²

The district court granted Cazares' motion for summary judgment on Count I finding that: (1) the Church as a corporation did not have standing to assert First Amendment rights of freedom of religion in a civil rights action, and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed. Summary judgment on Count II was granted on the ground that the statements made by Cazares constituted mere opinions concerning the Church in its role as a public figure. In a subsequent action brought by Cazares and consolidated with the present case for purpose of review, the court found appellant's § 1983 claim groundless, frivolous and unreasonable and awarded attorneys' fees to Cazares.

For the reasons stated below, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the Church lacked standing to bring an action under § 1983. We hold, however, that the court was correct in granting summary judgment on both counts of the Church's Third Amended Complaint and in finding that because appellant's civil rights claim was groundless, frivolous and unreasonable, appellee was entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Background

In October of 1975, a corporation known as Southern Land and Development and As church employees moved into the hotel, a public controversy arose as to the type of religious organization that would use the facility. News media gave substantial coverage to the developments. On January 28, 1976, appellant Church of Scientology of California announced that it was directly connected with Southern Land Corp. and United Churches of Florida and would be utilizing the hotel for functions of the Church of Scientology of California.

Leasing Corporation (hereafter Southern Land Corp.) purchased the Fort Harrison Hotel in downtown Clearwater, Florida. Because the hotel was a city landmark centrally located in the downtown area, the press speculated about the background of Southern Land Corp. and the future use of the hotel. Documents filed in Clearwater City Hall indicated the hotel would be used as a training facility for a large religious organization. Personnel of Southern Land Corp. identified the organization as United Churches of Florida, Inc.

During the progress of the news developments, appellee Gabriel Cazares, Mayor of the City of Clearwater, made statements on numerous occasions speculating as to the identity of the purchaser of the hotel and the purposes for which the hotel would be used. When the Church of Scientology of California revealed it was the true owner of the hotel, Cazares became one of its harshest critics.

According to appellant, Cazares' criticism was unlawful. In its Third Amended Complaint it contended that utilizing his power as Mayor of Clearwater, Cazares interfered with the Church's free exercise of religion by: making false and defamatory remarks, thereby turning the community against the Church and its adherents; inducing clergymen of other faiths to shun association with it and its adherents; inducing local city and state officials to undertake discriminatory and harassing actions and investigations of the Church; inducing civic organizations and other entities to shun association with the Church and its adherents and join public condemnation and ridicule of the Church; inducing the news media to refrain from publishing accurate information and/or favorable comments concerning the Church and to publish only adverse comments and false and derogatory information concerning the Church.

II. Standing

In granting Cazares' motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 count, the district court initially addressed the issue of standing. The court recognized that there were two possible theories under which a corporation might bring a civil rights action: (1) to protect the rights of its members; or (2) to protect its own rights as a corporate institution. The court found that the pleadings raised only the latter theory but that the Church would have standing under neither theory because: (1) there were no rights that could not be asserted by an individual member of the Church and no need for the Church to protect the rights of its members; and (2) as a corporation, the Church's right to free exercise of religion was not directly protected by the Civil Rights Act; thus the Church lacked standing to bring suit for the protection of its own rights.

In finding that the Church lacked standing to seek protection of the civil rights of its members the district court interpreted NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) in an unjustifiably narrow manner by requiring the presence of "unusual circumstances" before a corporation could sue on behalf of its members.

In NAACP, the State of Alabama brought an action in state court seeking to enjoin the NAACP from conducting activities in Alabama and sought records, including membership lists. The Alabama court held the Association in contempt for noncompliance with the order to produce records revealing the names of its members. NAACP sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court urging two points: first, that it was constitutionally entitled to resist official inquiry into its membership lists; and second, that on behalf of its members, it was entitled to assert that their One reason the Supreme Court upheld NAACP's standing to assert a constitutional right on behalf of its members was that to have held otherwise would have defeated the purpose of the suit. If the individual members had to be parties, they would have revealed their identity. Though that was certainly a reason for the decision, it was not the only reason. As the Court stated:

exercise of a right personal to them, namely, their affiliation with the association as revealed by the membership lists, is protected from compelled disclosure. Without deciding whether the NAACP had standing as an institution, the Court noted "that petitioner argues more appropriately the rights of its members, and that its nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it (the NAACP) act as their representative before this Court." 357 U.S. at 458-59, 78 S.Ct. at 1169-70.

Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The Association, which provides in its constitution that "(a)ny person who is in accordance with (its) principles and policies ..." may become a member, is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views. The reasonable likelihood that the Association itself through diminished financial support and membership may be adversely affected if production is compelled is a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its members. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070.

357 U.S. at 459-60, 78 S.Ct. at 1170-71. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court suggest that only in "unusual circumstances" can a corporation sue to protect the rights of its members. ³

In the present case the district court also denied the Church representational standing because it found there were no rights that could not be asserted by an individual member of the Church, thus there was no need for the Church to protect the rights of its members. An identical argument was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). In Hunt, a Washington state agency challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute concerning the selling and shipping of apples in North Carolina. North Carolina challenged the commission's standing to bring the action on behalf of Washington state growers and dealers arguing, inter alia, that the growers and dealers "are under no disabilities which prevent them from coming forward to protect their own rights if they are, in fact, injured by the statute's operation." 432 U.S. at 342, 97 S.Ct. at 2440. Using the analysis originally set forth in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), discussed infra, the Court found standing.

In denying representational standing to the Church, the district court also emphasized that the complaint did not specifically state that the Church was seeking to represent its members in the action. We are unaware of any authority that requires such an explicit statement. Indeed, in Congress of Racial Equality v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir. 1963), we allowed CORE to assert the constitutional rights of its members although the pleadings did not specifically seek relief on behalf of any member. In that case the district court, at the behest of the Mayor of McComb...