Cole v. General Motors Corp., G83-408 CA.
| Citation | 641 F. Supp. 28 |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. G83-408 CA.,G83-408 CA. |
| Parties | Gregory A. COLE, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Oldsmobile Division of General Motors Corporation, and AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Bart T. Stupak by Bart T. Stupak, Menominee, Mich., for plaintiff.
Foster, Swift, Collins & Coey by John L. Collins, William R. Schulz, Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
This dispute arises from plaintiff Gregory Cole's suspension and eventual termination from two apprenticeship programs with General Motors Corporation ("GMC"), and its Oldsmobile ("Olds") and AC Spark Plug ("AC") Divisions, all named defendants. Suit was initially filed in the Ingham County Circuit Court charging that defendants' conduct violated the Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act ("MHCRA"), M.C. L.A. § 37.1101, et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.550(101), et seq., and later amended to additionally claim breach of employment contract by Olds. Defendants removed the case to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), on grounds that plaintiff's claims arose under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, since the suit, in effect, alleged violations of a contract collectively bargained between an employer and a union representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, as defined in section 301. The case is now before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff began an apprenticeship program with defendant AC on April 10, 1978. On September 24, 1978, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. On his return to work on December 5, 1978, AC terminated him from the apprenticeship program, at least in part for failing to fulfill the program's education requirements. Plaintiff then began a janitorial position with GMC's Flint plant on December 18, 1978. On May 14, 1979, plaintiff began another apprenticeship with defendant Olds in Lansing and filled out an employment application, including a medical questionnaire, before he began. On March 19, 1980, defendant GMC suspended plaintiff from that program, and on April 8, 1980, it terminated him from the program, both actions based in part on alleged falsification of medical information on the medical questionnaire.
Plaintiff contends that he suffers from a personality disorder resulting from head injuries he sustained in the September 24, 1978, automobile accident. He contends the condition neither affected his qualifications for nor his ability to perform either of the apprenticeships, and says that he answered the medical questionnaire in what he believed to be a truthful manner. He maintains that defendants' suspension and terminations based, in part, on plaintiff's alleged falsification of the medical questionnaire regarding this condition, violated the MHCRA. Defendants contend that both the suspension and the two terminations were "for cause"; that plaintiff's condition was and is related to both his qualifications and his ability to perform the apprenticeships; and that his condition was one but not the sole reason for the suspension and terminations.
On April 7, 1983, plaintiff amended his complaint to claim breach of employment contract by defendant Olds. At all times in question, plaintiff was a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"), and agreements collectively bargained between the UAW and GMC were in effect. The collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") provided a four-step grievance procedure, the final step involving issuance of a final and binding decision by an impartial umpire. Plaintiff's amended complaint makes no mention of the CBA's, simply alleging that as to the second apprenticeship, defendant Olds entered into an employment contract with him with full knowledge as to plaintiff's medical and physical condition and breached that contract by terminating him on the basis of alleged falsification of the medical questionnaire as it pertained to his physical/mental condition.
Following removal of the case under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, supra, defendants moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants' primary claim is that federal law preempts plaintiff's state law claims because (1) GMC as an employer in an industry affecting interstate commerce is required by section 301 to collectively bargain with its employees' chosen representative, the UAW; (2) section 301(a) provides for a federal district court suit as the remedy for breach of any collectively bargained agreement; (3) the substantive law to be applied to section 301(a) suits is federal law; and (4) state law may be consulted if compatible with the purpose of section 301, but the MHCRA is incompatible with the purpose and hence is preempted. Defendants then argue that applying federal law, plaintiff's claims are barred in their entirety either because plaintiff has failed to pursue the grievance remedies available under the CBA, a prerequisite to his right to sue under section 301(a), or, even if exhaustion is shown, plaintiff's claims are time barred because not filed within the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff responds that state law is not preempted because the conduct sought to be regulated by the state is merely a peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act or touches upon interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. Even if state law is preempted, plaintiff contends he has exhausted available remedies under the CBA by having his committeeman file a written grievance after his suspension in March, 1980, but that under the CBA the union had sole power to appeal to higher steps of the grievance procedure and wrongfully refused to do so, thereby preventing plaintiff from fully exhausting his contractual remedies. Finally, plaintiff contends that his complaint was filed within the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract in Michigan, and the three-year statute of limitations for actions under the MHCRA, and hence the filing was timely. Defendants contend that the applicable statute of limitations in a section 301(a) case is the six-month limitation period provided in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby making plaintiff's filing more than two and one-half years after his April, 1980, termination untimely.
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant bears the burden of showing conclusively that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir.1979); Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.1974); Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether there are issues of fact requiring a trial, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits, attached exhibits and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). A court may not resolve disputed questions of fact in a summary judgment decision, and if a disputed question of fact remains, the district court should deny the motion and proceed to trial. United States v. Articles of Device, 527 F.2d 1008, 1011 (6th Cir.1976).
Section 301 gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of collectively bargained contracts in industries affecting commerce, and the substantive law to be applied in such suits is federal law, "which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), where the Supreme Court further stated:
As a preliminary matter, I agree with defendants that both counts of plaintiff's amended complaint assert claims which are inextricably related to the CBAs in effect between GMC and the UAW, and hence they "arise under" and invoke section 301(a) and related rules of law. According to the affidavit of Dennis Richmond, filed in support of defendants' motion, paragraph 8 of the CBA exclusively reserved to GMC the right to hire, promote, discharge or discipline for cause. Paragraph 77 of the CBA governed complaints regarding unjust or discriminatory layoffs or discharges and their handling according to the grievance procedures set forth in paragraphs 28 through 55. Notwithstanding plaintiff's characterization of his claims as MHCRA violations, both counts of his complaint seek a remedy for defendants' suspension and discharge of plaintiff, conduct governed by the CBA.
The next inquiry is whether the MHCRA, the state law basis for plaintiff's claims, is compatible with the purposes of section 301. The philosophy of section 301 is to give statutory recognition to the collective bargaining agreement as a valid, binding and enforceable contract, and hence to promote a higher degree of responsibility on the parties to the agreement. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. at 916. "Section 301 expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce those agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in this way." Id. at 455, ...
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