People v. Reck
| Decision Date | 17 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 29096.,29096. |
| Citation | 392 Ill. 311,64 N.E.2d 526 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. RECK. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Joseph Burke, Judge.
Emil Reck was convicted of murder, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Wm. Scott Stewart, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, and Joseph A. Pope, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.
Plaintiff in error, Emil Reck, was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the crime of murder. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the pententiary for a period of 199 years and the cause is now before us on a writ of error.
We have only the common-law record and the briefs present no statement of errors as required by Rule 39 of this court. Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, c. 110, s 259.39. The assignment of errors appears only as a part of the abstract of the record. It has been announced by this court many times that the purpose of Rule 39, requiring a statement of the errors relied upon as the concluding paragraph of the statement of the case in the briefs, is to advise the court and counsel what the alleged errors relied upon on appeal are, and to limit the issues to the question thus stated. It appears, however, from the brief and argument for plaintiff in error that the issues sought to be tendered are based upon matters arising on the preliminary proceeding instituted by the public defender of Cook county, who was appointed as a friend of the court, and who filed a petition praying that the court empanel a jury to inquire into the question as to whether or not the defendant was a feebleminded person and requesting that he be permitted to introduce evidence in support of his petition and that the jury make a finding in accordance with said evidence.
From the record it appears the public defender had entered his appearance for the defendant, which was later, at the request of the defendant, withdrawn on order of the court. The record then discloses that two attorneys entered their appearance as counsel for the accused. Thereafter, and while the two attorneys were still of record, the court appointed the public defender as a friend of the court. It is urged there was a lack of propriety in this appointment because it was the duty of the court to see that no advantage was taken of the defendant; that the appointment of the public defender as a friend of the court resulted in deprivation of safeguards which the court should have insisted upon.
Nothing appears in the record to show that counsel appearing of record for the defendant were in any way prevented from taking part in the proceedings as instituted by the public defender other than his appointment. It does not appear they made objection and we hardly see how it could be said that the court, merely by the appointment of the public defender as a friend of the court and his acts thereunder, denied to the defendant necessary safeguards either as to the entering of his plea of not guilty or as to his mental condition. The acts of the public defender seemed to be in good faith and for the benefit of the defendant.
It is true, as was said in People v. Hart, 333 Ill. 169, 164 N.E. 156, 158, cited by counsel for the defendant, that ‘The duty and responsibility of raising the question whether the defendant was insane at the time of the trial rests upon him and his counsel;’ and while this responsibility does rest upon his counsel, the record seems to be silent as to any attempt on their part, by motion or otherwise, to act or object to the public defender acting after their motion which they filed to have a behavior-clinic-examination report made to the court. This motion was granted and such report filed. The record discloses that the defendant, after such finding, entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury while represented by counsel of his own choosing, which resulted in his conviction.
The duties of the public defender are clearly defined in the statute, Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, c. 34, s 163f, and the court may, with the consent of the defendant, appoint counsel other than the public defender and shall so appoint if the defendant shall so demand. If it could be determined from the record here that the public defender, acting as a friend of the court, was unfriendly to the defendant, or by his conduct failed to protect the interest of the defendant, or was assuming to displace counsel representing the defendant, it would, of course, be highly improper for the public defender to act, especially as against the wishes of counsel in the case. It certainly should be clear to any court that under such circumstances counsel for the defendant, as selected by him, has a right to carry on the case of defendant without interference and it is the duty of the court to afford such protection. After counsel is acting in a case it is certainly not proper for the court, after the public defender has been displaced, to permit him in any way to interfere with the proceedings. His authority to proceed and his duties are fully and clearly outlined under the statute and he should in no way participate as a public defender when the defendant has demanded other counsel, or other counsel selected by him appear as attorneys of record and are so acting.
Counsel for defendant cites the case of People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 157 N.E. 247, 255, and quotes the language used in that opinion as follows: ‘It is the spirit...
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Reck v. Pate
...murder, and he was sentenced to prison for a term of 199 years. The conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N.E.2d 526. Several years later Reck filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, S.H.A. ch. 38, § 826 et seq., all......
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