Santa Rosa County v. Administration Com'n, Div. of Administrative Hearings, 93-659

• Decision Date: 14 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-659,93-659
• Citation: 642 So.2d 618
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1965 SANTA ROSA COUNTY, Florida, Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Don W. Davis, in his capacity as Hearing Officer for the Division of Administrative Hearings; and Department of Community Affairs, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 618

642 So.2d 618

19 Fla. L. Weekly D1965

SANTA ROSA COUNTY, Florida, Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS, Don W. Davis, in his capacity as Hearing Officer

for the Division of Administrative Hearings; and Department

of Community Affairs, Appellees.

No. 93-659.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Sept. 14, 1994.

Kenneth G. Oertel of Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A., Tallahassee, and Thomas V. Dannheisser, County Atty., Santa Rosa County, Milton, for appellant.

Stephanie M. Callahan, Asst. Gen. Counsel and Suzanne H. Schmith, Certified Legal Intern, Dept. of Community Affairs, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Richard Grosso, Tallahassee, for amicus curiae 1000 Friends of Florida.

PER CURIAM.

Santa Rosa County appeals from a summary judgment in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and Don W. Davis in his capacity as hearing officer for DOAH. The County's suit challenged the constitutionality of certain comprehensive planning statutes found in the Growth Management Act, Part II of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, and rules applied by the Department of Community Affairs to implement the Act. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and certify a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.

The County, pursuant to section 163.3161, submitted a proposed comprehensive plan to the Department for written comment on April 2, 1990. DCA provided the County with its objections, recommendations and comments regarding the County's comprehensive plan. Subsequently, the County adopted its comprehensive plan by ordinance. DCA issued its "Statement of Intent to Find the Comprehensive Plan Not in Compliance" with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5, and Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. DCA later filed a petition with DOAH for a determination that the County's comprehensive plan did not comply with Chapter 163. The Department alleged: (1) the County's comprehensive plan failed to discourage urban sprawl as required by Rule 9J-5006(3)(b)7 and 9J-5.011(2)(b)3, and was inconsistent with other requirements of Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b); (2) the coastal element of the County's plan was inconsistent with section 163.3177(6)(g) and Rule 9J-5.012; and (3) the plan was inconsistent with several provisions of the West Florida Regional Policy Plan, in violation of sections 163.3177(10)(a) and 163.3184(1)(b).

Almost a year later, the County filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court seeking to have a declaration as to the constitutionality of the statutes and rules being applied to the County in the administrative comprehensive plan case. The lawsuit was later moved to circuit court in Leon County. The Complaint raised the following issues as grounds for declaratory relief: (1) the validity and constitutionality of several provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5, which require that local government comprehensive plans contain provisions which discourage urban sprawl and achieve other land use goals; (2) the constitutionality of provisions of section 163.3184, which authorize the Administration Commission to withhold legislative appropriations to the County and to direct state agencies not to undertake certain infrastructure activities in the County and which allow DNR and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund to withhold permit and consent of use approvals if it is determined that the comprehensive plan is inconsistent with the coastal element requirements of Rule 9J-5; (3) the validity and constitutionality of Rule 9J-5 and sections 163.3184 and 163.3177 that require the comprehensive plans be consistent with Regional Policy Plans; and (4) the validity of parts of Rule 9J-5.012 which set out requirements for what a comprehensive plan must contain in its coastal element.

DCA filed motions to dismiss based on the County's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and the County's lack of standing to file the action. Circuit Judge Reynolds denied both motions. The case was assigned from Judge Reynolds to Judge Smith.

In June of 1992, the parties, in the context of the pending DOAH action, signed a Stipulated Settlement Agreement. The agreement provided in part:

18. Adoption or Approval of Remedial Plan Amendments. Within 60 days after receipt of the Department's objections, recommendations and comments, the local government shall consider for adoption all remedial plan amendments and a transmittal letter to the Department as provided by law. The letter shall describe the remedial action adopted for each part of the plan amended, including references to specific portions and pages.

