State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duckworth, 09–15690.

Citation648 F.3d 1216,23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 263
Decision Date11 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–15690.,09–15690.
PartiesSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff–Counter–Defendant–Appellee,v.Anna N. DUCKWORTH, Personal Representative of the Estate of Aquila E. Duckworth, Defendant–Counter–Claimant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Annabel Castle Majewski, Roy D. Wasson, Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, FL, for Appellant.Reed W. Grimm, Rhonda Burns Boggess, Taylor, Day, Currie & Burnett, Jacksonville, FL, for Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and HILL, Circuit Judges.TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

This appeal sits at the intersection of our summary judgment jurisprudence and Florida's choice of law rules. The defendant, Anna N. Duckworth (Anna) and her husband, Aquila E. Duckworth (Aquila), purchased two automobile insurance policies and one motorcycle insurance policy from the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), while they were Maryland residents. All three insurance contracts contained “anti-stacking” provisions that precluded the Duckworths from recovering uninsured motorist benefits under any policy other than that covering the damaged vehicle. Maryland law explicitly permits the use of such anti-stacking provisions in insurance policies without the informed consent of an insured.

The Duckworths subsequently moved to Florida, where Aquila was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist while driving the motorcycle covered under the Maryland policy. State Farm immediately paid Anna, as representative of Aquila's estate, the uninsured motorist benefits called for by that policy, $100,000, but, citing the anti-stacking provisions, later denied Anna's claim for benefits under the two automobile policies. State Farm then brought this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had satisfied its contractual obligations to Aquila's estate.1 Anna answered State Farm's complaint, asserted affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed for breach of contract.2 She alleged that the policies should be construed under Florida, and not Maryland, law. Because Florida law prohibits the use of anti-stacking provisions absent the insured's informed consent, and because neither Anna nor Aquila had given their informed consent, Anna argued that Aquila's estate should be entitled to recover uninsured motorist damages on all three policies.

At issue before the district court was the applicability of the public policy exception to Florida's choice of law rule in disputes over contract terms. Since Florida follows the rule of lex loci contractus—that is, Florida courts apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract was entered into—the parties conceded that, absent the exception, Maryland law would control and State Farm would be entitled to declaratory relief. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So.2d 1160, 1163 (Fla.2006) (explaining that an insurance contract is entered into in the state in which the contract was issued and delivered).

The public policy exception demands that Florida law control whenever the State has (1) a paramount public policy interest in the application of its own law and (2) a citizen in need of protection.3Id. at 1164–65. Whenever an insurance contract is at issue, it is also necessary that the insured party seeking to benefit from the exception satisfy a third prong: the insured must provide the insurer with reasonable notice “of a permanent change of residence,” id., such that the insurance risk would thereafter be “centered in Florida,” Gillen v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 300 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1974). The third prong's reasonable notice requirement is meant to “inform[ ] the insurer of which state's law will govern the policy” and turns on the clarity with which an insured expressed his intent to make Florida his permanent home. Roach, 945 So.2d at 1165. Because “the public policy exception is intended to be narrow,” it displaces Florida's lex loci rule only when all three prongs of the exception, including the reasonable notice requirement, have been satisfied. Id. at 1167.

Following discovery, State Farm and Anna filed cross-motions for summary judgment on State Farm's request for declaratory relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and State Farm sought summary judgment on Anna's counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm on all claims. In addressing State Farm's motion for declaratory relief, the court found for State Farm on each of the three prongs of the public policy exception, holding that (1) no paramount public policy required the application of Florida law, (2) the Duckworths had yet to establish themselves as Florida citizens, and (3) State Farm was not given reasonable notice that Florida law would govern the Duckworths' policies. The court then declared that State Farm had satisfied its contractual obligations to Aquila's estate and dismissed Anna's counterclaims.

