Rodriguez–heredia v. Holder
Citation | 639 F.3d 1264 |
Decision Date | 10 May 2011 |
Docket Number | 10–9540.,Nos. 10–9531,s. 10–9531 |
Parties | Felix Sanchez RODRIGUEZ–HEREDIA, Petitioner,v.Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Submitted on the briefs: *Kimberly Jo Trupiano, Trupiano Law, P.C., Salt Lake City, UT, for Petitioner.John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel, Channah M. Farber, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.Before HOLMES and McKAY, Circuit Judges, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
In these consolidated matters, petitioner Felix Sanchez Rodriguez–Heredia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In No. 10–9531, he seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of an appeal from a decision by an immigration judge (IJ) denying his request for a change in custody status. We dismiss this petition as moot because Mr. Rodriguez was released from detention and removed from the United States on July 30, 2010. In No. 10–9540, he seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA dismissing an appeal from an IJ's determination that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We deny this petition because Mr. Rodriguez's conviction of identity fraud under Utah law is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Mr. Rodriguez entered the United States without inspection at an unknown place on an unknown date. On May 6, 2009, he pleaded guilty to one count of identity fraud in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76–6–1102 for using another person's social security number to obtain employment. He was issued a notice to appear, which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as “[a]n alien present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.” At hearings before an IJ, he conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). He also requested a change in custody status, namely, release from detention.
The IJ denied his change of custody request, and the BIA later dismissed his appeal of that decision. In a separate decision, the IJ determined that Mr. Rodriguez was not eligible for cancellation of removal because his fraud conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude and precluded him from establishing good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) ( ). The BIA dismissed an appeal of that decision, concluding that, under the categorical approach, the conviction under the state statute required a specific intent to defraud, an element, it said, that has always been found to involve moral turpitude. The BIA further concluded that, even under the modified categorical approach, the specific facts of Mr. Rodriguez's offense constituted a crime involving moral turpitude—he “signed an Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I–9) and affirmed that the social security number on the form was his,” and he “listed a resident alien number on the form that was not his and indicated that he was a lawful permanent resident.” No. 10–9540, Admin. R. at 5. Accordingly, the BIA concluded that Mr. Rodriguez had not established his eligibility for cancellation of removal.
We first address the petition for review in No. 10–9531. Mr. Rodriguez seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's denial of his request for release from detention. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), this court has jurisdiction to review only final orders of removal, and the denial of Mr. Rodriguez's change in custody status was not a final order of removal. However, we need not resolve that issue. Respondent has since informed the court that on July 30, 2010, Mr. Rodriguez was released from detention and removed from the United States. Because Mr. Rodriguez is no longer in custody and did not seek damages, the petition for review in 10–9531 is moot. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir.2006) ( ). Mr. Rodriguez suggests that we apply the exception to mootness for issues “capable of repetition yet evading review,” Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.2002), because there is a likelihood that he would be paroled back into the United States and subject to further detention while continuing his removal proceedings. This argument, however, is wholly dependent on a favorable decision on his merits petition in No. 10–9540. As we proceed to discuss, the BIA correctly determined that Mr. Rodriguez is not eligible for cancellation of removal, and therefore the exception to mootness he urges is inapplicable.
Turning to the petition for review in No. 10–9540, Mr. Rodriguez challenges the BIA's determination that his fraud conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude and that he therefore failed to meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). There is a general jurisdictional bar to our review of “any judgment regarding the granting of” cancellation under § 1229b(b). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review “constitutional claims and questions of law” relating to relief under § 1229b(b), Arambula–Medina v. Holder, 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2092, 176 L.Ed.2d 722 (2010), provided that, as here, such issues arise in a petition for review of a final removal order, Hamilton v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 564, 568 (10th Cir.2007). Whether a conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude is a question of law that we review de novo. See Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1289 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2009). Because “a single member of the BIA decided [Mr. Rodriguez's] appeal and issued a brief opinion, we review the BIA's decision as the final agency determination.” Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).1
To determine whether a state conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, we ordinarily employ the categorical approach. Hamilton v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1284, 1286–87 (10th Cir.2009). Under that approach, we are “initially ... limited to considering the statutory definition of the crime, not the underlying factual circumstances of the crime.” Id. at 1287 n. 4. Our inquiry focuses on whether the Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). This Id. Thus, we ask here if Mr. Rodriguez has established that there is a realistic probability that Utah Code Annotated § 76–6–1102 would be applied to reach conduct that is not a crime involving moral turpitude. To meet his burden, “he must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815.
Mr. Rodriguez pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony under Utah Code Annotated § 76–6–1102. See Admin. R. at 44. In relevant part, the statute provides:
(2)(a) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person:
(i) obtains personal identifying information of another person whether that person is alive or deceased; and
(ii) knowingly or intentionally uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, employment, any other thing of value, or medical information.
(b) It is not a defense to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) that the person did not know that the personal information belonged to another person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b)(ii), a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of value is less than $5,000; or
(b) a second degree felony if:
(i) the value of the credit, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000; or
(ii) the use described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii) of personal identifying information results, directly or indirectly, in bodily injury to another person.
Utah Code Ann. § 76–6–1102 (emphasis added). Significantly, as the emphasized language in subsection (2)(a)(ii) shows, the statute requires proof of a specific intent to defraud in all circumstances. Although “crime involving moral turpitude” is not defined by statute, we have said that “[m]oral turpitude refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general.” Wittgenstein v. INS, 124 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this concept, we have followed ...
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