20. Review of Remedial Amendments and Notice of Intent. Within 45 days after receipt of the adopted remedial plan amendments and support documents, the Department shall issue a notice of intent pursuant to Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes, for the adopted amendments in accordance with this agreement....

b. Not in Compliance: If the remedial actions are not adopted, or if they do not satisfy this agreement, the Department shall issue a notice of intent to find the plan amendments not in compliance and shall forward the notice to DOAH for a hearing as provided in Subsection 163.2184(10), the Florida Statutes, and may request that the matter be consolidated with the pending proceeding for a single, final hearing. The parties hereby stipulate to that consolidation and to the setting of a single final hearing if the Department so requests.

In September 1992, DCA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the circuit court action, alleging among other things settlement of the administrative litigation concerning compliance of the comprehensive plan and that the civil suit was thus moot, as Santa Rosa now had no present need for a declaratory judgment. The court granted the motion. The summary judgment order read in part:

On June 24, 1992, a settlement agreement was entered into between the County and the DCA, which resolved the disputes between the parties arising out of or related to the comprehensive plan adopted by the County. (Settlement Agreement, Part I, paragraph 9, page 3). There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of such settlement agreement, nor the non-existence of any dispute as alleged in the complaint, which was the predicate for this action.

The constitutionality of a statute can only be challenged in a declaratory judgment action when there is "an actual, present and practical need for the declaration." (citation omitted) There must be a bona fide need for a declaratory judgment based on present, ascertainable facts, or the Court has no jurisdiction to render such relief. (citation omitted).

It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby entered in favor of the Defendants, who shall go hence without day, and the Plaintiff shall take nothing by this action.

The County subsequently filed a motion for rehearing which was denied. In the order denying rehearing, the court noted that Santa Rosa alleges that it still needs a declaration because it will have future problems complying with Chapter 163 and Rule 9J-5. The court stated, "[t]his Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain hypothetical disputes which may or may not occur in the future nor does this Court have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions." Although the summary judgment was based on mootness, the issue of standing re-emerged in the motion for rehearing. In the order denying rehearing, Judge Smith explained:

Initially, this Court was concerned as to the propriety of this cause even being considered under the declaratory judgment act. There was a close question as to whether Santa Rosa County, as a political subdivision, had standing to offensively challenge the constitutionality of certain statutes and rules. Department of Education v. Gerald Lewis, 416 So.2d 455 (Fla.1982). The Court concluded that Santa Rosa County's tenuous standing was predicated on its present and ongoing dispute with DCA, in which the administrative proceeding was then pending before Don Davis.

...

The Settlement Agreement resolved the dispute between the parties as to the particular facts alleged in the Complaint. This Court granted Summary Judgment on the grounds that the requested declaration no longer presented an actual controversy as to the state of facts nor was there a bona fide, present need for the declaration for the reason that Santa Rosa County was no longer subject to sanctions.

We agree with the County that the issue is not moot; however, we affirm the summary judgment based on the County's lack of standing.

Mootness

The entry of a settlement agreement between the County and DCA does not moot the issues presented for declaratory judgment. The settlement agreement, as indicated in the above quoted portions of paragraph 18 and 20B, reached tentative terms on settlement which require the County to enact amendments to its plan in order for DCA to find the plan "in compliance." If the amendments do not satisfy the agreement, DCA may request the matter be consolidated with the pending proceeding for a single, final hearing. Either party can request a final hearing under paragraph 14 in the event of breach of the agreement or if it becomes apparent that any party is not proceeding in good faith. DCA has since accepted the County's amendments and has joined with the County to defend the amendments against intervenors; however, the amendments may still be rejected by the Administration Commission and found "not in compliance." Sec. 163.3164(1); Sec. 163.3184, Fla.Stat.

Even if the settlement agreement is determined to be final, the issue is still not moot because of the ongoing nature of growth management and comprehensive planning. Sections 163.3161(6), 163.3191(1) and 16...