Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.

Decision Date27 September 1995
Docket NumberNos. 93-1101,94-10787,s. 93-1101
PartiesGATEWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP., Defendant-Appellant. MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP., Plaintiff, v. GATEWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Douglas G. Bonner, Senior Atty., Washington, DC, Alan Wright, Sharon Freytag, Haynes & Boone, Dallas, TX, David Kelther, Haynes & Boone, and Lynne Liberato, Haynes & Boone, Ft. Worth, TX, for appellant.

Kevin C. Nash, Nash & Samra, Dallas, TX, Douglas Aaron Cawley, Felicia Latham, and Susan Powley, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, TX, for appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges:

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. ("MCI") appeals a district court order affirming the judgment of an arbitrator who found that MCI breached its contract with Gateway Technologies, Inc., ("Gateway") and awarded attorneys' fees as actual damages as well as $2,000,000 in punitive damages. MCI contends that its contract with Gateway provides for de novo review by this court of the errors of law in the arbitration award and urges vacation of the entire award, claiming that the arbitrator improperly assessed both attorneys' fees and punitive damages as well as excluded critical evidence. While we agree that the contract provides for de novo judicial review of "errors of law" in the arbitration award, this court vacates only the punitive damages and otherwise affirms the arbitration award.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During 1990, the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VADOC") solicited bids to design and implement a telephone system that would enable inmates to place collect calls to authorized individuals without operator assistance. After successfully bidding for the project, MCI subcontracted with Gateway. Under their contract, MCI, as a telephone service carrier, agreed to secure the local access lines over which inmate calls would be made, while Gateway promised to furnish, install, and maintain all the equipment and technology necessary to provide the automated collect calls. 1 The contract expressly provided that the parties were independent contractors and neither partners, joint venturers, nor agents. Contract ("Agreement"), Apr. 29, 1991, at Article 2. Further, it imposed on the parties a duty to negotiate in good faith any disputes arising from the contract. Id. at Article 9. In the event that such good faith negotiations proved fruitless, the parties agreed to binding arbitration, "except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal." Id.

After installment of the VADOC phone system, MCI complained to Gateway that the automated system it had designed was improperly completing many collect calls. Ostensibly, because of the problems with Gateway's system, MCI integrated its own automated system to bypass the defective one. During the arbitration, however, the arbitrator found that MCI's decision to migrate from the Gateway system was motivated primarily by the significant profits promised by integration. 2 Once MCI had integrated its own system, it sent a default notice to Gateway. Although Gateway proposed to cure the defects with updated software, MCI refused to sign a confidentiality agreement for this software, thus leaving the problems with the original system unsolved. In January 1993, MCI formally terminated its contract with Gateway.

On July 30, 1993, the arbitrator found that MCI had breached its contractual duty to negotiate in good faith and awarded actual as well as punitive damages to Gateway. MCI filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to vacate the award; Gateway simultaneously moved to confirm it. Although the district court purported to review the award according to the standard agreed upon in the contract, it did not interpret "errors of law" as requiring "a scrutiny as strict as would be applied by an appellate court reviewing the actions of a trial court." Rather, it chose to "review the [a]ward under the harmless error standard, but with due regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Applying this standard, the district court confirmed the award in its entirety.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

This court reviews the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award under a de novo standard. Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994); McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 819-20 (5th Cir.1993); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir.1990). As the Supreme Court recently explained, this is not a special standard, but reflects the application of typical appellate principles. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995).

Usually, however, the district court's "review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow." Antwine v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir.1990). In a proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") circumscribes the review of the court, providing that an award shall not be vacated unless: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there is evidence of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the rights of one of the parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. Sec. 10(a)(1)-(4) (Supp.1995). Forsythe Int'l, S.A., 915 F.2d at 1020.

In this case, however, the parties contractually agreed to permit expanded review of the arbitration award by the federal courts. Specifically, their contract details that "[t]he arbitration decision shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal." Agreement Apr. 29, 1991, at Article 9 (emphasis added). Such a contractual modification is acceptable because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract and

the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties.... '[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.' Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 1216, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1256, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989)) (emphasis added).

See also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A., v. M/V Sky Reefer, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 132 L.Ed.2d 462 (1995) (enforcing a contractual provision mandating arbitration in Tokyo, Japan); First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct 1920, 1925, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (observing that "the basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts are enforced according to their terms.") (citations omitted); Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., v. Dobson, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995) (the FAA "intended courts to enforce arbitration agreements into which parties had entered and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.") (citations omitted); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (stressing that courts should "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."). Because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supplements the FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award. 3

The district court accordingly erred when it refused to review the "errors of law" de novo, opting instead to apply its specially crafted "harmless error standard." This choice apparently reflected the district court's unwillingness to enforce the parties' contract because "the parties have sacrificed the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration on the altar of appellate review." Prudent or not, the contract expressly and unambiguously provides for review of "errors of law"; to interpret this phrase short of de novo review would render the language meaningless and would frustrate the mutual intent of the parties. When, as here, the parties agree contractually to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review, federal arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the terms of the arbitration contract. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 469, 109 S.Ct. at 1250.

Because the district court erroneously employed "harmless error" review of the award, both the actual and punitive damages awarded to Gateway were scrutinized and confirmed less rigorously than the parties had intended. As a result, this court will review the award de novo for "errors of law." 4

B. Actual Damages

Upon finding that MCI had breached its contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith with Gateway, the arbitrator awarded actual damages to Gateway in the form of attorneys' fees. 5 The award is premised on the notion that had MCI satisfied its contractual obligation, Gateway would not...

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