Breakiron v. Comm'r Martin Horn

Decision Date18 April 2011
Docket NumberNo. 08–9003.,08–9003.
PartiesMark BREAKIRON, Appellantv.Commissioner Martin HORN; Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Conner Blaine, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stuart B. Lev, Esq., Claudia Van Wyk, Esq. (Argued), Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.James P. Barker, Esq. (Argued), Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Appeals & Legal Services, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellees.Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

A Pennsylvania jury found Mark Breakiron guilty of first-degree murder and robbery for killing a bartender and stealing her purse and money bags from the bar. At the penalty phase, the jury found as an aggravating factor that he committed the murder “while in the perpetration of a felony”—i.e., the robbery. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(6). The trial court sentenced him to death. On Breakiron's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court invalidated the murder conviction (and thus the death sentence) because it found that the prosecution withheld material evidence regarding one of its witnesses in violation of the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The District Court concluded, however, that the Brady evidence was not material to Breakiron's robbery conviction and did not disturb it.

The Commonwealth 1 has not appealed the District Court's ruling and states that it is prepared to retry Breakiron for murder. Breakiron appeals the denial of relief from his robbery conviction, which, if invalidated, would no longer constitute an aggravating factor during any future penalty phase. Breakiron argues that the Brady violations found by the District Court require the invalidation of his robbery conviction as well, and he raises four other claims addressed to that conviction. We agree with Breakiron on the Brady claim and conclude that three of his other claims also warrant relief. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's judgment to the extent that it denied Breakiron's habeas petition as to his robbery conviction and remand for the District Court to grant his petition as to that conviction. 2

I. Background

Because Breakiron's murder conviction no longer is at issue, we need only briefly summarize the background relevant to the issues we address. On March 24, 1987, Breakiron killed Saundra Marie Martin, the bartender of a bar called “Shenanigan's” in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, at which he was the night's last patron. He also stole her purse and bags of money from the bar. The Commonwealth charged him with murder and robbery and tried him before a Fayette County jury in April 1988. As explained in more detail below, that jury included a member who had been exposed to testimony by another panel member at voir dire that Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing[.] (N.T. 448; A. 717.) 3

At trial, Breakiron never denied killing Martin or committing theft by stealing the money. Instead, he put on a voluntary intoxication/diminished capacity defense and argued that he was guilty of third-degree murder because he did not have the specific intent to kill. He also argued that he was guilty of theft, but not robbery, because he decided to steal after his attack on Martin was complete. See 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 3701(a)(1) (defining robbery as, inter alia, infliction of injury or use of force “in the course of committing a theft”).

The only evidence potentially relevant to that issue was the testimony of the Commonwealth's witness Ellis Price, who was incarcerated with Breakiron before Breakiron's trial, and Breakiron's own testimony. Price testified that, while imprisoned with Breakiron, he and Breakiron had “conversations regarding the offenses with which [Breakiron] has been charged,” and that Breakiron made “statements ... regarding whether or not he participated in these crimes.” (N.T. 1112; A. 1410.) Price testified that Breakiron “told me that when he was at the bar, that there was another guy and girl there. So, he went into the bathroom to hide until they left.” (N.T. 1114; A. 1412.) According to Price, Breakiron told him that he then returned to the bar area and asked for another drink. ( Id.) Martin, however, told him that it was closing time and asked him to leave, “so he picked up the ashtray and started hitting her.” ( Id.) Price further testified that Breakiron said [h]e hit her a few times. She wouldn't go to the floor. So, he just—he pulled out the knife and I don't know what he did after that. Then, he drug her out to his truck and took her to ... his pap's house” and “finished her off there.” (N.T. 1114–15; A. 1412–13.)

Breakiron, by contrast, testified that Martin started the altercation by hitting him over the head with “something heavy” after he put his arm around her. (N.T. 1253; A. 1551.) He further testified that he “blacked out,” awoke to find Martin with a knife sticking out of her back, left the bar and drove away. (N.T. 1254–55; A. 1552–53.) He then returned to the bar, put Martin's body in his truck, went back into the bar, [a]nd then when I started to leave, I saw two money bags laying on the floor to the entrance by the dance floor” and [p]ut them in the back of the truck.” (N.T. 1260–61; A. 1558–59.) At closing, Breakiron's counsel argued that he was not guilty of robbery because he decided to steal the money after killing Martin. (N.T. 1260–61; A. 1558–59.) Breakiron's counsel, however, did not request a charge on the lesser-included offense of theft, and the trial court did not give one.

The jury found Breakiron guilty of first-degree murder and robbery. At the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence after finding as an aggravating factor that he murdered Martin “while in the perpetration of a felony”—i.e., the robbery. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(6). (It found as an additional aggravating factor that he committed the murder “by means of torture.”) The trial court sentenced Breakiron to death on the murder conviction plus five to ten years of imprisonment on the robbery conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 524 Pa. 282, 571 A.2d 1035 (1990). Breakiron filed a petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 9541–9546 (the “PCRA”) in 1996, and the PCRA court denied it after holding an evidentiary hearing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that ruling as well. See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 556 Pa. 519, 729 A.2d 1088 (1999) (“ Breakiron–2 ”).

Breakiron then instituted the federal habeas proceeding at issue here in 2000. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second PCRA petition in state court. The PCRA court dismissed it as untimely and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94 (2001) ( “ Breakiron–3 ”). The parties then litigated the federal habeas petition before three different District Judges for almost seven years, during which Breakiron amended his petition several times, took discovery, and received an evidentiary hearing. Breakiron ultimately asserted eighteen claims, including claims addressed to the guilt and penalty phases of his trial and to his murder and robbery convictions. Among them were claims that the prosecution withheld evidence in violation of Brady that he could have used to impeach Ellis Price.

The District Court issued findings of fact on the Brady claims on September 19, 2007. It then issued its opinion and order on September 24, 2008, granting relief on three of those claims and invalidating the murder conviction. The District Court did not find Price's testimony relevant to the robbery charge, however, so it did not grant relief from the robbery conviction on that basis (or any other). The District Court granted Breakiron a certificate of appealability on one claim, but the parties agree that it is moot in light of the invalidation of his murder conviction and he has not pursued the claim on appeal.4 The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. The Commonwealth has not appealed and asserts that it is prepared to retry Breakiron for murder. Breakiron appealed and filed a motion to expand the certificate of appealability to raise the claims at issue here, which we granted.

II. Analysis

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). Our review of the District Court's legal conclusions is plenary. See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2010). Like the District Court's, our review of Breakiron's claims is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). “AEDPA provides that, where a habeas petitioner's claim was ‘adjudicated on the merits' in state court, the petition may not be granted unless the state court decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

Under AEDPA, a state court decision is “contrary to” established federal law “if the state court reaches a conclusion opposite to the Supreme Court's own conclusion on a question of law or decides the case differently where the Supreme Court was confronted by a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.2009). A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of established federal law “if the state court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the...

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