Anna now appeals.4 She claims that issues of material fact remain that preclude summary judgment on each of the exception's three prongs. Of particular importance to this appeal, Anna argues that it is disputed whether she informed a State Farm representative that her and Aquila's move to Florida was “permanent.” She suggests this is a material question of fact that must be resolved before any judgment may issue.

We disagree and affirm. Taking into account all of the undisputed facts, and assuming that Anna informed a State Farm representative that the Duckworths' move would be “permanent,” State Farm still did not receive reasonable notice sufficient to trigger the public policy exception. In fine, even if Anna informed the representative as alleged, her later actions overwhelmingly indicated to State Farm that the Duckworths' move to Florida was not necessarily permanent and that, consequently, Maryland law would continue to govern the Duckworths' policies. The issue of fact upon which her appeal rests is therefore immaterial and, as State Farm was deprived of reasonable notice, judgment as a matter of law was proper.

I.

The undisputed record evidence establishes the following facts. 5 In 1989, Anna moved to Edgewater, Florida, with her mother, her two daughters, Nikki and Falon, and her youngest sister. There, in 1996, Anna met Aquila. They married in October 1998, while Aquila was in Navy training in Illinois. At that time, they both had Florida drivers' licenses and were registered to vote in Florida.

In December 1998, the Duckworths left Edgewater for San Diego, California, where Aquila was to be stationed. At that time, they owned one vehicle, Aquila's 1971 Cadillac Deville. Anna rented a San Diego apartment for her, Aquila, and her two daughters beginning in January 1999. By July of that year, they had insured the Cadillac with a local State Farm agent, Jack Dale, and added a second automobile policy for a newly-purchased Ford Probe. As Anna understood them, these “full coverage” policies were consistent with the California insurance “requirements” Dale described to her. In 2001, after purchasing a Yamaha V–Star Classic motorcycle, the Duckworths purchased a third (motorcycle) policy as well as a renters' insurance policy from Dale's State Farm agency. All of the Duckworths' policies were paid by automatic draft from their joint checking account at the North Island Federal Credit Union in San Diego.

While in San Diego, Anna and Aquila received mail from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles notifying them that they needed to renew their Florida drivers' licenses. Anna completed the required forms over the Internet, and she and Aquila received their renewed licenses shortly thereafter. Though issued by the Florida agency, the renewed licenses listed the Duckworths' San Diego address as their place of residence. All three vehicles—the Cadillac, the Ford, and the Yamaha motorcycle—were registered in California and had California tags.

In 2003, Aquila requested a transfer from his post in California. He was thereafter assigned to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, as a military police officer. Before the Duckworths left for Maryland, Anna notified Dale of their impending move and cancelled their renters' insurance policy. At that time, Dale informed Anna that, once settled, she should get in touch with a State Farm agent in Maryland, and he offered to find an agent for her if she needed one.

The Duckworths left San Diego in March 2003. They took with them the Probe and the motorcycle; the Cadillac was left behind and presumably sold. In April, Anna and Aquila moved into a Germantown, Maryland, apartment with Falon; Nikki, had moved from California to Florida. Anna got herself, Aquila, and Falon settled, but never asked Dale to find her a Maryland State Farm agent. Instead, within “a month or two,” Anna found the phone number for the Connie Davis State Farm agency in a phone book advertisement and called to request a renters' insurance quote. While on the phone with a Davis agency representative, Anna also obtained an automobile and motorcycle insurance quote. She then went to the agency's office and applied for insurance on the Probe and the motorcycle. She did not purchase renters' insurance at that time. While at the agency office, Anna submitted her and Aquila's (Florida) drivers' licenses to be copied and also provided the agency representative with VINs for the Probe and the motorcycle. The Connie Davis agency issued policies for both vehicles that fully complied with Maryland insurance requirements.

The Duckworths paid the same amount for their Maryland policies as they had for their California policies, and they received approximately the same “full coverage” as in California. State Farm billed the Duckworths for their Maryland policies on the 15th of...

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