Croom v. Balkwill

• Decision Date: 07 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–16315.,09–16315.
• Citation: 645 F.3d 1240,23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 73
• Parties: Patsy CROOM, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.William F. BALKWILL, Sheriff, in his individual and official capacities, Clifford Legg, SCSO Sergeant, in his individual and official capacities, Frank Bybee, SCSO Detective, in his individual and official capacities, Stephanie Graham, SCSO Deputy, in her individual and official capacities, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

645 F.3d 1240

23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 73

Patsy CROOM, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.William F. BALKWILL, Sheriff, in his individual and official capacities, Clifford Legg, SCSO Sergeant, in his individual and official capacities, Frank Bybee, SCSO Detective, in his individual and official capacities, Stephanie Graham, SCSO Deputy, in her individual and official capacities, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09–16315.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 7, 2011.

Thomas P. Scarritt, Jr., John J. Dingfelder, Scarritt Law Group, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Appellant.Frederick Joseph Elbrecht, Cty. Atty., Richard R. Garland, Ralph Marchbank, Dickinson & Gibbons, P.A., Nevin Alan Weiner, Nevin A. Weiner, P.A., Sarasota, FL, for Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and RIPPLE,^* Circuit Judges.PER CURIAM:

On August 20, 2004, Patsy Croom was seized by law enforcement and detained for up to two hours while officers¹ searched the residence of her son. Croom argues the officers' actions violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Croom appeals.

I.

In August of 2004, Croom, a 63–year old retiree and Arkansas resident, came to Sarasota, Florida to visit her son whose wife had recently committed suicide. ² On the day in question, Croom was gardening in the front yard of her son's home (“the Premises”), wearing only a one-piece bathing suit. It was a sunny day; her son was at work; and Croom “bounced back and forth” between the house and the yard, cooking, sunning herself, and watering the plants. Her son's friend, Tashko Dinev, was sleeping inside. The appellees (“defendants”), meanwhile, were preparing to search the Premises.

In June 2004, a confidential informant alerted the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office that three men, including Croom's son and Dinev, were selling ketamine ³ out of two local residences—one of which was the Premises. After conducting some background investigation,⁴ officers intercepted a package from Bulgaria being shipped to the Premises containing thirty-five vials of ketamine.

Detective Frank Bybee, the defendant in charge of the investigation, obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the Premises and arranged for a controlled delivery of the package. The validity of the warrant was conditioned upon the receipt of the package by an occupant of the premises. Bybee classified the warrant as “high hazard,” pursuant to Sheriff's Office policy, because the search was for narcotics and required entry into a house. Law enforcement personnel were divided into two teams: a entry/search team and a perimeter team. After rehearsing the execution of the warrant, the teams departed for the Premises on the afternoon of August 20th in separate, unmarked vehicles.

Sometime between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., United States Postal Inspector John Crockett, dressed as an ordinary mailman and wearing a one-way transmitter, ⁵ approached the Premises with the package. He met Croom in the front yard, and Crockett asked her if she knew “Mr. Nicola Hristov,” the addressee of the package. Croom told Crockett that she did not, because she was just visiting her son and was not from the area. The two conversed for five or more minutes, talking about the weather, the tragic reason for Croom's visit, as well as her various medical issues.⁶ The conversation culminated with Crockett asking Croom if she could sign for the package. She did, took the package inside, left it unopened on a computer table, and returned outside to resume watering the plants. Crockett testified during his deposition that Croom “didn't seem to pose any risk at all.” Deposition of Crockett at 44.

The package was equipped with a sensor to alert law enforcement when it had been opened. Law enforcement waited for approximately thirty minutes for a signal from the sensor. When none came, defendant Sergeant Clifford Legg decided to proceed with the warrant's execution.

Croom was seated on a “timber” when people wearing masks, dressed in black, and carrying guns ran up screaming for her to “hit the ground.” Appellant's Brief at 13. She was approached by a female member of the group, ⁷ whom she told, “I'm getting down as fast as I can. I've got arthritis. I can't get down on the ground.” Id. The female, Deputy Graham, kept yelling at Croom to get down. When Croom was unable to comply, Graham pushed Croom from a squatting position to the ground. Id. at 14. Graham then placed a foot on Croom's back, and Croom heard a gun “click.” Croom Deposition at 88. Graham told her to “shut [her] mouth” when Croom tried to ask questions.⁸ Croom was detained on the ground for up to ten minutes.

Eventually, Croom was ordered to “get up.” She was unable, and defendant Graham and two others had to help her to her feet. Croom was brought into the house. It was only at this juncture that Croom learned that her detainors were law enforcement personnel.

At some point during this period, the officers woke Dinev. He promptly admitted to importing and distributing the ketamine, was arrested, and was removed from the scene.

Croom was detained for up to two hours while the officers conducted their search of the property. Initially, she was placed on the couch and given a glass of water. At some point she was moved to the dining room table. Although each defendant's deposition testimony varies somewhat, it seems clear that the defendants ceased harboring any suspicions that Croom was involved in the criminal activity after they spoke with both her and Dinev.

In the wake of the incident, Croom alleges she suffered medical problems caused by the manner of her seizure and detention by the defendants.

II.

Croom argues that the district erred by granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant below. Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir.2010).

A.

It is undisputed that the defendants are law enforcement officers who were acting in their official capacities at the time of the incident. Consequently, the defendants enjoy a qualified immunity from suit that protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In order to find the defendants susceptible to suit, we must first answer two questions in the affirmative. One, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer[s'] conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), modified, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that courts need not address Saucier's two prongs in sequential order). And two, was that right “clearly established”? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Meaning, based on the facts alleged, “would [it have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted”? Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

The district court answered the first question in the negative, concluding that the facts alleged by Croom, even if proven to be true, did not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. Though we are sympathetic to Croom's plight and frustration, after careful consideration, we must agree.⁹

B.

The Fourth Amendment protects “the people” from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.¹⁰ In this case, the Fourth Amendment “event” at issue— i.e., the state action triggering the amendment's protection—is Croom's extended seizure by law enforcement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied” (emphasis omitted)).

Traditionally, seizures by law enforcement have been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if justified by probable cause to believe that the detainee committed a crime, see Summers, 452 U.S. at 696, 699–700, 101 S.Ct. 2587; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–16, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101–03, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). However, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of limited detentions— i.e. seizures lacking the essential attributes of full, custodial arrests—may be constitutional even in the absence of probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (“The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In such cases, the Court has “balance[d] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Id. And, “[w]hen the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's...