City of Jacksonville v. Bowden

Decision Date10 March 1914
Citation67 Fla. 181,64 So. 769
PartiesCITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al. v. BOWDEN.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

Suit by J. E. T. Bowden against the City of Jacksonville and others. From an order restraining defendants from submitting certain ordinances to the voters, they appeal. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The lawmaking power of the Legislature of a state is subject only to the limitations provided in the state and federal Constitutions; and no duly enacted statute should be judicially declared to be inoperative on the ground that it violates organic law, unless it clearly appears beyond all reasonable doubt that, under any rational view that may be taken of the statute. it is in positive conflict with some identified or designated provision of constitutional law.

A statute should be so construed and applied as to make it valid and effective, if its language does not exclude such an interpretation.

Where a statute does not violate the federal or state Constitution the legislative will is supreme, and its policy is not subject to judicial review. The courts have no veto power and do not assume to regulate state policy, but they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as expressed in valid enactments, and decline to enforce statutes only when to do so would violate organic law.

The Constitution is the controlling law, and, while, in appropriate proceedings properly taken, it may be the duty of the court to declare a legislative enactment to be inoperative in whole or in part, if it plainly violates the Constitution, yet, as under our system of government the lawmaking power of the Legislature is subject only to the limitations contained in the state and federal Constitutions the court should, in deference to the Legislature, take care to so interpret an enactment as to make it consistent with the Constitution, if it can be done upon any reasonable consideration of the legislative intent, as shown by a fair application of all the language used to the purpose designed to be accomplished by the enactment.

In conferring upon municipalities appropriate quasi legislative powers for local governmental purposes, the Legislature does not violate the implied principle of organic law that the Legislature shall not delegate its general lawmaking power.

The express authority given to the Legislature by the Constitution to 'prescribe' the 'powers' of municipalities, and 'to provide for their government,' is not subject to implied limitations that would curtail the real intent and purpose of the authority expressly conferred as disclosed by a consideration of the language used and the subject-matter upon which it operates.

While under the express authority 'to provide for the government' of municipalities and to 'prescribe their jurisdiction and powers and to alter or amend the same at any time,' the Legislature cannot delegate to a municipality its general lawmaking power for the state, nor confer a power that violates any other express provision of organic law, nor confer 'powers' other than for municipal purposes, yet the Legislature has a wide discretion in the government it may provide and in the powers it may prescribe for a municipality, and also in the means and instrumentalities it may use in providing the government and prescribing the powers, when organic law is not plainly violated.

A statute may be, in whole or in part, repealed or superseded or abrogated by implication of law as a result of the due enactment of a subsequent statute covering the same subject, or by the operation of a later statute upon the occurrence of a definitely specified contingent event.

If it is clear from its terms and purpose that the intent of a statute is that it shall supersede another statute upon a stated contingent event, the courts will give effect to such intent, when organic law is not thereby plainly violated, since the intent of the law is its vital force, and the province of the courts is to ascertain and effectuate the valid legislative purpose.

Neither the Constitution nor the common law defines the line of separation between the powers that shall be exercised directly by the Legislature and those that may be indirectly exercised through delegated authority conferred upon municipal governmental agencies.

Where the Legislature has authority to provide a governmental regulation, and the organic law does not prescribe the manner of adopting or providing it, and the nature of the regulation does not require that it be afforded by direct legislative act, such regulation may be provided either directly by the Legislature, or indirectly by the legislative use of any appropriate instrumentality, where no provision or principle of organic law is thereby violated.

Uniformity is not required in the character and number or in the powers and duties of municipal officers, and it is entirely clear that the Legislature may authorize a municipality to create and abolish its own municipal offices, and to define and change their powers and duties.

Chapter 6705, Sp. Acts 1913, confers a limited power upon the city of Jacksonville to regulate the character and number and the powers and duties of its administrative officers and boards for municipal purposes; and, when that power is duly exercised within the limitations of the law, conflicting statutes are superseded by the force and operation of this statute in conferring the power upon the municipality, and in expressly repealing all inconsistent statutory provisions.

Chapter 6705, Sp. Acts 1913, is limited in its operation, is confined to municipal governmental regulations, and is not, beyond all reasonable doubt, in conflict with the principle of organic law which forbids a delegation of the general lawmaking power of the state. Nor does the statute, in effect, authorize a municipality to repeal a state law.

COUNSEL P. H. Odom, of Jacksonville, for appellants.

Kay & Doggett, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

This appeal is from an order restraining the city of Jacksonville and it officers from submitting to the voters of the city, for adoption or rejection, at an election called for October 28, 1913, certain ordinances that had been adopted by the city council under chapter 6705, Acts of 1913, and designed upon approval by the electors of the city to supersede portions of the city charter statutes. The suit is properly maintained by Bowden, a resident, citizen, and taxpayer of the city. See Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963.

The statute which was, in effect, held by the chancellor to be inoperative is as follows:

'Chapter 6705--(No. 285)
'An act amending the charter affecting the government, powers, duties, jurisdiction, officers, boards and elections of the city of Jacksonville, and extending and enlarging the powers of the government of said city, and providing a method whereby the charter of said city may be hereafter amended by ordinance, approved by the electors of said city, and to repeal all laws inconsistent herewith.
'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Florida:
'Section 1. That the numbers, powers, duties, terms of office and the time and manner of election or appointment of any and all boards and officers of the city of Jacksonville, whether created by or recognized in state Legislation or city ordinance, excepting only the legislative powers and duties of the city council, may be amended and changed, and any and all boards and officers whether created by or recognized in state Legislation or city ordinance, may be abolished and new boards and officers created, by ordinance adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the city council, and approved by the mayor or passed over his veto, and at a special municipal election approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified electors of said city who shall vote thereon in such special municipal election:
"Provided, that the first such special municipal election shall be held on a date to be fixed by the city council not less than three months and not more than six months after the passage and approval of this act.'
'Provided, further, that such ordinance or ordinances shall be published in one or more newspapers published in said city not less than three times a week for eight weeks next preceding such special municipal election;
'Provided, further, that the electors of said city shall be given an opportunity at such election or elections to vote separately upon each amendment to said charter, and upon the proposed change or changes as to each office to be affected thereby;
'Provided, further, that this act shall not deprive the city council, under existing state Legislation, of the power to create or abolish any office not created by or recognized in state legislation or by ordinance approved by the vote of the electors of said city.
'Sec. 2. That all laws or parts of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

'Sec. 3. This act shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval by the Governor.

'Approved May 23rd, 1913.'

The ordinance sought to be submitted to the electors for adoption or rejection is designed to transfer to the city council some of the powers and duties now exercised by the board of bond trustees of the city under legislative enactment, and to define the powers and duties of the mayor with reference to the police force of the city. It apparently follows the authority expressly given.

It is contended, in support of the order appealed from, that the statute above set out is unconstitutional, because it attempts to authorize the municipality to repeal certain statutes, and because it...

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