64 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. 1951), 505, State v. Hicks

• Docket Number: 505
• Date: 02 May 1951
• Citation: 233 N.C. 511,64 S.E.2d 871
• Parties: STATE, v. HICKS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 871

64 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. 1951)

233 N.C. 511

STATE,

v.

HICKS.

No. 505

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 2, 1951

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Ralph V. Kidd and J. C. Sedberry, Charlotte, for the defendant-appellant.

Atty. Gen. Harry McMullan and Asst. Atty. Gen. Ralph Moody for the State.

ERVIN, Justice.

It is an ancient and basic principle of criminal jurisprudence that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Mansfield, 207 N.C. 233, 176 S.E. 761. Several criteria have been prescribed by the authorities for determining in diverse situations whether two indictments are for the same offense. The one applicable on the present record is the 'same-evidence test,' which is somewhat alternative in character. It is simply this: Whether the facts alleged in the second indictment, if given in evidence, would have sustained a conviction under the first indictment, State v. Freeman, 162 N.C. 594, 77 S.E. 780, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 977; State v. Hooker, 145 N.C. 581, 59 S.E. 866; State v. Hankins, 136 N.C. 621, 48 S.E. 593; State v. Nash, 86 N.C. 650, 41 Am.Rep. 472; State v. Revels, 44 N.C. 200; State v. Birmingham, 44 N.C. 120; State v. Jesse, 20 N.C. 95, or whether the same evidence would support a conviction in each case. State v. Clemmons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.E. 760; State v. Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50. See, also, in this connection, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 279.

Whether the facts alleged in the second indictment, if given in evidence, would have sustained a conviction under the first is always to be determined by the court from an inspection of the two indictments. State v. Nash, supra. Whether the same evidence would support a conviction in each case is to be determined by a jury from extrinsic testimony if the plea of former jeopardy avers facts dehors the record showing the identity of the offense charged in the first with that set forth in the last indictment. State v. Bell, supra.

When these rules are laid alongside the case at bar, it is clear that the judge rightly refused to submit to the jury the two specific issues tendered by the defendant and rightly rejected the plea of former acquittal. The plea merely set forth the several indictments and the result of the former trial, and drew the legal conclusion from these bare matters that the defendant was being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. It did [233 N.C. 517] not aver any facts dehors the record showing the identity of the crimes charged in the former indictments with those described in the present one. These things being true, the plea was insufficient, for it revealed on its face the nonidentity of the several offenses. The defendant's legal standing would not be bettered a whit, however, on this phase of the case if his plea of former acquittal had gone beyond the record and invoked the extrinsic testimony. This is so because evidence of a conspiracy to damage or injure property owned or used by the Duke Power Company will not support a conviction of a conspiracy to damage or injure property owned or used by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company. State v. Hicks, supra; State v. Crisp, 188 N.C. 799, 125 S.E. 543.

This brings us to the question whether the trial judge erred in refusing to dismiss the prosecution on compulsory nonsuits under G.S. § 15-173.

The defendant was not entitled to have the action nonsuited on the theory that the crime alleged was committed outside

Page 876

the State. While the conspiracy was formed in South Carolina, one of the conspirators, namely, Chesley Morgan Lovell, committed overt acts in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, in furtherance of the common design. As a consequence, the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County had jurisdiction to try the action. State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 136. In legal contemplation, a criminal conspiracy is continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. 11 Am.Jur., Conspiracy, section 23.

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