Sch. Bd. of Avoyelles Parish v. United States Dep't of Interior

• Decision Date: 22 July 2011
• Docket Number: Nos. 09–30660,09–30897 and 09–31102.,s. 09–30660
• Citation: 270 Ed. Law Rep. 434,647 F.3d 570
• Parties: SCHOOL BOARD OF AVOYELLES PARISH, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, Defendant–Appellant.School Board of Avoyelles Parish, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.United States Department of Interior; Elderwood Properties, Defendants–Appellants,v.Le Chevalier, Incorporated, formerly known as, La Nuit, Inc.; William D. Arnoudville; Carla Baudin Arnouville; Clay Emil Roblin; Cynthia Gauthier Roblin; David John Guillot; Angela Wynn Guillot, Defendants–Appellees.School Board of Avoyelles Parish, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.United States Department of Interior, Defendant–Appellant,v.Le Chevalier, Inc., formerly known as La Nuit Inc.; William D. Arnoudville; Carla Baudin Arnouville; Clay Emil Roblin; Cynthia Gauthier Roblin; David John Guillot; Angela Wynn Guillot, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

647 F.3d 570

270 Ed. Law Rep. 434

SCHOOL BOARD OF AVOYELLES PARISH, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, Defendant–Appellant.School Board of Avoyelles Parish, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.United States Department of Interior; Elderwood Properties, Defendants–Appellants,

v.Le Chevalier, Incorporated, formerly known as, La Nuit, Inc.; William D. Arnoudville; Carla Baudin Arnouville; Clay Emil Roblin; Cynthia Gauthier Roblin; David John Guillot; Angela Wynn Guillot, Defendants–Appellees.School Board of Avoyelles Parish, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.United States Department of Interior, Defendant–Appellant,

v.Le Chevalier, Inc., formerly known as La Nuit Inc.; William D. Arnoudville; Carla Baudin Arnouville; Clay Emil Roblin; Cynthia Gauthier Roblin; David John Guillot; Angela Wynn Guillot, Defendants–Appellees.

Nos. 09–30660

09–30897 and 09–31102.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 22, 2011.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREWest CodenotesPreemptedLSA–C.C. art. 689 James Thompson Lee (argued), Charles Addison Riddle, III, Cory P. Roy, Marksville, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.Elizabeth Ann Peterson (argued), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Div., Washington, DC, Jennifer Bailey Frederick, Asst. U.S. Atty., Lafayette, LA, for Defendant–Appellant.Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.Before GARZA, STEWART and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

These three closely related appeals arise out of two district court cases: Avoyelles Parish School Board v. United States, No. 08–1364 (W.D.La.) (“ Avoyelles I”), and Avoyelles Parish School Board v. United States, No. 08–1374 (W.D.La.) (“ Avoyelles II”). Each case involves a different tract of land (respectively, the “ Avoyelles I tract” & “ Avoyelles II tract”) owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (“School Board”). Neither tract is accessible by public road, and both share borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (“Refuge”). The Refuge is owned by the United States and operated by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), an agency within the United States Department of Interior (“Department”). The School Board filed these suits in state court against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The Department removed the cases to federal court, and the School Board amended its complaints to state causes of action against the Department pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (“QTA”). In both cases, the district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands. The court further concluded that, pursuant to the rights of passage, the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. The Department appeals that holding. The right of passage in Avoyelles II also burdened the land of Elder Properties (“Elder”). Elder appeals the court's choice of route. The three appeals were consolidated. For the following reasons, we REVERSE both judgments in full and remand for further proceedings.

I

Both parcels of School Board lands at issue are so-called “Section 16” lands. Prior to Louisiana's admission to the Union, the sixteenth section of each township was set aside by the federal government “for the support of schools within” the township. Act of April 21, 1806, ch. 39, § 11, 2 Stat. 391, 394. After Louisiana's admission to the Union, the title of Section 16 lands was found to lie with the State. State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 195 La. 457, 197 So. 140, 143 (1940); see also Louisiana v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 458 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir.2006) (“[T]he State is the fee title owner of the Section 16 lands involved in this law suit....”). Louisiana treats Section 16 lands as effectively in trust to the State for purposes of education. Ebey v. Avoyelles Parish Sch. Bd., 861 So.2d 910, 914 (La.Ct.App.2003), cert. denied, 871 So.2d 349 (La.2004). “The management of these trust lands is vested by the State in the local school boards.” Id. Section 16 lands themselves are used for various purposes, such as hunting, fishing, timber, and minerals, with the ultimate benefit of the use going to education. See, e.g., id. at 911.

