Independent School Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County v. Glass, 53634

• Citation: 1982 OK 2,639 P.2d 1233
• Decision Date: 12 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 53634,53634
• Parties: 2 Ed. Law Rep. 579, 1982 OK 2 INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9 OF TULSA COUNTY, Oklahoma, a public body corporate, Appellant, v. Wilson GLASS, in his capacity as County Assessor of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and as a member of the Board of Tax Roll Corrections; Richard Warner, in his capacity as Chairman of the Tulsa County Board of Tax Roll Corrections; Terry Young, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Tulsa County Commissioners and as Chairman of the Tulsa County Board of Tax Roll Corrections; John Cantrell, in his capacity as Tulsa County Treasurer; and Anita Nesbitt, in her capacity as Tulsa County Clerk, Appellees, and Ford Motor Company, Tulsa Junior College, the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, on Behalf of the Tulsa City-County Health Department, the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, on Behalf of the Tulsa City-County Library, and the City of Tulsa, Appellee and Appellant Intervenors.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1233

639 P.2d 1233

2 Ed. Law Rep. 579, 1982 OK 2

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9 OF TULSA COUNTY, Oklahoma, a public body corporate, Appellant, v. Wilson GLASS, in his capacity as County Assessor of Tulsa

County, Oklahoma, and as a member of the Board of Tax Roll

Corrections; Richard Warner, in his capacity as Chairman of

the Tulsa County Board of Tax Roll Corrections; Terry Young,

in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Tulsa County

Commissioners and as Chairman of the Tulsa County Board of

Tax Roll Corrections; John Cantrell, in his capacity as

Tulsa County Treasurer; and Anita Nesbitt, in her capacity

as Tulsa County Clerk, Appellees,

and

Ford Motor Company, Tulsa Junior College, the Board of

County Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, the Board of

County Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, on Behalf of

the Tulsa City-County Health Department, the Board of County

Commissioners of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, on Behalf of the

Tulsa City-County Library, and the City of Tulsa, Appellee

and Appellant Intervenors.

No. 53634.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Jan. 12, 1982.

Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; B. R. Beasley, Judge.

Appellant appeals from the refusal of the district court to enter a permanent injunction prohibiting the refund of personal property tax which had been erroneously taxed under the freeport exemption pursuant to Okla.Const.art. 10, § 6A.

AFFIRMED.

Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold by J. Douglas Mann, Tulsa, for appellant.

Dyer, Powers, Marsh, Turner & Armstrong by Thomas G. Marsh, Tulsa, for appellees and cross appellants, Ford Motor Co. and Wilson Glass, Tulsa County Assessor.

HODGES, Justice.

The question presented is whether Ford Motor Company (Ford), appellee and appellant intervenor, was the recipient of an erroneous tax refund based on a "freeport exemption," pursuant to the Okla.Const.art. 10, § 6A. ¹ Independent School District No 9 of Tulsa County, Oklahoma (District) seeks to enjoin the refund.

Ford is a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Oklahoma. It operates a glass manufacturing plant in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, within the boundaries of Independent School District No. 9, appellant. A portion of Ford's inventory during the 1977 tax year consisted of goods, wares and merchandise purchased outside of Oklahoma and shipped to its Oklahoma plant. This merchandise was held for manufacturing and then shipped, within less than nine months to points outside of Oklahoma. In 1977, Ford did not file a personal property tax return or a written list of its taxable personal property located within Tulsa County before March 15, 1977, as required by 68 O.S. 1971 § 2431. ² However, Ford did file a rendition with the county assessor before April 10, 1977, which was accepted as being true and correct. The county assessor notified the Tulsa County Board of Equalization (Board) of the assessed value of the property based on Ford's rendition. Ford did not appeal the assessment or valuation of its personal property, nor was the assessment altered by the Board.

On or before the third Monday in June, 1977, the county assessor submitted his abstract of the tax assessment rolls to the State Board of Equalization. No changes were made in the assessed value of Ford's personal property. A certificate of valuation covering Ford's property was issued to the county assessor, who sent a copy to the Tulsa County treasurer. The treasurer submitted an ad valorem tax bill to Ford for $1,265,307.93. This statement included a 10% penalty for late filing. Ford paid one-half of the taxes on January 3, 1978, and the balance on April 3, 1978.

