Hale v. King

Decision Date26 May 2011
Docket NumberNo. 07–60997.,07–60997.
PartiesJohn Ashley HALE, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Ronald KING, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Margaret Bingham, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Mississippi Department of Corrections; Mike Hatten, Health Service Administrator of Wexford for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe, Physician at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Zandu, Psychiatrist at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; Doctor Patrick Arnold, Physician for Correctional Medical Services at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Williams, Psychiatrist of Correctional Medical Services for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Trinca, Physician for Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Miriam Moulds, Kitchen Supervisor at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe 2, Chief Executive Officer of Correctional Medical Services for Mississippi Department of Corrections; John Doe 3, Chief Executive Officer of Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution for Mississippi Department of Corrections; Doctor McCleave; Doctor Woodall; Wexford Health Services, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

642 F.3d 492
24 A.D. Cases 1549
43 NDLR P 82

John Ashley HALE, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Ronald KING, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Margaret Bingham, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Mississippi Department of Corrections; Mike Hatten, Health Service Administrator of Wexford for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe, Physician at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Zandu, Psychiatrist at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; Doctor Patrick Arnold, Physician for Correctional Medical Services at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Williams, Psychiatrist of Correctional Medical Services for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Trinca, Physician for Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Miriam Moulds, Kitchen Supervisor at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe 2, Chief Executive Officer of Correctional Medical Services for Mississippi Department of Corrections; John Doe 3, Chief Executive Officer of Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution for Mississippi Department of Corrections; Doctor McCleave; Doctor Woodall; Wexford Health Services, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 07–60997.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 26, 2011.


[642 F.3d 496]

Jeffrey Scott Levinger (argued) (Court–Appointed), Hankinson Levinger, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.Sasha M. Samberg–Champion, App. Section, Antitrust Div., Diana Katherine Flynn, Civil Rights Div.—App. Section, Dirk Christian Phillips, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Intervenor.Pelicia E. Hall, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Charles Baron Irvin, Jackson, MS, for Defendants–Appellees King, Epps, Hatten and Bingham.Katie Lofton Wallace, Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, Defendant–Appellee Arnold.Joseph A. O'Connell, III, Vardaman Kimball Smith, III, Bryan Nelson, P.A., Hattiesburg, MS, for Defendants–Appellees Trinca, McCleave, Woodall and Wexford Health Services.Robert Lawson Holladay, Sr., Townsend, McWilliams & Holladay, L.L.P., Drew, MS, for Defendants–Appellee Moulds.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.Before JOLLY, SMITH and OWEN, Circuit Judges.PER CURIAM:

No member of the panel nor judge in regular active service of the court having requested that the court be polled on Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. and 5th Cir. R. 35), the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. We GRANT the petition for panel rehearing filed by intervenor the United States and, without hearing oral argument, withdraw our prior opinion, Hale v. King, 624 F.3d 178 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam), and substitute the following.

This case presents the question of whether certain Mississippi prison officials are entitled to sovereign immunity from claims that they violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The district court dismissed the Title II claims against the officials after determining that Title II does not validly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title II claims that challenge conduct that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. We VACATE and REMAND.

I

John Hale, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit against the State of Mississippi and a number of individuals who worked at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) or for the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Hale's complaint appeared to assert claims for monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based in part on Hale's allegations that he suffered from chronic Hepatitis C, chronic back problems, and psychiatric conditions during his incarceration and that the defendants provided him with inadequate medical care.

Hale subsequently amended his complaint to include claims under Title II of the ADA against certain individual defendants: Ronald King (Superintendent of

[642 F.3d 497]

SMCI), Christopher Epps (Commissioner of MDOC), and Mike Hatten (Health Service Administrator for SMCI) (the Appellees). Specifically, Hale alleged that, under prison regulations, his health problems resulted in his classification as “medical class III” and “psychiatric C.” Hale maintained that because of his classification, the Appellees prevented him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite and regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school. He requested compensatory damages against each defendant in his or her individual and official capacity, as well as all filing fees and attorneys fees, and he also sought injunctive relief to bring the MDOC into purported compliance with Title II of the ADA and to prevent his exclusion from participation in MDOC programs.

The district court, proceeding sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), dismissed Hale's § 1983 and Title II claims after the court determined that Hale's allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. With respect to Hale's Title II claims against the Appellees, the district court concluded that Hale could not recover from the Appellees in their individual capacities under the ADA, that Hale's request for injunctive relief was moot because Hale was no longer incarcerated, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hale's Title II claims for damages against the Appellees in their official capacities. The district court made its Eleventh Amendment determination after concluding that Title II of the ADA did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity for Hale's claims because “Title II is not a ‘congruent and proportional’ response [to constitutional violations] in the context of state prisons.” In reaching this decision, the district court “assum[ed] arguendo that [Hale] would be able to establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA.”

Hale appealed the district court's holding with respect to the Appellees' Eleventh Amendment immunity. After Hale filed his pro se brief on appeal, we appointed counsel to file a supplemental brief to address the question “whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for claims that violate Title II but are not actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The United States intervened and submitted a brief supporting Hale's position.

II

The district court dismissed Hale's Title II claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which allows it to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”1 We review such dismissals de novo, using the same standard applicable to dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 We also review de novo “the question of whether a state is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”3

In United States v. Georgia,4 the Supreme Court established a three-part

[642 F.3d 498]

test for addressing whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in a given case. A court should consider “which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II” and then determine “to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment.”5 If the State's conduct violated both Title II and the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. 6 If the State's conduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the court must then determine “whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”7

A

It is unclear whether, under Georgia, a court is required to determine if allegations state a claim for relief under Title II before proceeding to consider any other issue in the three-part analysis. We note that at least two other circuit courts have concluded that determining whether there has been a violation of Title II is a necessary first step.8 The United States argues that the district court below failed to address whether Title II had been violated—the district court instead assumed that Hale's allegations “establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA” before moving on to consider whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to Hale's claims. The United States thus argues that we should remand the case to the district court in order to allow the district court to evaluate in the first instance whether Hale's allegations state a claim for relief under Title II.

Although we do now proceed to consider whether Hale stated a claim for relief under Title II, we do not decide today whether Georgia prohibits a court from addressing the validity of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity without first deciding that a claimant's allegations actually state a claim for relief under Title II. Determining whether Hale has stated a claim for relief under Title II requires only that we apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to Hale's allegations. We are well-suited to perform this task ourselves.9

“Under the 12(b)(6) standard, all well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but plaintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.”10 We generally confine our analysis to the complaint and its proper attachments,11 which “must contain

[642 F.3d 499]

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”12 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”13 The well-pleaded facts must permit the court “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”14 Because Hale was proceeding pro se at the district court, we hold his complaint “to less stringent...

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