Rawlings v. Dovenmuehle Mortg., Inc., Civ.A. 97-D-1581-N.

Citation64 F.Supp.2d 1156
Decision Date23 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 97-D-1581-N.,Civ.A. 97-D-1581-N.
PartiesRay D. RAWLINGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama

C. Knox McLaney, III, Montgomery, AL, Angela L. Kimbrough, Tuscaloosa, AL, for plaintiffs.

Daryl L. Masters, Montgomery, AL, Gregory D. Crooslin, Michael B. O'Connor, Montgomery, AL, Peter S. Fruin, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are two motions for summary judgment:

(1) Plaintiffs filed a Motion For Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Mot.") on April 8, 1999. Defendant Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. ("Defendant") filed a Response To Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Resp.") on April 28, 1999.

(2) Defendant filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mot.") on May 10, 1999, together with a Memorandum Brief In Support Of Defendant's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Memo."). Plaintiffs filed a Response To Defendant Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Resp.") on May 26, 1999. Defendant filed a Reply To Plaintiffs' Response To Dovenmuehle Mortgage's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Reply") on June 2, 1999.

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that both Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Ray Rawlings ("Rawlings") and Christopher Powers ("Powers") purchased a home on October 4, 1991, initially financed by Molton, Allen & Williams. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8.) In 1994, the loan servicing was transferred to GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. ("GE Capital"). (Id. ¶ 8.) On March 12, 1997, GE Capital informed Plaintiffs that the servicing rights for their loan had been transferred to Defendant. (Pls.' Mot.Ex. A.) The letter from GE Capital stated that the effective date of said transfer was April 1, 1997. (Id.) On April 14, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a correspondence informing them that their mortgage payment was due in the amount of $1,735.80 for March 1, 1997 through the end of April. (Rawlings Aff. at 2.)

Plaintiffs claim that, on April 25, 1997, Plaintiff Rawlings mailed a letter to Defendant, informing Defendant that the March payment had been timely made to GE Capital. (Id. at 3.) Enclosed with said letter were copies of canceled checks to demonstrate that the April 1997 payment had been made to Defendant and the January, February, and March 1997 payments had been made to GE Capital. (Id. at 3.) Defendant contests whether such letter was ever sent to Defendant, claiming that it never received said letter. (Def.'s Resp. at 3.)1

On June 6, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs both a letter informing them that they owed late charges of $38.20 and a Notice of Default. (Rawlings Aff. at 3.) Plaintiff Rawlings responded to Defendant by letter dated June 25, 1997. With the letter, Plaintiff Rawlings enclosed copies of checks to demonstrate that the January through March 1997 payments had been made to GE Capital and that all payments effective April 1997 had been made to Defendant. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff Rawlings also included a copy of his account history with GE Capital. (Id.) In said letter, Plaintiff Rawlings requested that "this matter be corrected promptly and a letter mailed to [him] stating that such has been corrected." (Id.) At approximately the same time, Plaintiff Rawlings contacted Defendant to request a copy of his loan history. (Id. at 2.) Defendant sent Plaintiffs a Payment History on July 26, 1997; however, said Payment History was not for Plaintiffs, but for other persons. (Id. at 3.)

Thereafter, by telephone conversation with Defendant, Plaintiff Rawlings requested that Defendant contact GE Capital to try to remedy any misapplied payments. (Rawlings Dep. at 36-37.) Defendant told Plaintiff Rawlings that it did not handle such matters and that he should contact GE Capital himself. (Rawlings Aff. at 2.) On August 4, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs another letter regarding their loan being in default. (Id. at 4.) Then, on August 12, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs another Default Notice. (Id.)

On August 26, 1997, Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to Defendant, enclosing previous correspondence from Plaintiff Rawlings to Defendant as well as copies of Plaintiffs' canceled checks and Plaintiffs' account history with GE Capital. (Rawlings Aff. at 4.) In said letter, Plaintiff's attorney requested that Defendant contact him "to rectify the matter or he would have no choice but to file suit." (Rawlings Aff. at 4.)

On September 3, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a notice of their loan being in default. (Rawlings Aff. at 4.) Again on September 8, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a notice of their loan being in default. (Rawlings Aff. at 4.) On October 6, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a letter regarding late charges of $152.80, as well as a notice that their loan was in default. (Rawlings Aff. at 4.) On October 7, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs another Notice of Default. (Id.)

On October 24, 1997, Plaintiff Rawlings sent a letter to GE Capital, requesting that GE Capital verify to Defendant that all payments were timely made for the January, February, and March 1997 loan payments. (Id.) On November 6, 1997, Defendant sent Plaintiffs another Notice of Default. (Id. at 5.) On November 7, 1997, GE Capital sent Plaintiffs a letter informing them that their check # 5019, dated March 15, 1997, had been misapplied to another mortgage account in error, and that those funds were being sent to Defendant. (Id.) Subsequently, Defendant received the funds that Plaintiff had paid GE Capital for the March 1997 payment, and Plaintiffs' account balance was restored to current status. (Rawlings Dep. at 39.)

Plaintiff Rawlings spent approximately $75 for secretarial services in corresponding with Defendant. (Rawlings Dep. at 23.) Additionally, Plaintiff...

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