Murray v. City of Roanoke
Decision Date | 07 May 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 3803,3803 |
Citation | 192 Va. 321,64 S.E.2d 804 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | FERRIS MURRAY AND OTHERS v. CITY OF ROANOKE. Record |
Messick & Psaki, Martin, Martin & Hopkins and W. S. Hubard, for the plaintiffs in error.
C. E. Cuddy and B. T. Fitzpatrick, for the defendant in error.
On March 16, 1950, Ferris Murray was tried and convicted by a jury in the Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke, upon a warrant charging him with keeping a gambling house in violation of section 8 of chapter 68 of the Code of the City of Roanoke. Tried at the same time and before the same jury, by consent of the parties, the remaining appellants, Earl Barton, N. P. Carter, Joe Wheby, Crafton Warren, George Murray, Joe Unice, A. M. Murray, Joe Davis, O. L. Martin, A. E. Willis, H. R. Wimmer, Abraham George, Henry Lawrence, E. W. Souma, N. J. Nackley and George Chapman were severally convicted upon separate warrants charging each of them with participating in a gambling game for money in violation of section 7 of chapter 68 of the said Code.
The cases were heard upon appeals from judgments of conviction by the Civil and Police Justice for the city of Roanoke. For the purpose of this appeal, the questions in each case being the same, pursuant to agreement of counsel for appellants and the city of Roanoke, and an order of the trial court, one record covering the evidence and the proceedings was made up for this appeal.
There are several assignments of error, the first of which is that the judgments of the Hustings Court and all proceedings on the warrants are void because the offenses, charged in the warrants as being in violation of the ordinances of the city of Roanoke, admittedly occurred in the county of Roanoke, approximately 200 yards west of the corporate limits of the city.
The city, on the other hand, insists that by virtue of the provisions of its charter, 1 especially the general welfare clauses therein and the general statutes of the state, the legislature of Virginia 'has conferred directly and by inference jurisdiction upon the cities over all criminal offenses, whether state or municipal, within the radius of one mile of their corporate limits.'
Section 27 of the charter of the city, with reference to the power of its civil and police justice, in part, provides:
'In criminal cases, he shall possess all the jurisdiction and exercise all the power and authority conferred by law upon a trial justice, and except where it is otherwise specifically provided by law, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all misdemeanor cases occurring within the corporate limits of the city and concurrent jurisdiction with the county authorities of offenses committed within one mile of the corporate limits.'
Section 7 of chapter 68 of the city code makes it unlawful for any person to bet money or play at any game for money or other thing of value.
Section 8 makes it unlawful for any person to keep or possess any apparatus or paraphernalia used in gaming for the purpose of gaming, etc.
The two sections are respectively modeled after, and closely follow, sections 18-278 and 18-284, Code of Virginia, 1950.
Code of Virginia, 1950, section 15-560 provides:
'The jurisdiction of the corporate authorities of each town or city, in criminal matters, shall extend one mile beyond the corporate limits of such town or city; * * *.'
Code of Virginia, 1950, section 17-139 reads as follows:
In Virginia, counties and cities are separate and distinct legal entities. Each is a subordinate agency of the State government, and each is invested by the legislature with subordinate powers of legislation and administration relative to local affairs within a prescribed area. Citizens of the counties have no voice in the enactment of city ordinances, and conversely citizens of cities have no say in the enactment of county ordinances.
Appellants do not deny that the legislature may give extraterritorial effect to municipal ordinances and may allow cities to enact ordinances for police and sanitary purposes to be effective in territory contiguous to the corporation. Light v. Danville, 168 Va. 181, 205, 190 S.E. 276. They contend that unless the legislature expressly gives such authority to a city, the effect of its ordinances is restricted to the corporate limits of the municipality, and that in this case no such express permission has been given.
In 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, section 194, page 832, it is said:
'It is a well-settled rule, however, that unless otherwise provided by the organic law, or in some instances, by specific legislation enacted by the state, municipal ordinances have no extraterritorial force or operation, and are effective only within the boundaries of the municipality.'
In the same authority, section 284, page 917, it is further said:
* * *
In 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, section 141, page 284, it is said:
'The Legislature may, and often does, expressly or by implication, grant to municipal corporations the right to exercise police power beyond and within a prescribed distance of the municipal limits especially for the preservation of the public health, and accordingly municipal corporations may have the implied right to exercise certain extraterritorial police powers when the possession and exercise of such powers are essential to the proper conduct of the affairs of the Corporation.'
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in express words by statute or charter, those necessarily or fairly implied or incidental to the powers expressly ...
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