Ford filed a complaint of erroneous assessment and petition for correction of its 1977 personal property taxes with the Tulsa County Board of Tax-Roll Corrections September 26, 1978, seeking a refund of $83,784.01. Ford claimed that a part of its inventory for 1977, was exempt from taxation under the "freeport exemption." Ford had not claimed the exemption, nor requested the Tulsa County Board of Equalization to review or cancel it prior to filing the complaint. The county assessor notified Ford on October 10, 1978 that his office had determined that the refund should be $92,167.97.

The Board of Tax-Roll Corrections met to hear Ford's refund request, December 12, 1978. After considering Ford's unreasonable delay and/or fault in discovering and claiming the refund, the Board of Tax-Roll Corrections voted two-to-one to grant Ford's refund request. The refund was increased from $83,784.01 to $92,167.97. It was conceded by all parties at the time of trial that the proper amount of the refund, if owing, is $92,167.97.

The District sought a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent the payment of the refund to Ford. A temporary restraining order was entered by the trial court, but it was dismissed and the permanent injunction denied on April 6, 1979.

It is asserted by the School District that the tax refund was illegal because Ford failed to follow proper procedures and voluntary payment of taxes on exempt property does not justify a refund. Ford counters by contending that the School District has no standing to prosecute the appeal and that it may not collaterally attack the decision of the Board of Tax-Roll Corrections. Because the issue of standing is critical to the prosecution of the appeal by the District, it must be resolved before the merits can be reached.

I

Standing has traditionally been defined as whether a party has a sufficient interest in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. If reliance is not placed on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. ³ Ford contends that the School District lacks standing to enjoin the refund because 68 O.S.Supp. 1974 § 2479 ⁴ authorizes only the taxpayer and the County Assessor to seek review of the Board's decision. Ford's position would be tenable if the District sought to avail itself of the statutory remedy of a trial de novo. The issue is not under-assessment or non-assessment. The District is not appealing the decision of the Board, nor is it seeking a trial de novo. Rather, it seeks to prevent what it characterizes as an illegal refund of public funds which has been erroneously authorized by the Board. The District asserts that it has a direct and pecuniary interest in the refund, and that it seeks to protect its revenues from the illegal and arbitrary action of the Board.

A litigant must have the capacity to sue in order to be entitled to injunctive relief. When a remedy for any particular wrong or injury has been provided by statute, generally no redress can be afforded by injunction. In the absence of a constitutional violation, before a statutory remedy will preclude a suit for injunctive relief, the statutory provision must provide for a speedy, complete, convenient and beneficial relief. If the statutory remedy is obviously inadequate, injunction may lie. ⁵ A party must assert his/her own legal rights and interests and cannot rest a claim for relief on the rights or interests of third parties. ⁶

A violation of a state statute is an injury to the State and its citizens. A continuing violation is an irreparable injury for which injunctive relief is available. ⁷ However, standing does not depend on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal. ⁸ Before a litigant possesses standing as a proper party to seek injunctive relief, it must be alleged that: the challenged action has caused him/her injury in fact; the relief sought would remedy the injury; and, the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court and the reviewing court must construe the petition in favor of the complaining party. It is not necessary to decide whether a litigant will ultimately be entitled to any relief in order to hold that the party has standing to seek judicial redress for his/her grievance. The proper inquiry concerning standing is whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered injury to a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions. If he has not, standing does not exist, and the case must be dismissed. If standing exists, the case must proceed on the merits. ⁹

We agree with the District that it has standing to seek injunctive relief. The District has an interest in the subject matter, the capacity to sue, and the power to protect and prevent the wrongful disposition of revenues. ¹⁰

II

The District asserts that Ford is not entitled to a refund of personal property taxes because it failed to show good cause for failing to appear before the Board of Equalization prior to filing its claim with the Board of Tax-Roll Corrections. It argues that failure to follow the statutory guidelines places Ford in a fatal procedural posture. Ford counters that showing good cause is not a requirement if the property is constitutionally exempt. We must agree with Ford.

Property is never exempt from taxation except by a special and definite provision of law. ¹¹ Unless the constitutional provision which grants the exemptions is self-executing, the Legislature may qualify, curtail or annul any exemption. Constitutional provisions which exempt certain classes of property or those which direct that the Legislature shall not tax designated property are self-executing. ¹² These provisions are operative without supplemental or enabling legislation. The Legislature may not abridge or extend a constitutional provision which is a self-executing grant of power to the taxpayers if the provision is self-complete. ¹³ Provisions which authorize the Legislature to exempt specified classes of property or requiring the...