These two particular parcels of Section 16 lands are enclosed estates—estates not accessible directly by public road. The enclosed parcel at issue in Avoyelles I is bounded for approximately one-half mile on the east by the Refuge, and otherwise adjoins private lands and bayous. The enclosed parcel at issue in Avoyelles II is bounded for approximately 0.1 mile on the east by the Refuge and otherwise is bounded by private lands. Historically, access to both parcels included passage through the Refuge to Lac Long Road, an improved public road. After some distance on Lac Long Road, the historical paths to the parcels diverge. To reach the Avoyelles I parcel, one continues through the Refuge along private roads until one reaches the border of the School Board's land. To reach the Avoyelles II parcel, one follows a different private road, Buck Road, that eventually leads through Elder's lands before reaching the School Board's.¹

After some time, Elder began obstructing passage along the Buck Road route with a locked gate, forcing the School Board to rely on all-terrain vehicles (“ATVs”) to reach its lands via the Refuge. The FWS, however, eventually soured on both the ATV use and, more generally, the unrestricted passage through Refuge lands. It accordingly announced new permit conditions for the School Board and its invitees. In particular, the FWS sought to restrict the hours of passage, prohibit overnight parking of cars, and limit the use of some types of vehicles. The School Board signed an FWS permit regarding access to the Avoyelles I parcel that contained those restrictions. It did not seek judicial review of the permit.

The School Board did, however, file two state court suits—one for each parcel—against the respective adjoining landowners seeking to enforce its rights of passage under state law. Specifically, in Avoyelles I, the School Board sued (1) the Department; (2) White Oak Farms, Inc.; (3) Bunkie Elevator and Gin Co.; and (4) Laborde Paradise, LLC (“Laborde”). In Avoyelles II, the School Board sued (1) the Department; (2) Bayou Lafourche, Inc.; (3) Elder Properties; (4) Le Chevalier, Inc.; (5) William and Carla Arnouville; (6) Clay and Cynthia Roblin; and (7) David and Angela Guillot. The Department removed both cases to federal court, and in both cases the School Board amended its complaint to add a claim under the QTA.

In Avoyelles I, the Department did not dispute the School Board's entitlement to a right of way through the Refuge or the route thereof. Rather, the Department sought to assert FWS's authority to impose conditions on the use of the School Board's right of way pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (“Refuge Act”). The district court concluded on summary judgment that the Department could not impose all of its desired restrictions, in particular the restrictions on hours of use and vehicle types. The Department appeals.

Various landowner-defendants involved in Avoyelles II disputed the appropriate route for the School Board's right of passage. The district court trifurcated its proceedings to decide first, which nearby roads were public; second, what route the right of way would take; and third, the School Board's indemnification obligation. The first stage was resolved after a trial and was not appealed. In the second stage, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of a route, based on the historical route of access, through the property of both the Department and Elder. As in Avoyelles I, the district court held that the FWS could not impose some of its restrictions on hours and vehicle types. The Department and Elder appeal.

II

A

It is well-settled that we have a duty, if necessary, to examine the basis of our jurisdiction sua sponte. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir.1987). We requested supplemental briefing on two matters that raised potential jurisdictional hurdles that would foreclose consideration on the merits. We first asked whether the district court rendered a final appealable judgment in Avoyelles I. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (granting jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”). The district court issued a “Memorandum and Judgment” that appears to have resolved the key issues between the parties, but that neglects to mention the School Board's claim against one landowner—Laborde. Where a district court's order “disposes of one or more but fewer than all of the claims for relief asserted, or completely determines the rights and liabilities of one or more but fewer than all of the parties,” we will ordinarily not treat the order as final and appealable. Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.1980). The Department argues that the district court's judgment is nevertheless final and appealable because it plainly resolves all claims, despite inadvertently failing to list every party specifically. Upon close review, we agree.

We have routinely recognized a court's authority to rule implicitly on matters, including dismissal of claims. See, e.g., Wilson v. Boise, No. 00–30803, 252 F.3d 1356, 2001 WL 422621, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar.30, 2001) (“By failing to address Wilson's claim, the magistrate judge implicitly dismissed it.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 961, 122 S.Ct. 369, 151 L.Ed.2d 280 (2001); Lott v. City of Lubbock, TX, No. 98–10447, 184 F.3d 819, 1999 WL 500689, at *1 (5th Cir. June 18, 1999) (“Lott's state law claims were implicitly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”). The School Board sought just one servitude in Avoyelles I, which it received. The district court's grant of a servitude resolved all claims,...